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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, the Department of Public Safety in Kalamazoo,
Michigan (KDPS), has been involved in automation efforts to support its officers’
activities, in response to the insistence of the public and the demands of other
governmental agencies. Between 1989 and 2006, the department has purchased,
implemented, and attempted to maintain three separate computer systems. These
systems were purchased to provide computer-aided dispatching (CAD), records
management systems (RMS), and mobile personal computing (MPC). The cost to the
taxpayers has been well over $4 million in purchases alone. This figure does not
include the untold hundreds of thousands spent on maintenance and upkeep
expenses. At the time o f this study, KDPS was paying $118,000 annually in
maintenance costs to Intergraph Public Safety. In each instance, the systems never
performed as vendors had claimed at the time of purchase. Not only have these
systems squandered taxpayer dollars, but they also have caused near catastrophic
disasters because o f their inability to perform at an appropriate level. In essence, on
numerous occasions, or at inopportune times, these systems failed to work. The
backlash to this activity has been the constant search to find a better system or pour
more money into a system that will never reach the functionality promised.
In the fall of 2001,1 took over as the supervisor of the dispatch center for
KDPS. While working late, a dispatcher received a call of a warehouse fire. The
1
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procedure would be to rely on the CAD system to recommend what fire apparatus
responds and send those fire fighting rigs and other fire fighters. In the midst o f
dispatching the fire apparatus to this dangerous fire, the dispatcher’s computer
crashed, locked up, and ceased to function. She yelled out to other dispatchers what
happened to her computer and they were able to recover and dispatch the fire rigs. A
dangerous situation was avoided, but critical information was lost on that dispatch—
information such as when the call came in, how long it took us to send fire-fighting
resources, and who were the first units sent.
As the use of computers through the 1980s to 1990s increased, so did the
dispatchers’ reliance on the computer to assist them. Dispatchers rely on the
computers for key portions of their job, and failure on the part of the computers puts
society in harm’s way. The inability o f the dispatchers to properly dispatch a fire is a
terrible predicament, as would be the dispatcher losing an officer on a foot pursuit or
high-speed vehicle pursuit, or even a high-risk traffic stop. Dispatchers use the
computers to track officers on the streets. Their inability to properly track an officer
in a high-risk situation can be dangerous. Officers can get hurt, or even worse, be
shot or have to handle a dangerous situation by themselves, and the dispatcher would
not be able to send help because they would not know where they were.
Examples of the potential dangers posed by computer systems failures in
dispatch situations occurred in KDPS and in Grand Rapids, Michigan, a large city
just to the north of Kalamazoo, Michigan. In the spring of 2000, a KDPS dispatch
received a call on a 911 telephone line. The caller indicated her husband was having
a heart attack. She was calling from within the City of Kalamazoo; therefore, the 911
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call was directed to KDPS. Her husband was at an address in the Township of
Kalamazoo, which meant the call should have been forwarded to emergency services
in the Township, a separate jurisdiction from KDPS, who supply their own
emergency response services. The dispatcher typed in the address where the caller
said her husband was, but the new CAD system “defaulted” to an address in the City,
indicating it should be KDPS’s call. What occurred was the dispatcher typed the
street “Dwillard” into CAD, but since it was not a street in the City, it defaulted to
“Dwight” and accepted the dispatch as a medical emergency. The dispatcher
dispatched the call, not realizing it should have been transferred to the Township and
also used the “Dwight” street address to send emergency help. KDPS units arrived
on “Dwight” street and realized there was no emergency at that address. Other
dispatchers and the dispatcher who took the call realized the mistake and turned it
over to Township emergency response units to handle the rescue. The husband died
as a result of the heart attack, and the caller sued the City and CAD vendor, DM Data
Inc., stating the delay caused by the dispatcher and computer led to a delay in
emergency medical response, which led to the death of her husband. The CAD
system was fixed to avoid any default to an address because of this incident. The
lawsuit was later settled. The settlement agreement was undisclosed by all parties.
In the fall of 2001, the Grand Rapids Police Department blamed the death of
a two-month-old on a failure of their new CAD system. The dispatcher took the call
and passed it on for dispatching by another dispatcher while that dispatcher answered
another call. Because of their high call volume, they had dispatchers taking
telephone calls while others dispatched the proper emergency response units to the
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call. In this case, the call was lost and emergency medical responders were delayed,
leading to the death of the infant. Failure of the new system purchased by the
department was to blame (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/grpress/access/
94622456.html). Another incident in Grand Rapids involved the wrong fire
apparatus being dispatched to an accident on a busy interstate. Both incidents were
blamed on the failure of their new CAD system (http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/
grpress/access/94622456.html).
Not only has the public been placed in a precarious situation, unknown to
them, but they have been bilked out of hundreds of thousands if not millions of
dollars just as at KDPS. Failure of the computer to function properly or partial
malfunctions have cost the taxpayers an exorbitant amount of money. The purchase
price of a system bought in 1989 from Command Data, Inc., Boulder CO, was
slightly over $800,000, a system purchased in 1997 from DM Data, Inc., NJ, cost
$1.3 million and the purchase price of a system bought in the fall of 2002 from
Intergraph Public Safety, a subsidiary of Intergraph, Inc., Huntsville, AL, was $1.7
million. Annual maintenance costs for the systems through the 1990s ranged from
$30,000 in 1990 to almost 67,000 in 1999. The last system is costing over $100,000
in annual maintenance costs. In the system purchased in 1989, company promises
made it appear the department had purchased enough hardware for future
requirements on storing data. It was quickly discovered that was not the case and
additional money was spent to bring more hardware on line. The promise to allow
for a “paperless” department, in essence allowing all reports to be done on computers
instead of being handwritten, was not attainable because of the lack of memory space
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on the purchased computers, which became a point o f contention because the
argument to go “paperless” was used to convince the City Commission to spend the
money on the project. This expectation or goal was never achieved on that system.
In 1997, KDPS began looking for a new system to replace the 1989 system.
Rising maintenance costs and the belief that better systems existed prompted the new
project. The contract was awarded to DM Data, but that system was two years in
production; the first attempt at bringing CAD live was a dismal failure and was
turned off before the end o f an eight-hour shift. Six months later, in October 1999,
under the looming threat o f “Year 2000” fears, the system purchased from DM Data
was brought back up. This time the department stayed with it, but the DM Data
system was prone to crashing and locking and was operationally difficult to use. The
RMS system went live in April of 2000, followed by attempts to bring newly
purchased— through federal Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) grant—
mobile personal computers on line in the summer of 2000. The MPCs, purchased
through DM Data for $900,000, were Xplore brand tablets. They never worked
reliably enough to depend on them and were prone to crashes and other connection
failures. It was discovered later that the Xplore brand tablets were not the problem.
The tablets were actually reliable, but the DM Data software caused the problems
and lack of reliability. The DM Data CAD system was prone to crashes like those
illustrated above, and the RMS was a continual battle to maintain by an inadequate
staff.
As KDPS struggled with DM Data to fix their product and make it work as it
was advertised, in the fall o f 2001, KDPS again started looking for a new system. In
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2002, a $1.5 million contract was awarded from the City of Kalamazoo to Intergraph
Public Safety to provide KDPS a completely new computer system. Believing the
shortcomings o f previous systems would be rectified by this purchase, KDPS went
with an expensive product to ensure they were purchasing a system that would
function properly and provide reliable service for dispatching, RMS, and MPC
usage. Despite the department’s best efforts, problems were encountered with this
system as well. The CAD system immediately had a “bug” in the software that failed
to keep the correct time on the PCs. The PCs would get out of synchronization,
causing errors to appear on their computer screens. In short, because the times were
different on different PC’s, one dispatcher would dispatch a unit stamping it with a
time that did not exist on another PC. The company later admitted they knew about it
but could not fix it before the product was shipped to KDPS.
The last system was also purchased because Intergraph ensured KDPS, and
checking with other agencies it appeared to be so, that the CAD system would never
crash. This was an attempt to avoid situations encountered with the DM Data system
(warehouse fire). It reportedly would never have a system-wide failure causing the
dispatchers to not be able to use the system. Based on client-server architecture, a
multiple loop was established between the PCs and server. If one link went down,
the other would remain functional. This was put to the test in April of 2005, when
the entire CAD system “hung.” For four hours the dispatchers were faced with
something Intergraph told KDPS would not happen; they worked without CAD.
The list o f problems goes on. Part of the RMS purchased in the Intergraph
system was bought to provide Michigan Crime Information Reporting System
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(MCIRS) information to the State of Michigan. This is an automated process that
captures crime information and tallies a report and sends it to the state. This is a
mandated monthly occurrence required by the State of Michigan. It took over two
years for the Intergraph system to be able to provide that report. The system was
purchased based on a contractual agreement that Intergraph could provide that report
in their current software, but that was not the case. It took two years o f work to
complete the software changes. KDPS’s estimated staff costs alone were enormous.
For the past four years I have been employed as the project manager at KDPS
as their Information Technologies (IT) manager. For a short period I was actually the
City o f Kalamazoo’s IT manger as they transitioned between directors. I held that
position from October 2002 to April 2003. In the course of those years, the
department moved to a newly renovated building requiring wiring, design, and
implementation of needed technologies for a new building. A computerized 911
answering system was designed and implemented, a consolidated dispatch center
was initiated, and the department replaced their computer system, encompassing
computer-aided dispatching, records management, and mobile computers in the
police cruisers. Additionally, the department’s radio communications system was
replaced and a new radio tower constructed. Under my guidance the department
spent over $8 million in renovations, new equipment, and new systems. I was also
involved in the purchase o f the Command Data system in 1989 and, to a lesser
extent, the DM Data system in 1997.1 became fully involved and responsible for the
DM Data system in the fall o f 2001. Because of this involvement, I am keenly aware
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of the tragedies and failures at each turn in KDPS’s efforts to automate their
department.
A Case of State-Corporate Crime
What occurred to KDPS, and to other local law enforcement agencies as they
purchased and implemented integrated computer systems, is an example of statecorporate crime. In the criminological literature, state-corporate crime is defined as
illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing
interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one
or more institutions of political governments and (2) policies and/or practices
in pursuit o f the goals of one or more institutions of economic production and
distribution. (Michalowski and Kramer 2006:34)
In the case of the KDPS purchases and implementation of integrated computer
systems during the 1989-2004 period, socially injurious actions and negligence on
the part of corporate vendors, the federal government, Michigan state government,
and KDPS itself produced three specific social harms.1
First is the loss, misuse, misdirection, or squandering of money that was used
to purchase or sustain these computer systems. More directly, the department
purchased systems that did not work and never produced the end product promised,
and more money had to be spent to correct the perceived problems, resulting in
taxpayers’ money being wasted, squandered, or bilked from KDPS. Whether
calculated in its entirety, or calculated by each segment of the project, the department

1 Throughout this dissertation the term computer system refers to an integrated
system that combines the use of computer-aided dispatching (CAD), records
management system (RMS), and mobile computing in the police cruisers.
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experienced a loss at the hands of the vendors, was duped into thinking the systems
were appropriate to purchase by the federal government, and was encouraged as well
as coerced into purchasing these systems by the state and federal governments.
While the loss may not be in the tens of millions of dollars, it nonetheless had
dramatic effects on a department facing shrinking budgets. At the local government
level, a million dollar project can be devastating to a department or the tax base if
squandered or lost. At a time when the average cost of a public safety officer is
calculated at $100,000 (salary plus benefits) and fuel costs for vehicles continues to
spiral out of control, the loss of even 1% of the $28-30 million dollar budget is
devastating.2 While the budget continues to shrink for KDPS, the costs of
computerization continue to rise.
A second harm that occurred to KDPS as it struggled with the
implementation of computer systems that either failed or did not deliver what the
vendors promised was a lack of productivity and the development of a culture of
secrecy. Organizations can suffer the loss of productivity as employees struggle to
make the system a success. A culture of secrecy can develop (Vaughan 1996) as
employees struggle to make the system work, meanwhile disguising or making
excuses for why the system is failing or not delivering. Pressure from administrators
and questions from City administration, outsiders, and elected officials prompt a

2 Over the last several years, the annual budget for KDPS has decreased from a high
o f $31 million in 1999 to 2006’s $27 million. This represents over half of the city’s
annual budget. KDPS consumes on average 52-54% of the city’s annual budget (city
annual reports).
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regrouping and cover story to explain the shortcomings of the system. Technical
explanations are given to laypeople as a means of covering up why things are not
working as promised. Leadership can suffer, while top mangers make decisions in
hopes o f resurrecting dying projects. All of these situations occurred at KDPS.
A third social harm exists when a system interferes, inhibits, or distracts
employees from providing their life-saving services. KDPS, and police in general,
provide life-saving services to their communities. As previous examples have
illustrated, part o f that service is the answering of emergency telephone calls and
sending emergency responders to the scene. Presently, this function is assisted by the
use of computers, specifically CAD systems. Information is tracked via computer as
to when a call was taken, what crime or emergency event is occurring, and the
address and reportee information. This information is then used to track the officers’
progression (arrival, time at the scene, when they left, and how long to write the
report) through the call. Included in the Intergraph system was mapping and an
Automatic Vehicle Locator (AVL) system which utilizes a satellite Global
Positioning System (GPS), which the dispatchers rely on to determine where the
officers are so that they can then dispatch the closest available emergency vehicle.
This system is also used to dispatch fire calls and emergency medical events. This
information is o f vital importance. A failure in any part of the CAD system can mean
a delay in response, no response, or the wrong units being sent to the call. Incorrect
information, wrong assignment of officers, or misdirection or even loss of
information can be catastrophic, resulting in life-threatening situations, or even
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death, for officers and/or the citizens they serve. In these times, officers simply must
be able to rely on their equipment to ensure public safety.
The Present Study
In the present study, I will develop an explanation of the case of statecorporate crime that resulted in the social harms that occurred at the KDPS in its
purchase and implementation of integrated computer systems during the 1989-2004
period. Specifically, I will show that the facilitation of the federal government, the
mandates o f the state of Michigan, and the complicity of computer vendors, whether
with knowledge or not, produced social harm to public safety officers and to the
public in general, through the loss of tax dollars and the potential danger the public
and officers were exposed to by these computer systems not functioning properly.
To develop the explanation for the state-corporate crime that occurred at
KDPS, I will use the integrated theory of state-corporate crime initially developed by
Kramer and Michalowski (1990) and later elaborated by Kauzlarich and Kramer
(1998) as shown in Table 1 (also see Michalowski and Kramer 2006). The integrated
theory focuses the attention o f the analyst at three levels—the institutional
environment, the organization, and interpersonal interaction.
Analysis at the institutional environment level involves identifying the formal
relationships between corporate and governmental organizations as specified by law
and regulations, as well as history and culture. In addition, it entails examining
“catalysts for action” (or inaction), the existence or absence of motivations (e.g.,
culture of opportunity, economic pressure), opportunity structure (e.g., availability of
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legal means, blocked goals/strain, access to resources), and operationality of control
(e.g., political pressure, public opinion) in the broader political economy and culture
that together make specific actions or negligence more or less likely.
At the organizational level o f analysis, the researcher examines factors within
each of the culpable governmental and corporate organizations that can account for
the state-corporate crime. As in the institutional level of analysis, motivations (e.g.,
corporate/organizational culture, corporate/organizational goals, managerial
pressures), opportunity structures (e.g., instrumental mentality, creation of
illegal/harmful means, role specialization), and operationality o f control (e.g., culture
o f compliance, subcultures of resistance, safety and quality control procedures) are
examined within the responsible corporate and governmental organizations.
Finally, at the personal interaction level, interpersonal dynamics are
identified. Specifically, motivations (e.g., socialization, social meanings, individual
goals), opportunity structure (e.g., definitions of the situation, perceptions of
attractiveness and availability of illegal/harmful means), and operationality of
control (e.g., personal morality, obedience to authority, groupthink, diffusion of
responsibility) are analyzed.
Michalowski and Kramer (2006:35) see three advantages to using this multi
level integrated theoretical approach to studying cases of state-corporate crime like
that which occurred at KDPS. First, state-corporate criminal behavior may be a
product of the relationships between social institutions, not some hidden agreement
or covert act on the part of the offenders. Second, focusing on relationships between
corporate and governmental actors at various levels provides a more complete
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understanding of deviant organizational outcomes, such as the social harms that
resulted from the process o f computer system purchase and implementation at
KDPS, than would viewing corporations and/or governments as closed systems.
Lastly, the integrated theory of state-corporate crime provides for a vertical look at
the intersection of deviance by the individual, organizational, and institutional
political/economic entities. The belief here is that such an approach helps address
issues o f subject/object relations seen in some of the crime research literature.
Overview of Study
Using the integrated theory of state-corporate crime, I intend to explain what
happened to cause the social harms that accompanied the purchase and
implementation of computer systems at KDPS during the 1989-2004 period. The
study will make a contribution to the state-corporate crime literature by
demonstrating the utility o f the integrated theory in explaining state-corporate crime
that occurred within and to a local government agency. As will be shown in the next
chapter, most case studies of state-corporate crime focus on catastrophic events that
grab national headlines. Here the focus is on a case that produced (and continues to
produce) real, but more subtle, social harms that affect a local government agency
and the ordinary citizens it serves. These social harms matter, and explaining how
and why they occurred potentially can help prevent such harm from happening in the
future.
My study begins in the next chapter with a review of the state-corporate
crime literature. This review includes a discussion of the development of the concept
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14
of state-corporate crime, a more in-depth explication of the development of the
integrated theory o f state-corporate crime, and a critical analysis o f published case
studies of state-corporate crime. Chapter HI lays out the methods used in the present
study, including a description o f the research setting, data collection, analysis
strategy, and limitations of the study. Chapters IV through VI include my analyses of
the institutional, organizational, and personal interactional levels involved in this
case o f state corporate crime, respectively. The final chapter discusses my
conclusions based on the research findings and provides policy recommendations at
the institutional, organizational, and personal interactional levels designed to prevent
state-corporate crime of the type that occurred at KDPS from happening in the
future, both in Kalamazoo and in other local law enforcement agencies around the
nation.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The purpose of this chapter is to review the theoretical and empirical
literature on state-corporate crime. First, I will trace the development of the concept
o f state-corporate crime. Then I will present the integrated theoretical model o f statecorporate crime (Kramer and Michalowski 1990; Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998;
Michalowski and Kramer 2006). Next, I will review existing case studies of statecorporate crime. Finally, I will explain why these studies have been important and
how they relate to this dissertation.
The Concept of State-Corporate Crime
The shaping of a concept and its precepts and notions is an evolutionary
event. So it was with the origins of the concept of state-corporate crime. With its
beginnings planted squarely in Sutherland’s (1934) development o f the concept of
white-collar crime, it too has taken time to develop and evolve. Kramer,
Michalowski, and Kauzlarich’s (2002) article, “The Origins and Development of the
Concept and Theory of State-Corporate Crime,” provides an in-depth overview of
the historical development of the concept. Beginning with a seminal speech by
Chambliss (1989), the concept grew from the belief that, not only was there state
crime that was causing social harm, but there was also an intersection of deviance, a
combination o f state crime, individual, and organizational acts. The combination of
15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

all these forces working congruently and at multiple levels provides for a theoretical
explanation o f state-corporate crime.
In 1990, Ronald Kramer started using the concept of state-corporate crime.
His argument was that considerable work had been done on corporate crime and state
crime as separate but distinct activities, but little work had been done on the
intersection o f both types of crime. In other words, Kramer believed that social harm
was occurring when there was collusion or interaction between a private enterprise
and governmental institutions. When both act together, serious criminality exists
producing serious social harm. At that point, Kramer (1990) defined state-corporate
crime as:
State-corporate crime is defined as an illegal or socially injurious social
action that is the collective product of the interaction between a business
corporation and a state agency engaged in a joint endeavor. These crimes
involve the active participation of two or more organizations, at least one of
which is private and one of which is public. They are the harmful result of an
interorganizational relationship between business and government. (P. 1)
Working with Ray Michalowski, Kramer started working on refining and
developing the concept of state-corporate crime. In 1990, they presented a paper
(Kramer and Michalowski 1990) refining the definition of state-corporate crime and
calling for an integrated theoretical model for analysis of state-corporate crime. They
noted that the private production and manufacturing in the United States could not
have developed or functioned without the support of the government. This support
comes in the form o f economic, political, and legal protections and controls. There
had also been two separate but parallel tracks in criminological work dealing with
corporate and state deviance. One focused on organizational deviance in private
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corporations or businesses, while the other focused on state crime or state-organized
criminality. Kramer and Michalowski suggested that there was an intersection of
both. The intersection involves the complicity of both the state and private business.
Deviance could be explained by looking at both simultaneously, thus the term statecorporate crime could be used to denote both forms of deviance. They refined the
definition originally given by Kramer to:
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that occur
when one or more institutions of political governance pursue a goal in direct
cooperation with one or more institutions of economic production and
distribution. (Kramer and Michalowski 1990:4)
This definition provided for a broader scope and approach to the study of
state-corporate crime, but provided for “direct” cooperation and the pursuit of a goal.
Aulette and Michalowski (1993) worked further to refine the concept o f statecorporate crime. Using a case study approach to examine a fatal fire at the Imperial
Food Products chicken processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina, they suggested
that, rather than specific goals or the attainment of goals, acts of omission should be
examined. Essentially, acts of omission/negligence on the part of the government
allow for private businesses to act in an illegal manner in pursuit of corporate goals.
They found that the failure to follow regulations, which hindered private production,
allowed for the fulfillment of other goals and objectives. In essence, the government
allowed the private corporation to ignore mandated safety regulations in pursuit of
higher profits. This was in support of North Carolina’s goal to be business-oriented
and support corporate interests rather than support workplace safety.
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Aulette and Michalowski (1993) further refined the definition of statecorporate crime to include:
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that result from
a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in
pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2)
policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of
economic production and distribution. (P. 175)
More importantly, both Aulette and Michalowski, and further work by Kramer and
Michalowski (1993), delineated two forms o f state-corporate crime.
State-initiated corporate crime (such as the Challenger explosion) occurs
when corporations, employed by the government, engage in organizational
deviance at the direction of, or with tacit approval of, the government. Statefacilitated corporate crime (such as the Imperial Food Products fire in
Hamlet) occurs when government regulatory institutions fail to restrain,
deviant business activities, either because of direct collusion between
businesses and government or because they adhere to shared goals whose
attainment would be hampered by aggressive regulation. (Pp. 271-72)
In 1998, Kauzlarich and Kramer in their book, Crimes o f the American
Nuclear State, A t Home and Abroad, examined the intersection of deviance between
nuclear weapons manufacturers and the proliferation of nuclear weapons by the
United States (see further below). In that book they defined state-corporate crime as
“criminal acts that occur when one or more institutions of political governance
pursue a goal in direct cooperation with one or more institutions of economic
production and distribution” (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998:10).
Later, Michalowski and Kramer (2006) refined and added to their previous
definitions of state-corporate crime. While the definition of state-corporate crime
used by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) seemed adequate for examining the case of
nuclear proliferation, it lacked the nuances of earlier definitions. Absent were
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thoughts on social harm, criminal activity, and Michalowski and Aulette’s distinction
between state facilitation versus state initiation. Thus, Michalowski and Kramer
(2006) adopted the earlier definition proposed by Aulette and Michalowski (1993) as
the most recent and comprehensive definition of state-corporate crime
State-corporate crimes are illegal or socially injurious actions that result from
a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of
the goals o f one or more institutions of political governance, and (2) policies and/or
practices in pursuit o f the goals of one or more institutions of economic production
and distribution (p. 34).
In their most recent work, State-Corporate Crime: Wrongdoing at the
Intersection o f Business and Government, Michalowski and Kramer (2006) provide a
set of case studies o f state-corporate crime, many of which use Kramer and
Kauzlarich’s (1998) revised integrated theory of state-corporate crime that I discuss
next. This discussion is followed by a review of several case studies of statecorporate crime, many of which appear in Michalowski and Kramer (2006).

Development of an Integrated Theory of State-Corporate Crime
While many mainstream and critically-oriented theories of crime have their
place in attempting to explain and prevent state-corporate crime, they fall short in
their ability to adequately explain offending at the state, corporate, or individual
levels. In order to explain the intersections of deviance at multiple levels, Kauzlarich
and Kramer (1998), building upon earlier work by Kramer and Michalowski (1990),
present an integrated model of state-corporate offending, briefly discussed in Chapter
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I (see Table 1 in Appendix B.), that explores motivation, opportunities, and controls
at three levels o f analysis: the interactional, organizational, and institutional/cultural
levels. This model integrates components of several criminological theories that fall
short by themselves in addressing the intersections of state-corporate crime. For
example, Kauzlarich and Kramer utilize anomie and strain, rational choice,
differential association, routine activities, political economy, and organization
models (Rothe and Mullins 2006; Rothe 2006).
At the socio-psychological level of analysis, Kauzlarich and Kramer
recognize the utility o f differential association in efforts to explain group dynamics.
At the individual level, a person may be prone to engage in a criminal act if the
weight of the favorable definition of an act exceeds the unfavorable definition. They
also incorporate sociological models of socialization. At the interactional level,
motivation may be affected by one’s socialization within an environment, the social
meaning given to their behavior, an individual’s goals and issues of personality, such
as amoral behavior, obedience to authority, and interactional behavior within a large
organizational context.
At the organizational level, Kauzlarich and Kramer draw heavily from
organizational theories that argue crime may be inherently built into the
organizational structure and behavior. Organizations are strongly goal-oriented and
prone to norms and standards that may induce or sustain criminal behavior in
furtherance of these goals. Emphasis is on performance, while governing norms of
the organization may be weak or absent (anomie). These goals or performance
standards may be blocked internally or externally causing strain (e.g., standard
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operating procedures, completion o f projects which equates to accounts receivable).
Kauzlarich and Kramer also argue that organizational crime may depend on two
other additional factors, availability o f illegal means and a social control
environment that can foster deviant organizational crime (p. 146). Organizational
opportunities may include instrumental rationality, role specialization, and task
segregation, while controls include a culture o f compliance, rewards structures,
safety and quality assurance controls and procedures, plus effective communications
processes or systems.
At the institutional/cultural level of analysis, the major interacting social
institutions and social structures are examined. In particular, the political and
economic institutions and their interrelationships are key indicators/explanatory
factors in state-corporate crimes. Kauzlarich and Kramer suggest the primary
assumption of that perspective is that the very structure of corporate capitalism
provides the impetus toward organizational crime (p. 146), and thus results in crimes
o f capital (Michalowski 1985). Furthermore the political economy perspectives
stress the shaping and/or constraining influences of the broader historical structure of
a society as a factor influencing organizational behavior. Analysis at this level
includes such factors as the culture of competition, economic pressure, and
performance emphasis under the catalyst of motivation. Also needed is the
availability o f legal and illegal means, blocked goals and access to resources that are
included under opportunities. Controls at the structural level are said to include
international reactions, political pressures, legal sanctions, and public opinion
(Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998; Rothe and Mullins 2006).
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Theoretical integration also includes utilizing different perspectives within
the overall framework o f interest. Not only do we recognize the three levels of
analysis (Table 1, Appendix B), each with specific catalysts such as motivation,
opportunity, and controls, we also recognize the theoretical history within the
integrated model. For example, Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) model utilizes
anomie, rational choice, differential association, routine activities, political economy,
and organizational models as a means of explaining the nuclear weapons
proliferation in the United States. Each theoretical approach was necessary to explain
what occurred within the specific historical context as the events unfolded. In other
words, the explanation required both an historical basis and the integration of all the
theories.
In broad terms, state crime and state-corporate crime scholars identify both
internal and external controls on behavior (Ross 2000). External controls lie outside
of the specific state apparatus. These often include watchdog type activities of the
media and other outside influences that tend to hold the state to the certain norms of
society. Internal controls are those established by the state itself and are directed at
itself. These include self-regulating controls such as laws, rules, regulations, and
standard operating procedures (e.g., contracting and purchasing rules). These rules
can be tangible, such as written purchasing guidelines, or symbolic, such as a
promise to control crime through the addition of 100,000 officers (Crime Bill, 1994
H.R. 3355; 103 H R 3355).
At the macro, or institutional level, broad social forces of competition and
goal attainment intersect with the lack of effective controls to produce an
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environment where states are able to ignore domestic and/or international laws and
regulations as they see fit in order to enact or promote their policy objectives. Any
outside controls, such as the media, general population opinion, and/or internal state
obstacles, can be ignored or manipulated via hegemonic discourse, symbolic political
gestures, or altering policy to immediately appease the public while continuing in a
covert, illegitimate direction. Drawing upon anomie and institutional anomie theories
(Merton 1938; Messner and Rosenfeld 2007), broader forces o f cultural goals of
success and competition, when coinciding with blocked goal attainment processes,
push political organizations and their agents toward violation o f law in
accomplishment o f their objectives.
Organizations are also influenced by open or blocked opportunity structures.
As the state may be affected by anomie, it is more often organizations that are so
affected. The same forces that impact the state more strongly impact larger
corporations. In a society where increasing corporate profits is the paramount goal,
and legal means may be blocked, individual agents, acting on behalf of corporate
interests in maximizing profits, can be prone to illegal and/or unethical activity.
Blocked legitimate means for increasing profits can be replaced by use of
illegitimate means. Additionally, if illegitimate means are seen as easier to use and
more profitable, the concept of instrumental rationality “by whatever means
necessary” may provide the rationalization for using illegitimate means as opposed
to legal ones.
The complexity of organizations, whether governmental or corporate,
provides for a host o f opportunities for deviant or criminal behavior. Government
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agencies or corporations that are heavily laden with bureaucratic layers can maintain
levels o f secrecy pertaining to resource allocation, operating procedures, utilization
of corporate resources, and objectives. External actors may not know who did what
within an organization. Even within the organization itself, secrecy between
divisions, bureaus, and offices is commonplace. Internal organizational structures of
information control often inhibit external actors from obtaining information. Even
government agencies under the control of the Freedom of Information Act have the
ability to hide their activity within layers of the bureaucracy and keep it from the
public eye. Corporations not subject to the Freedom o f Information Act are cloaked
in a blanket of secrecy. Only information released to stockholders is available for
scrutiny, but not the methods used to achieve corporate goals. The inability of
external actors to obtain information, coupled with the corporation’s ability to avoid
detection, can be strong motivators or facilitators of criminal activity (Rothe 2006).
At the micro or interactional level, this integrated approach combines aspects
of differential association and social learning theories, as well as core elements of
symbolic interactionism. Additionally, social theories such as dramaturgy and social
constructionism can be included in analyzing the person-to-person relationships.
Social constructionism (Berger and Luckman 1967; Loseke 1999) is used to explain
the socially constructed perceptions of what occurred at the interactional level, and
even the organizational level. An actor’s perception, or socially constructed version
o f what is happening and/or has occurred, adds to the understanding of the deviant or
criminal behavior. Dramaturgy (Goffman 1959, 1974; Manning 1997, 2003) is used
to explain the situated means actors use to portray themselves within an interactional
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framework. Used successfully by Manning (1997) to explain the social organization
of police work and in explaining the impact of technology on police (2003), it is a
valuable theory to use in explaining how individuals act differently when confronted
with varying situations in social settings. The use of the “front stage” versus the
“back stage” (1974) allows actors to put up “fronts” and give different portrayals of
themselves in varying interactional settings. These micro-level factors are relevant in
understanding state-corporate crimes at all levels. Individual level motivations can be
personal, but these motivations are highly malleable within organizational cultures
and contexts that encapsulate these actors. Cultural elements, both in the broader
socio-cultural sense (singular actors motivated for personal success and
advancement), coupled with organization cultures that prescribe goal attainment
“through any means necessary,” can also socialize an individual into broader
ideological beliefs that facilitate violating laws for the sake of the organization and
individual benefit. Day-to-day interactions with coworkers provide ample
opportunity for the transmission, not only of a criminogenic value system, but also
neutralizations and rationalizations that excuse and/or justify such behavior
(Kauzalarich and Kramer 1998; Rothe 2006; Rothe and Mullins 2006).
In the following section, I review case studies of state-corporate crime. Many
o f these studies employ Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theory of statecorporate crime detailed above.
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Case Studies of State-Corporate Crime
One o f the first case studies using the concept of state-corporate crime and an
integrated theoretical approach was Kramer’s (1992) work on the space shuttle
Challenger disaster. Using what he called an integrated theory o f organizational
misconduct, he laid out the case for understanding that the Challenger explosion was
more than just a failure o f the O-rings during the lift off. Kramer (1992) notes
the explosion of the shuttle was not an “accident.” While the technical cause
o f the explosion was the failure of the O-ring se a l. .. actions of NASA and
MTI concerning the flawed design of the field joint and the safe launching of
the shuttle were the actual causes of the disaster. (P. 238)
He further notes the explosion was the
collective product of the interaction between a government agency (NASA)
and a private business corporation (MTI) and thus can be viewed as an
instance of state-corporate crime. This disaster cannot be attributed solely to
the actions of one organization. (P. 238)
Kramer goes on to argue that the empirical evidence he disclosed in his study points
to the complicity o f the state and corporate enterprises involved in deviance at the
expense of both taxpayers, and, more importantly, the deaths of the astronauts and
the impact on their families.
Additionally, Kramer notes that the Challenger disaster case study supports
the usage o f an integrated theoretical approach to the study of state-corporate crime.
Specifically, he argues there is
general support for the hypothesis that criminal or deviant behavior at the
organizational level results from a coincidence of pressure for goal
attainment, availability and perceived attractiveness of illegitimate means,
and an absence of effective social control. (P. 239)
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External pressure placed on NASA to keep an accelerated, unreasonable launch
schedule caused engineers to make unwise, deviant decisions. Combine this with the
lack of any effective social controls on NASA from independent agencies or the
public, and decisions were made that cost lives. Because of the existing
environmental conditions, both at NASA and the other private corporations involved,
the eve of the shuttle launch saw the dismissal of grave early warning signs that low
atmospheric temperature could cause a rupture in the O-ring seals and an explosion.
Vaughan (1996) conducted a more comprehensive case study of the
Challenger disaster published in an exhaustive 575-page book entitled, The
Challenger Launch Decision, Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. In
this epic case study, she explored the various post-launch and pre-launch actions to
determine what caused the horrendous explosion that killed the astronauts. Using
Merton’s (1957) social structure and anomie theory (SSA) and her own work on
organizational deviance (Vaughan 1983, 1992) as her guiding theoretical approach,
her conclusions mirrored those of Kramer (1992). Because of the pressure put on
both the employees o f NASA, Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI), and other private
companies involved, the normalization o f deviance occurred at multiple levels. As
Vaughan (1996) states:
we must wonder about processes that normalize deviance, possibly allowing
organizational members honestly to view their actions as normal, rather than
deviant. . . . The answer to the question of “good” people and “dirty” work
suggested by this research is that culture, structure, and other organizational
factors, in combination, may create a worldview that constrains people from
acknowledging their work as “dirty.” Thus, rather than contemplating or
devising a “deviant” strategy for achieving the organization’s goals and then
invoking techniques of neutralization in order to proceed with it or rationalize
it afterward, they may never see it as deviant in the first place. (P. 408)
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In the Ford Pinto case, it was the design flaw and the organizational pressure
placed on Ford employees that allowed a dangerous automobile to be produced even
after the company knew o f the dangers. Likewise, in the case of the Challenger
disaster, good, talented people had their worldview distorted, leading them on the
path to disaster. Vaughan (1996) contends that the Challenger disaster is a story of
how environmental and organizational forces shape worldviews and allow for
seemingly intelligent responsible individuals to miss telltale signs of impending
disaster. Furthermore, the launch is not a story
o f harm done with amoral calculations. . . . It is a story that illustrates how
disastrous consequences can emerge from the banality of organizational life
. . . a series of seemingly harmless decisions were made that incrementally
moved the space agency toward a catastrophic outcome. (P. 410)
While Vaughan did not argue for a theoretical explanation of state-corporate crime,
she nonetheless supported the concept. She viewed the disaster as an intersection of
organizational deviance normalized through the work culture at both NASA and
contracting corporations.
Both Kramer’s (1992) and Vaughan’s (1996) work were important for
several reasons. Kramer’s work set the stage for further work on both an integrated
theoretical explanation o f state-corporate crime, and further established and gave
credibility to the concept of state-corporate crime. Vaughan’s work took the
explanation for the Challenger disaster past the technocratic explanations given for
such “accidents.” Vaughan delved into the sociological aspects of organizational
deviance, and showed through the use of empirical evidence that deviance is
normalized through cultural activity as well as through the quest for productivity

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29
(capitalist production), causing strain among the members to produce at whatever
cost.
Aulette and Michalowski (1993) conducted a case study of a tragic fire that
occurred in Hamlet, North Carolina, on September 3,1991, at the Imperial Food
Products chicken processing plant. Padlocked fire doors were found to be the
immediate cause o f death and injury to workers at the processing plant. As fire raged
through the plant, workers attempted to escape through the locked fire doors. The
company locked these fire doors in an apparent attempt to stop employee theft, but
more importantly, it was failure on the part of the federal and state governments to
enforce safety standards in the facility that ultimately was responsible for the deaths
and smoke inhalation injuries. Failure to stop the hydraulic leak immediately
followed by the locked doors created the tragedy. This regulatory failure was
facilitated by the State of North Carolina through its refusal to fund and support
safety standards. This interwoven complicity allowed for the continuous disregard of
safety standards by company managers, thus avoiding the costs of these practices, all
in the name of increasing corporate profits. In other words, obeying safety standards
and regulations can cost money and thereby reduce profits. Additionally, in this case,
the doors were allegedly locked to stop employee theft. Rather than install needed
devices to prevent the theft, company managers chose to lock escape routes, which
ultimately resulted in the employees’ deaths (Aulette and Michalowski 1993).
Again, as in the case o f the Challenger disaster, the ultimate cause of the fire
was a technical failure found to be a faulty hydraulic line that ruptured near a deep
fryer culminating in an explosion and subsequent fire. Aulette and Michalowski
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argue that “those who died or were injured in the Hamlet fire, however, were the
victims o f much more than a simple mechanical breakdown. They were the victims
of a series o f social decisions made by a broad array o f institutions” (Aulette and
Michalowski 1993:172).
These decisions were based on three contextual occurrences—the social
context, the organizational context, and the control context. The social context
involved the historical, social, and political setting in North Carolina at the time of
the fire. The organizational setting included the cultural and organizational situations
that led to the doors being locked. Last was the control context which Aulette and
Michalowski (1993) argue:
A competitive economy dominated by profit-seeking investors, a government
committed to offering an attractive profit-making climate and consequently
far from aggressive in protecting the health and safety of workers, and
workers with very limited ability to shape the safety and health conditions of
their work place, all contributed to the fire in Hamlet. (P. 194)
They go further to suggest that it was not simply these two acts, but a complicity
between actors that was at fault. They suggest “that state-corporate crime can be
understood as the result of an interaction between elements of government and
elements of the private-production system” (p. 195). Adding
unlike the prototype offered by Kramer and Michalowski, the events leading
to the Hamlet fire were more the consequences of socially injurious
omissions on the part of governmental agencies, rather than direct
consequences of the pursuit of specific goals, as was the case with
governmental actions surrounding the building and launching of the ill-fated
Challenger. (P. 194)
In the final analysis, Aulette and Michalowski (1993) argue that
the deaths in Hamlet are clear evidence that laws alone are not sufficient to
protect worker safety. They require political will for their effective
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enforcement. Without this will, they become more symbolic than real. The
Hamlet fire constitutes a clear instance of state-corporate crime precisely
because it was the absence of this political will and the omissions on the part
of politically constituted agencies that enabled the management of Imperial
to continue violating basic safety requirements at the plant in its pursuit of
private profit. (P. 205) (emphasis in the original)
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) attempt to substantiate that the nuclear build
up experienced by the United States and the rest of the world is a case of statecorporate crime. They found that the Department of Energy and private nuclear
weapons contractors had been working in secrecy, unchallenged by regulations or
independent review. In their book that examined nuclear proliferation in the United
States, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) found deviance on the side of the government
in its complicity with private nuclear weapons manufacturers in spreading nuclear
weapons to further capitalistic goals. Additionally, the federal government initiated
such action under the penumbra of imperialism as it sought to maintain the status
quo and to expand its political and economic interests.
In their book, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) provide further support of an
integrated theoretical approach to the study of state-corporate crime. For their study
o f nuclear weapons proliferation, they used an integrated approach to identify and
explain points of deviance located at the intersection of the three levels of analysis
and the three catalysts o f action discussed earlier. In Figure 1 (p. 149) they proposed
an analytical framework as a means o f explaining the intersections of deviance.
Essentially using several levels to explain what was occurring historically,
organizationally, and interactionally. For example, at the intersection of the
institutional level o f analysis with motivation as a catalyst, they examined the use of
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nuclear weapons to maintain the U.S. “Empire.” The motivation for the imperialistic
endeavors o f the United States was to keep so called “third world nations” in line so
that these countries could provide cheap labor, resources, investments, and markets
for U.S. use (p. 152). Nuclear proliferation was also consistent with conservative
ideology, and specifically the belief that the use of nuclear weapons, or the threat
thereof, was a necessary deterrent to keep third world nations in line with U.S.
interests.
Under opportunity structures, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) note that after
World War II the nuclear proliferation capabilities of the United States were
essentially limitless. The United States faced little opposition or structural controls
against the proliferation o f nuclear weapons and the spread of imperialism and
conservative ideology. International responses to the build-up and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons by the United States and Soviet Union received scant criticism as
the world took sides to reap the benefits of partnering with one of these world
powers. The International Court shied away from issues dealing with nuclear
proliferation as it too was controlled by one of these powers. Additionally, each
power chose whether to concern itself with rulings or pressure placed on them by the
international courts or international opinion. Controls from the media or social
movements, while widely publicized, had little effect on the spread of nuclear
weapons.
Organizationally, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) found that the Department
o f Energy and its predecessors were interested only in production goals.
Organizational behavior that supported these goals and objectives was legitimate.
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Behavior opposed to, interfering with, or slowing progress in goal attainment was
illegitimate. It was the mission of the organization that was tantamount and defined
the rules. Pertaining to internal structures and operating procedures, the Department
of Energy and its employees were free to work unfettered by regulations and any
scrutiny from independent or outside agencies. Cloaked in a cloud of secrecy, the
agency was left to achieve its organizational goals without fear of publicity or legal
challenges. In sum, at the organizational level motivation came from the mission and
the goals to support that mission. This set the stage for the organizational or
“corporate culture” within the department; few internal constraints hindered workers
whose focus was the mission of the department.
On the social control level, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) argue that no
program under the federal government’s jurisdiction has been clouded in more
secrecy than the nuclear weapons program. “Secrecy has been the rule, and only in
the last few years have we witnessed any movement on the part of the government to
open the program up for public and scholarly scrutiny” (Kauzlarich and Kramer
1998:158).
On an individual or interactional level, employees had no reward structure
that would offer those interested in revealing the method of operation within the
agency. As is often the case, rationalizations were employed by various actors to
make their harmful activities more acceptable to themselves and others. Individuals
were socialized into the culture by the continuous emphasis placed on the
departmental mission. Material success was emphasized in the growing number of
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weapons and the perceived nuclear might of the United States (Kauzlarich and
Kramer 1998).
Earlier work on state-corporate crime began to advance the concept that there
may be two forms o f state-corporate interaction that lead to social harm where the
government either initiates the crime, as in the nuclear weapons case, or merely
facilitates it by failing to regulate corporate activity, as in the Hamlet fire case. In
their study o f the crash of Valujet Flight 592, Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000)
discovered that, while technical factors were the immediate cause of the crash, it was
the complicity o f private corporations and governmental institutions that was the
primary cause of the disaster, in particular state facilitation via lax regulation and .
weak safety standards. Specifically, the crash of Flight 592 can be attributed to
the failure of SabreTech and ValuJet employees to follow safety procedures
regarding the preparation, identification, and storage of potentially hazardous
materials. Indeed, had these workers correctly capped the oxygen generators,
flight 592 might have landed safely in Atlanta. (Matthews and Kauzlarich
2000:293)
More specifically, they argue:
As profit-seeking organizations, ValuJet and SabreTech employed a number
of questionable techniques to maximize profit. ValuJet’s radical cost-cutting
procedures included using older planes in various stages of disrepair,
outsourcing all its maintenance, and providing very low wages and benefits
to employees. SabreTech was also experiencing a high degree of pressure for
capital accumulation at the time directly preceding the crash by agreeing to
complete their work on the oxygen generators quickly or incur a loss of
$2,500 per day. The other organization involved in the crash, the FAA, was
not a direct profit-seeking entity, but one designed to both regulate and
facilitate the accumulation of capital for airline companies. The FAA’s
refusal (on economic grounds) to institute specific safeguards that could have
prevented the catastrophe of flight 592 illustrates the injurious consequences
that can result not only from pursuing capital, but also from state
encouragement of capital accumulation. (P. 147)
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The Valujet accident is an example of state-facilitated state-corporate crime
in that three separate agencies, two private corporations (Valujet and Sabretech),
coupled with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), disregarded or operated in
such a manner as to diminish the importance of, or failed to enforce, safety
regulations. The crash could have been avoided if the two private corporations had
followed established safety regulations and the FAA had enforced such regulations.
As Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) point out, as in other instances o f statefacilitated state-corporate crime, the pursuit of profit was critical in the formulation
o f organizational policy and practice. While organizations that refrain from crime
also have a strong interest in profits, there was a very distinct set of organizational
relationships which led to the crash of Flight 592. In this context it was characterized
by weak social control over the actors and organizations involved, and ample
opportunity to shape acceptable risks (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000).
The latter 1990’s and early 2000’s saw an increase in the number of studies
o f state-corporate crime in the criminological literature. On an international level,
McMullen (1996) studied toxic steel and its effects on the environment. Harper and
Israel (1999) studied economic needs and lax regulatory practices in Papua, New
Guinea. Green and Ward (2004) point to several case studies where deviance was
explained by and. fit the model of state-corporate crime—but not using the same
criteria. One was the arming of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army by a British arms
trader.
The arms trade illustrates examples of state-corporate crime where states and
corporations have colluded covertly to breach embargos on repressive states,
or trade in weapons or equipment which have devastating consequences for
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the civilian populations upon which the arms are employed. (Green and Ward
2004:31)
Shrimp farm exploitation in Honduras and devastation by the lack o f regulations in
the oil industry in Nigeria are other international case studies of state-corporate
crime (Green and Ward 2004).
American criminologists have continued to apply the concept of statecorporate crime to a growing number of areas. For example, Wonders and Danner
(2006) examined the strategic role of women in state-corporate crime on a global
level. They explored the harms that are widely defined as illegal within the West that
are regarded as necessary costs for developing countries to bear if they wish to
participate in the New World Order, with many of these harms affecting women
more than men. Protections extended to citizens in the West are rapidly eroding as
developed countries struggle to maintain economic superiority. Transnational
corporations are involved in collusive activity with governments in the developing
world that cause social harm, and arguably harm women the most. Wonders and
Danner argue that women’s suffering is exacerbated because of state-corporate
crime.
In the late 1990’s, the Ford Motor Company’s Explorer sport utility vehicle
(SUV) was involved in several fatal accidents involving rollovers or single car
crashes where vehicle malfunction was indicated as the cause. The Explorers were
prone to catastrophic accidents (usually due to a rollover) where another vehicle was
not the cause or proximate cause. What emerged was a case of tire tread separation
on Bridgestone-Firestone tires that were standard equipment on Ford Explorers. This
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defective tire, coupled with the ease with which the Explorer would roll over, led to
numerous deaths and accidents. The media hype about this case was enormous,
causing both companies to experience substantial losses. Bridgestone-Firestone is
still feeling the ramifications today in multiple civil law suits, while Ford still
grapples with the problem that the Explorer is prone to rollovers. Mullins (2006)
argues that
widely covered in the media, and the source o f scores of still unresolved
court cases in the United States and abroad, the tread separation case stands
as one o f the largest failures o f the automobile industry to protect consumer
safety and well being to date. (P. 208)
Like other cases of state-corporate crime, the push to meet organizational goals, tied
to the making of money, caused Bridgestone-Firestone and Ford Motor Company to
ignore warning signs o f things gone awry. In this case, the government’s
involvement pointed to facilitation rather than initiation. According to Mullins
(2006),
as Barnett (1981), Chambliss and Zatz (1993), and Matthews and Kauzlarich
(2000) have shown, it is often the state’s obligation, at least under a capitalist
economy, to protect, encourage, and assist corporations in capital
accumulation. Gold et al. (1975) argue that the primary purpose of the state in
a capitalist system is to allow the corporate capitalist economy to flourish.
Government becomes constrained by the needs and desires of major
corporations. . . . All o f these perspectives would predict little-to-no action on
behalf o f the state in guarding citizen safety. On the other hand, as O’Connor
(1973) also noted, the state must protect the perceived legitimacy of both the
capitalist system and itself. Thus, in the face of widespread public concerns
or panic, it must take, or appear to take, effective action to minimize the
source of concern. (P. 225)
In this case, the federal government passed legislation, but in effect it was too little
too late, and it had little effect on the manufacturers of the tires or automobiles.
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Cruciotti and Matthews (2006) explored the grounding and subsequent oil
spill of the Exxon Valdez in 1989. First defined as an accident, they contend that the
“accident” was an avoidable consequence of a series of acts and omissions. It was no
mere accident but “rather, this disaster is better understood as a form of statefacilitated corporate crime wherein decisions taken by several organizations made
the grounding o f the Valdez a likely outcome” (Cruciotti and Matthews 2006:231).
The catastrophic oil spill that severely damaged the Alaskan ecosystem resulted from
a series o f overt acts and negligent behavior on the part of the corporation and the
federal government. Slow response and the government’s lack of intervention caused
further problems once the oil leaked from the vessel.
More recent use o f the concept of state-corporate crime can be found in the
analysis o f the Iraq War, as scholars claim that the invasion and subsequent
occupation of Iraq is a violation of international law (Kramer and Michalowski 2005;
Kramer, Michalowski, and Rothe 2005). Some of these studies dealt more with state
crime and the interwoven complicity of the U.S. government, while another study
(Rothe 2006) focused on true state-corporate crime involving a government
contractor, Halliburton. Halliburton was awarded lucrative government contracts for
supplies and services in the Iraq War. Vice President Dick Cheney was formerly the
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Halliburton. The links between Vice President
Cheney and Halliburton show the potential for state-corporate crime embedded in
this new policy o f war by subcontract. There have been claims that the association
between Cheney and Halliburton resulted in no-bid, cost-plus contractual work
without competitive pricing or oversight. This is a problem endemic in war
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situations, but was exacerbated by the relationship between Vice President Cheney
and Halliburton. According to some, the affiliation between Cheney and Halliburton
has established war profiteering as an acceptable and systematic practice within the
Bush Administration by rewarding “corporations for who they know rather than what
they know, and a system in which cronyism is more important than competence”
(Rothe 2006:334). Rothe further argues that state-facilitated, state-corporate crime
occurred in the dealings with Halliburton. By circumventing established guidelines
and awarding contracts to Halliburton without properly following federal contracting
guidelines, Halliburton violated numerous laws, and federal purchasing and
contracting rules. The complicity goes further as Rothe shows Halliburton’s
connection not only with Cheney, but President Bush’s family as well.
Using the analytical framework developed by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998),
Rothe (2006) is able to show that at each level there exists a catalyst that stimulates
deviance. At the institutional level, the historical precedence of providing private
contractors government contracts in times o f war has been around since the United
States has been involved in wars. What allows the collusion and corruption is a
culture that thrives on circumventing the system. Once a contract is in place, lax
governmental regulations and regulators allow for price-fixing and ultimately
outlandish profiteering. Additionally, no outside controls are required.
Until measures are taken to provide international regulations for transnational
corporations and accountability measures for states utilizing privatization of defense
work, no external controls will exist. As currently stands, there is little to no
incentive or enforcement mechanisms for the State to adhere to any international
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laws; thus, an empowered universal criminal court that is empowered to address
states and corporations must be allowed to exist within the international arena”
(Rothe 2006:368).
Kramer and Michalowski (2005) argue that the Iraq War is a form of statecorporate crime. Using the integrated theoretical framework, they argue:
Our approach to the invasion o f Iraq links these three levels o f analysis with
the three catalysts for action . . . motivation, opportunity, and social control.
Our goal is to highlight the key factors that contributed to or restrained the
war on Iraq at each intersection of a catalyst for action and a level o f analysis.
The underlying theoretical premise guiding this analysis is the proposition
that organizational deviance is most likely to occur when pressures for goal
attainment and/or faulty operating procedures in corporate and governmental
organizations intersect with attractive and available illegitimate means in the
absence or neutralization of effective social control. (Pp. 309-10)
The motivation and opportunity for the United States to invade Iraq examined by
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), in that nation-states have a natural tendency towards
imperialism. The U.S. decision to invade Iraq was the product of imperial designs
and aggressive desires pursued within the context of opportunities and constraints
created by the end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11, 2001, and a bizarre
electoral outcome in November 2000.
These forces intersected in ways that allowed the new Administration to
deploy a messianic vision of a “New American Century” in which U.S. style neo
conservative economics and electoral democracy would rule the world, with the
United States as the imperial power overseeing the ongoing maintenance o f this
world order (p. 310).
U.S. history is fraught with evidence of imperialistic intentions. From
“Manifest Destiny” to enslavement to expansionist ideals, ranging from Cuba to
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Vietnam and now Iraq, the United States has continuously sought to instill and
spread its values and beliefs, in pursuit of its economic and political interests. Under
the guise of the Cold War (Cuba), to thwarting communism (Korea and Vietnam) to
stopping terrorism (Iraq), the United States has used its might to attack and attempt
to expand its influence. While this imperialistic approach is defended as necessary to
protect its citizens and national interests, other research has pointed out that a central
purpose of a capitalist-supported government is the expansion and maintaining of
that system (Michalowski and Kramer 2006; Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000). The
quest for capital accumulation and other interests have fueled U.S. expansion and
invasions of other nations.
Much like the analysis of nuclear weapon proliferation (Kauzlarich and
Kramer 1998), the imperialistic expansion in the Middle East opens the door for new
ventures and increased capital accumulation. Expansion in a capitalistic system
means money and the making of more money.
The fuller explanation resides in the relationship between U.S. economic
interests as resident in the structure of corporate capital and the long-standing will to
empire these economic interests have forged as a key characteristic of the U.S.
political establishment (Michalowski and Kramer 2006:331).
Michalowski and Kramer (2006) broke down the Iraq invasion into three
levels o f analysis using the integrated analytical framework to explain the motivation
to invade, the opportunity structure that existed that allowed the United States to
invade, and the lack o f obstacles and international reaction under the operationality
o f control.
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Summary and Conclusion
The work on state-corporate crime is rooted in the study of white-collar crime
and the belief that seemingly “good” people can be involved in or commit crimes or
deviant acts. As Sutherland (1949) notes, these offenders are not afflicted with
pathologies and cannot blame socio-economic conditions for their actions. The
intersection o f private interests (goals equate to money) and government goals,
coupled with lowered social or organizational controls to prohibit deviance, can lead
to state-corporate crime. As the above case studies have indicated, an integrated
theoretical approach best explains the actions of the state, private corporations, and
individuals involved in the commission of these socially harmful acts. Additionally,
it may not be an intentional act on the part of one person, but rather a culture that
allows normalization of deviance. Good people can see bad things coming their way
but are unable to react because of obstacles preventing them from seeing what they
are doing as wrong.
What the studies reviewed in this chapter have also shown is that the
government’s involvement can be active or passive. In the case of the Valujet crash
(Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000) and the Hamlet, North Carolina fire at Imperial
Foods (Aulette and Michalowski 1993), it was government’s inaction that was the
root cause of the tragedy. Failure of federal, state, and local government agencies to
fulfill their regulatory duties resulted in death and injury. In essence, it was the statefacilitated actions o f the companies involved that led to the death and injury.
Economic interests were the motivating catalyst for the harmful actions of each
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company. In part, the government’s inaction was due to economic factors, but it was
also due to other political goals and interests.
The 1990’s and early 2000’s have seen an increase in studies using the
concept of state-corporate crime, and, more importantly, providing support for the
integrated theoretical approach to studying state-corporate crime. Each study has
taken a catastrophic event, analyzed what occurred, and shown that, while perhaps
the actual cause o f the incident appeared to be an accident (e.g., failure of an O-Ring,
locking o f fire doors to prevent theft, or explosion of oxygen generators on an
aircraft), when we critically examine each incident we see a series of acts, or path of
deviance, that lead up to the catastrophe. Other studies point to state-corporate crime
on a more white-collar crime level. For example, the Halliburton (Rothe 2006) case
shows instances of white-collar crime (e.g., price fixing, subcontractor collusion), as
well as the commission of state-corporate crime in that the government’s
involvement facilitated and allowed injurious business practices to continue.
Personal relationships between government figureheads and corporate managers
leads to awards of contracts and sole-source awards precluding and excluding fair
contracting practices such as competitive bidding. In essence, the Halliburton
incident is an excellent example of white-collar crime being perpetuated and
exacerbated by an instance of state-corporate crime. The Halliburton incident existed
only because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which has been shown to be an instance of
state-corporate crime.
As the literature on state-corporate crime grew, only extensive catastrophic
disasters were studied (i.e., incidents of large-scale deaths, or the loss of millions of
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dollars coupled with the loss o f human life). In other words, the focus has always
been on a sensational event. One question for this dissertation to answer is, can this
integrated theory o f state-corporate crime (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998) explain a
case that is less sensational, involving a local government agency as a victim and
perpetrator o f deviance? Can this theory be used to explain a more micro-level
incident? My goal is to use the integrated theory to explain what occurred at KDPS,
a medium-sized public safety department.
Another goal o f this dissertation is theory elaboration. Vaughan (1992) writes
about theory elaboration and its usefulness:
Theory elaboration is a method for developing general theories of particular
phenomena through qualitative case analysis. By theory, I mean theoretical
tools in general (theory, models, and concepts), rather than a more restricted
formal meaning (a set of interrelated propositions that are testable and
explain some phenomenon). By elaboration, I mean the process of refining a
theory, model, or concept in order to specify more carefully the
circumstances in which it does or does not offer potential for explanation. (P.
175)
I use the integrated theoretical model o f state-corporate crime to examine an area
previously untouched. Researchers have shown that the concept of state-corporate
crime is appropriate for grand scale events and the integrated theoretical framework
is useful for explaining these large-scale state-corporate crimes, but can it be used in
making smaller-scale examinations? Is it useful for explaining crime or deviance of
individuals, small businesses, and local branches of government?
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CHAPTER IE
METHODS
The present work is a case study of state-corporate crime at KDPS. I use the
integrated state-corporate crime theory (Kramer and Kauzlarich 1998) to explain the
actions involved in the purchase, implementation, and maintenance o f the
department’s computer systems during the 1989-2004 period that led to the social
harm and injury detailed in Chapter I. This explanation focuses on the interaction
that occurred between the federal, state, and local governments; professional
organizations like the International Chiefs of Police; computer vendors that supplied
the computer equipment and maintenance services; and KDPS. The first section of
this chapter defines a case study. This is followed by a brief discussion of historical
ethnography, which is the method I employ. Then I discuss the research setting,
followed by my approach to collecting and analyzing the data.
What Is a Case Study?
Stake (1995) defines the case study as “the study of the particularity and
complexity o f a single case, coming to understand its activity within important
circumstances” (p. xi). Yin (1994) adds that a case study is “an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” Consistent
with these definitions, I examine a single case of state-corporate crime that occurred
45
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at KDPS. The goal o f this research is to use the case study method and integrated
theoretical approach to explain how and why state-corporate crime occurred at
KDPS.
Vaughan’s (1996) comprehensive study of the Challenger disaster epitomizes
the use of the case study method. She advocates the use o f the case study to get at the
rich details o f the narratives, feelings, concerns, and supporting documentation.
Gillham (2000) further notes the case study can be used to “‘get under the skin’ of a
group or organization to find out what really happens—the informal reality which
can only be perceived from the inside” (p. 11). For these reasons, I have chosen the
case study design for this research. It will allow me to focus on one entity, to tell the
story, and to get at the deep-rooted inter- and intra-organizational relationships,
actions, and omissions that led to the squandering of tax-payers’ money, putting the
public and public safety officers in harm’s way, and the death of at least one citizen.
Historical Ethnography
Ethnographic work in the social sciences usually refers to an inductive
approach that emphasizes in-depth exploration of a particular social phenomenon
rather than the deductive approach of hypothesis testing. It is used to develop an indepth understanding of the phenomenon being studied rather than developing
abstract empirical generalizations. It usually involves the use of unstructured data, or
data that cannot be quantified. This method focuses on smaller units of analysis, like
a single case or group, and “involves interpretation of the meanings and functions of
human actions, the product of which mainly takes the form o f verbal descriptions
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and explanations, with quantification and statistical analysis playing a subordinate
role at most” (Atkinson and Hammersley 1998:111).
The historical ethnography method may involve participant observation. In
the present study, I participated in the process and occurrences that led to the social
harm at the intersection o f state-corporate actions and negligence (Atkinson and
Hammersley 1998). I have been deeply involved in selection and implementation of
the computer systems purchased and installed at KDPS. This can, of course, have
positive and negative effects. The researcher in social science work is required to be,
by the very nature of the work, unbiased in his/her approach. The notion that the
scientist stands outside and looks in to provide results that are untainted is a widely
held tenet within the field o f sociology. Recently, opinions have begun to change that
belief, allowing for the acceptance of participatory research. Sociologists cannot
always “stand outside.” We are part of the social we examine, and we have a
particular interest in what we are studying. Therefore, we always bring with us some
“baggage,” as it were, to the research design, data collection, data analysis, and
interpretation of the results.
Clandinin and Connelly (1998) write o f “personal experience methods” as a
means o f qualitative analysis.
The social sciences are concerned with humans and their relations with
themselves and their environments, and, as such, the social sciences are
founded on the study o f experience. Experience is, therefore, the starting
point and key term for all social science inquiry. (Clandinin and Connelly
1998:153)
Experience is then brought to the forefront by the telling of the story.
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In our effort to find a middle ground—a place where we can both say that we
are involved in the study of experience and recognize the truths and
epistemological values of reductionism and formalism—we have come to the
study o f narratives and storytelling. We make the assumption that experience
is both temporal and storied. . .. Broadly speaking . . . the case is made that
when persons note something of their experience, either to themselves or to
others, they do so not by the mere recording of experience over time, but in
storied fo rm .. . . In effect stories are the closest we can come to experience
as we and others tell o f our experience. (Clandinin and Connelly 1998:155)
History is also a part o f the story and can present obstacles in our research.
Tuchman (1998) notes, “Whether done by social scientists or historians, historical
work requires a point of view. A point of view necessarily includes an interpretive
framework that implicitly contains some notion of the ‘meaning of history”’
(Tuchman 1998:225). Social scientists depart from historians in that historians are
interested in documenting what occurred. They seek to find out what happened,
whereas sociologists attempt to explain what occurred. So, doing historical
ethnographies can be a slanted activity where the biases or opinions of the researcher
can be brought into one’s work, especially when attempting to explain a specific case
or event (Tuchman 1998).
Tuchman (1998) further notes that another difficulty encountered when doing
historical work can be the interpretation of who is telling the story. “For the past 20
years, they [historians] have argued about whether what we call history—the story of
people and societies across time—concerns perceptions and activities of elites or of
‘ordinary’ folk [social history]” (Tuchman 1998:233). Whose story is it? Does it
relate what occurred, or does it provide a one-sided opinion of the researcher?
Nonetheless, the story is still important. It represents someone’s perspective of what
occurred. More important is the ability of the researcher to substantiate the story with
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evidence such as documentation or narratives of the events to support the
researcher’s interpretation o f what occurred and why. Stake (1998) writes of the
issue of story telling. Oftentimes the researcher will allow the case to tell its own
story. “Case content evolves in the act o f writing itself.. . . Case researchers enter the
scene expecting, even knowing, that certain events, problems, relationships will be
important, yet discover that some actually are of little consequence” (Stake 1998:93).
Furthermore, the researcher will decide what is necessary for an understanding of the
case. “It may be the case’s own story, but it is the researcher’s dressing of the case’s
own story” (Stake 1998:93). Subjective choices and judgment calls must be made
based on comprehensive coverage or other issues affecting the study (Stake 1998).
Vaughan (1996) addressed this in her Challenger study and essentially
concluded that the best approach was a chronological one supported by a review of
documents and follow-up interviews to corroborate the information obtained. The
essence of her approach was to try to see how interpretations or opinions varied by
different actors in constructing past events. Not all information is captured as well.
The information is selectively chosen based on the need of the researcher and
direction of the research (Tuchman 1998).
While there are weaknesses to historical ethnographies, the strengths
outweigh the weaknesses while pursing this type of work. Historically, the argument
against ethnographic work has been that it lacks the scientific rigor of quantitative
methods. In other words, it is not a “scientific” approach to research. It does not
follow the natural sciences protocol. On the other hand, positivistic approaches have
always been criticized for failing to capture the true nature of social phenomena due
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to its sterile, almost benign, approach. There is also the argument of the biases,
attitudes, and prejudices o f the researcher that could somehow influence the results.
This can be the case in all research. The counter arguments to these issues is that we
use qualitative, non-positivistic methods, like historical ethnography and participant
observation, to get at the richness o f human interaction that is not possible through
the use o f statistical methods. Historical ethnography strives to get at the rich stories
and interactions that can provide insight beyond the mathematical equations used in
the scientific approach. Researchers must be mindful of these pitfalls and cognizant
of the impressions or conclusions they may draw while doing their work. Only
through ethnographies can we tell such stories and get at root causes, roots feelings,
and root occurrences (Atkinson and Hammersley 1998).
The Research Setting
KDPS is located in Kalamazoo, Michigan, in the southwestern portion of the
state. The 2000 Census estimated the population of the city at approximately 80,000
(Citation needed- web page). Historically, this has been the average population since
the 1970’s, with a slight increase in the 1970’s followed by a slight decrease in the
1990’s (City of Kalamazoo Annual Reports 1990-2000). During normal business
hours, the population o f the city increases to 200,000-250,000. The city has two large
regional hospitals, a pharmaceutical company, a major university, and other
businesses that create a large influx of workers during the day. The city is
approximately 27 square miles and is marked by racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic
diversity.
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KDPS has approximately 270 employees, a decrease from 320 during the
1990’s. The department employs approximately 222 sworn public safety officers.
Most day and night shifts include about 13 officers working the streets as patrol
officers, patrol supervisors, and shift commanders. The others are station personnel
that staff the mini-stations to respond with the fire apparatus. KDPS officers are
sworn police officers, certified firefighters, and medical first responders. Kalamazoo
is the largest city utilizing this concept. Officers patrol the streets in their police
uniforms, but if a fire alarm or steady tone heard on their radios occurs, they respond
to the scene o f the fire and dress in their firefighting turnout gear. They fight the fire,
clean up, and go back to patrolling as police officers for the remainder of their shift.
Officers presently work 12-hour shifts on a rotating 28-day cycle.
According to BJA (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/) definitions, based on the
population of the city and staffing of the department, KDPS is considered a medium
sized department. The city’s crime trends mirrored the nation’s trends through the
1990’s and into the 2000’s. This is borne out by a continuous comparison of KDPS
crime numbers (Annual Reports 1993-2005, Intergraph Quarterly Reports) with
similar crime numbers of medium-sized departments made by the department and
city officials (http://www.ojp.usdoj. gov/bjs/).
Like many other departments in the United States, KDPS participated in
implementing community policing during the 1990’s. KDPS did enjoy the fruits of
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (Crime Bill) through
the grants and from other funding sources made available. It has also experienced the
loss o f funding o f such programs and has drastically cut back on such efforts and
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direction mainly due to costs and budget constraints. These cuts were seen both
locally, through budget constraints, and federally, through the cancellation of COPS
funding.
KDPS, like other law enforcement agencies of its size, has specialty units
within the department. They support an undercover Vice Crimes unit, a canine unit,
bomb squad, SWAT, and Community Public Safety unit. Despite the fact that the
officers are cross-trained to provide three services, the department operates in a
manner similar to other police departments and maintains law enforcement and fire
certifications just like all departments within the State of Michigan.
One reason why it is important to study the state-corporate crime that
occurred in Kalamazoo is the fact that the same types of social harm resulted in other
jurisdictions, making it not an isolated case. Even the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (FBI) experienced a highly-publicized failure of its computer system.
For example, on January 14, 2005, The New York Times headline reported that the
“FBI May Scrap Vital Overhaul for Computer System,” and The Washington P o st’s
headline from the same day read, “FBI Rejects Its New Case File Software; Database
Project Has Cost Nearly $170 Million.” In this case, the FBI scrapped a $170 million
computer system that was supposed to link all the FBI agents in the world through
one central system. They “dumped” their new system and its vendor in the early part
o f 2005, and in December 2005, a Wall Street Journal headline reported that the
“FBI Delays Awarding Contract for Computer System Overhaul—Nervous About
Money.” While the headlines give a brief description, what occurred was the
inability o f the contractor to be able to make their software function. The system was
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set to link all FBI offices and in theory FBI agents through one central repository for
their RMS. After spending the money, the vendor was unable to make the system
work. The overall blame was placed on the company’s software, but reports indicate
that the project was behind before it got started. After three years of work, the vendor
was trying to sue equipment and technology that was old and obsolete.
Other local agencies have experienced these types of debacles and disasters.
As noted in Chapter I, Grand Rapids, Michigan, experienced problems in 2001,
including a death of a young child. One only needs to look at other headlines to see
what is occurring in the rest o f the world. In Glasgow, Scotland, The Herald
reported, “Revealed the GBP On Computer Police Bungle. The System is Three
Years Late” (www.lexis-nexis.com). In this case, the Glascow police have been
attempting to bring an RMS live for the past three years. Because of computer
problems (i.e., software, hardware) the system still does not work as promised. The
Milwaukee Journal in September 2005 reported, “$7 Million and 6 Months Behind,
Still Failing to Deliver” about the Milwaukee’s Police Department’s $7 million
replacement computer system. The headline in the Buffalo New York Yews, October
29, 2005 (www.lexis-nexis.com) read, “ Buffalo Police Trying to Work Out Glitches
in New Computer System,” or Boston Herald, October 22, 2005, reported,
“Computer Revamp Puts Byte on Crime Information Flow, Released with
‘Glitches’” (www.lexis-nexis.com). In each case, the vendors have failed to provide
a working system as promised. So it is apparent that this problem not only is
occurring in other locations, but has hit larger and more expensive systems.
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My argument here is that KDPS is a reasonable place to study this type of
state-corporate crime. If anything, the happenstance that it is a public safety
department that provides consolidated services makes dependence on an integrated
computer system greater and failure of such a system much more dangerous. KDPS
personnel dispatch police, fire, and medical emergency cases, and rely heavily on the
computer to provide that service. As a result, KDPS is an appropriate place to study
this type of state-corporate crime. Clearly, the department is not alone in its
experience with life-threatening computer problems that resulted from the interaction
between corporate vendors, the federal government, Michigan state government,
professional organizations, and the KDPS. It is appropriate to begin with an in-depth
look at one case before moving on to generalize across other agencies.
Data Collection
The researcher is the primary gatherer of data in qualitative research. Yin
(1994) proposes several principles of data collection in a case study. One is the use
o f multiple sources of evidence that adds to the depth and richness of the study.
These sources include documents, archival records, direct observation, participant
observation, and physical artifacts. The multiple sources are used for triangulation
purposes. Patton (1987) proposes four types of triangulation—triangulation of data
sources, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological
triangulation. Using these types of principles, one can avoid issues of construct
validity, “because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple
measures of the same phenomenon” (Yin 1994.92).
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Following these premises, I collected information from the following
sources: KDPS annual reports; contracts between vendors and the City of
Kalamazoo; federal grant applications for fimding of computer-related equipment;
federal program solicitations; correspondence in the form of memoranda, electronic
mail, and letters; court case files; the provisions of the 1994 Crime Bill and codes of
regulations issued pursuant to this law; documents related to the programs
established under the Crime Bill and other federal legislation that provided monies
for computer technology to local law enforcement agencies; reports filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission by corporate vendors involved in the KDPS
case; information from websites of national professional associations; and
information gleaned from other sources on private computer vendors. O f particular
interest were the Department o f Justice (DOJ), National Institute of Justice (NIJ),
and Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) websites as they exist today,
and as they were in the late 1990’s. Other websites of interest included the
International Association of Chief s of Police (IACP), Association of Public Safety
Communications Officers (APCO), National Emergency Number Association
(NENA), and other web sites related to computer purchases. The vendors’ websites
include Intergraph Public Safety (a subsidiary o f Intergraph, Inc.), Motorola, and
DM Data, Inc. Federal regulations and rules were used to determine the existence of
any type o f guidance for the purchase or implementation of such systems. Other
websites were reviewed but provided little additional insight.
Documentation exists within KDPS from the purchase of its last two
computer systems. This information includes requests for proposals (RFPs),
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contracts, and other correspondence. Additionally, the department has grant
applications and awards since 1994 relating to computer purchases, and, more
importantly, the solicitations, indicating the federal government’s desire to facilitate
computer purchase/implementation.
Data collection focused more narrowly on the three levels of the Catalysts for
Action (Table 1, Appendix B). For example, under the “Institutional Environment”
level, information included the number o f computer vendors supplying software to
the police. Under motivation concerning culture of competition, one area examined
is the number of vendors that claim they can provide the type of system unique to
police/fire work. Are there hundreds of vendors that claim they can provide the
service, or only a limited few, raising the possibility of a partial monopoly with more
opportunities for increased costs and fewer penalties associated with providing faulty
equipment? If there are only a few, there must be economic pressure and
organizational goals that direct employees to secure sites like KDPS. Does the
culture allow the sale of these systems to “do whatever it takes to secure the
contract”? Under the opportunity structures section, information was sought to
determine if regulations, guidance, sanctions of rules existed either guiding the sale
o f the product to the government, or directions to the police to assist them in
purchasing or implementing a system. In terms of operationality o f control, what
were the pressures on the organization to implement these systems? Memoranda
provide what the climate in the department was concerning the system. Other
examples such as newspaper articles, commission meeting notes, memoranda, or
legal proceedings were retrieved and examined.
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In the “Organizational Structure” level concerning motivation, corporate
culture, operative goals, and managerial pressure can be uncovered and disclosed
through office correspondence and electronic mails. What were the directives? Was
there pressure from top executives or from the vendors to implement and make
payments for the system? Were there friction, obstacles, or roadblocks to completion
within the organization, or more narrowly, with the subunits within the larger
department? Electronic mail and office correspondence of employees can determine
task segregation, constraints, and policies. Vaughan (1996) also used this method to
uncover the normalization o f deviance that occurred within the private corporations
and NASA. Relying on internal memoranda, correspondence, and recollection of
encounters through personal interviews, Vaughan was able to show that through a
cultural change, deviance can become the norm and poor and tragic decisions can be
made.
The control aspects, quality control, communications processes, reward
structure, and codes of conduct can be retrieved from available policies and standard
operating procedures (SOPs). The culture of compliance, at least from the position of
KDPS, can be seen in the interactions through correspondence and recollection of
conversations.
At the interactional level involving face-to-face interaction and perceptions of
those interactions, much of that information can be relayed from my experience and
those who worked on the project both for me and independent of me, such as
workers at the city’s IT department. Under the structural level, attractiveness of
illegal means and perception or description of the situation will be explained through
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personal experience, observation, or narratives of conversations. For example, a
portion of some software was sent to the department to use. The company’s project
manager admitted to me later that she knew the software had “bugs” which caused
certain failures leading to the loss of police reports and causing a loss of valuable
time as officers had to rewrite their reports. This situation led to numerous events
which can be explained at multiple levels o f the theoretical framework. Important
here was that it was a conversation that led to the disclosure o f the company’s
culpability in knowingly shipping a defective software product.
The final section of the framework is at the lowest level of control aspects of
the various projects. When things go wrong, excuses, explanations, diffusion, and
neutralization begin to set in. Whether these factors trickle down from the top or get
entrenched in the activities of the workers at the bottom, they all contribute to the
cultural reaction. Actions, behaviors, and attitudes can change or cause redirection of
the project or even inaction on the part of the workers. These activities are best
disclosed from internal electronic mails and correspondence for reconstruction of
what occurred.
Data Analysis
Yin (1994) proposes two general strategies for qualitative data analysis. The
first is to rely on one’s theoretical propositions. Following Kauzlarich and Kramer
(1998), Kramer and Michalowski (2005), and Michalowski and Kramer (2006), the
integrated theoretical approach will guide the research and assist in analyzing all
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levels o f activity. In keeping with the above-mentioned authors and Vaughan (1992,
1996), the researcher lets the theory loosely guide him/her through the analysis.
Yin’s (1994) second strategy involves developing a case description. A
descriptive framework should be used upon which to organize the data and provide
the analysis in a narrative form to convince the reader. In order to tell the story, I
provide a linear progression—from whence it all started—in the development and
the requirements for automation within the department. Again, the use o f the
analytical framework will be the guide for the analysis.
Points of Contention
There are points o f contention with the ethnographic, case study type of
research method. Specifically, some in the field share a disdain for case study
methodology/approach. In a social science field that values positivism, the case study
is seen as lacking rigor. Questions of reliability and validity arise, coupled with the
overarching idea of generalizability. The tests for both validity and reliability can be
addressed through use of data triangulation—i.e., using multiple sources of evidence
or documentation. For example, a grant solicitation is found indicating the
availability o f funding for certain computer equipment. Internal documents and
emails are located supporting request for the funding, and employees recall
contacting the government about getting the funding. Controversies, issues, or the
award o f the money can then be corroborated through the contracting and purchasing
phase. Multiple “paper trails” exist, supporting the existence of the grant and the
solicitation that led to the purchase and implementation of the system. Additionally,
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the “chain o f evidence” allows for a review of the flow of information and where it
was retrieved. “Data source triangulation, for example, is attained if the phenomenon
remains the same in other times and places . .

(Scholz and Tietje 2002:338).

External validity deals with the idea o f generalizing beyond the case itself.
The thought is that the results of case studies cannot be generalized beyond the case
itself. My interest here is theory elaboration and insight into the actions o f those
involved in the computer system purchases and implementations. First, can the use
of the theoretical framework espoused by Kramer and his colleagues be a useful tool
for analyzing state-corporate crime at the local government level? Is criminal activity
or deviance occurring at the intersection of the federal government’s involvement
with private corporations in encouraging the purchase, implementation, and use of
computer systems, thus causing harm at the local governmental level? My intent is
not to provide sweeping overarching generalizations to all local law enforcement
agencies, but rather to assess the usefulness of the model and focus on the statecorporate crime experienced by KDPS, the city of Kalamazoo, and ordinary citizens.
Reliability o f a study deals with ability o f another researcher to replicate my
findings. Could the research be conducted again resulting in the same findings? Yin
(1994) suggests a protocol to document decisions made and steps taken in one’s
research. This issue of reliability can be overcome by noting precisely where the
information was retrieved. There remain some results that cannot be replicated. In
ethnographic participant observation research where we seek to get to the stories and
histories o f what occurred, we often deal with certain suppositions that cannot be
avoided. What the observer saw cannot be replicated, nor can what the observer felt.
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Both are important to the story; both bring a richness to what occurred. Qualitative
studies are like that; the stories are left to stand by themselves. Tuchman (1998)
notes that the stories should be corroborated with other information. Use of several
informants is important, along with approaching the information from an inductive
or deductive method. Tuchman uses the concept of “stock of knowledge at hand”
which I bring to this research. Others can tell the events and occurrences, but I am
the one who experienced it. I know where to dig to substantiate the explanations and
corroborate the evidence. I know the “paper trails” better than anyone. This “stock of
knowledge at hand” brings a certain insight as well as a predetermined outlook, both
o f which I am aware o f and try to be reflexive about when conducting my analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
There were at least five macro-level historical, political economic, and/or
cultural factors that provided the institutional environment conducive to the
formation of state-corporate crime that occurred at KDPS. First, the development of
computer technology, dating back to the late 1950’s when the “Cold War” began,
and the race for space established a relationship between the federal government and
private sector computer and information technology companies in the development
and marketing of these technologies. Second, the wars on crime, drugs, and
terrorism, dating back to the mid-1960s, all provided an emphasis on the use of
computer technology by police to control crime, as the military used such
technologies in waging its wars, and provided federal monies to police departments
for this purpose.3 Third, the “New Federalism” started by Nixon, continued by
Carter, and refined by Reagan, provided for changes in the relationship between the
federal government and state/local governments, particularly with regard to
disbursement o f federal funding and degree of oversight. Fourth, market deregulation
provided for fewer federal regulations, allowing for big corporate mergers and

The police, for the purposes of this chapter, refers to the social institution of
policing and the police profession at-large. It refers to uniformed police serving
states, counties, and municipalities. It excludes federal services such as the FBI,
ATF, etc.
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creation of oligopolistic conditions in the computer and information technology
market that allowed vendors to provide defective equipment and software to local
law enforcement departments. Finally, the end of the Cold War also sparked new
innovations in information technology as there was less emphasis on military
applications and a corresponding need to cultivate new markets. All these factors
played key roles in providing the catalysts for action (i.e., the motivation,
opportunity, and absence o f social controls) for federal government agencies,
computer technology vendors, law enforcement professional organizations, and local
police departments, that in turn caused a chain of events that led to state-corporate
crime at KDPS.
This chapter examines this institutional environment that played a key role in
providing the necessary conditions and created the motivation, opportunity
structures, and (a lack of) controls that existed while KDPS was adopting and
implementing computer technology in its department. The history of each of the
factors noted above will be discussed briefly along with how each provided the
conditions for the actions o f federal government agencies, computer vendors,
professional organizations, and local police departments. Once the general
institutional context has been explicated, I then turn to the specific motivations,
opportunities, and controls this institutional context provided for actors like those in
the case of KDPS.
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Institutional Contextual Factors
Development o f Computer and Information Technologies
Edwards’ (1996) sociological work on the computer and corresponding
discourse describes the historical development o f the computer. Edwards sees the
development o f the computer as linked to particular political/military endeavors.
Beginning in World War II with analog devices used to guide cannon rounds, to the
“Star Wars” like devices proposed in the 1980’s, computer development has been
spurred by military needs and desires, and funded by the federal government via
contracts to private companies. Emerging from Cold War fears of the Russians
attacking the United States, a system known as SAGE attempted to set up a
protective radar netting over the United States to warn of attack. This was the first
attempt at getting computers to work as a network and provide information on a
grand scale. Additional work on computerized guidance systems for ballistic missiles
and efforts in aeronautics continued through the 1950’s, supplying the Korean War
with new technologies. Fueled by a fiery speech by President Truman preaching the
imminent attack by the Russians and the overthrow of the world by communists, the
military attempted to stay one step ahead of Russian technology and missile
proliferation and to build an anti-missile early warning system. Combine this with
the advancement o f space initiatives and the creation of the National Aeronautical
Space Administration (NASA), computers were in demand and research and
development (R&D) was paramount.
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Technology in the 1960’s was sparked by the race for space and the Vietnam
War. As the United States sought to put the first person on the moon, the Vietnam
War saw advances in weapon technology, radar enhancement, flight controls, and
other communications technologies. “Developed during and after World War II for
code breaking, computer technology advanced rapidly in the 1960’s through private
enterprise (IBM) and federal programs (mainly from the Department o f Defense
[DOD] and NASA)” (Wadman and Allison 2004:122). Initiatives such as “Igloo
White” during the Vietnam War were among the first instances of high-tech war
waging. This operation was focused on the infamous “Ho Chi Min Trail.” Sensors
were placed on the trail to detect the presence of humans and vehicles. Monitored in
an isolated air conditioned sterile environment, once a sensor indicated the presence
of a vehicle or a human, air strikes were ordered, a bombing run ensued, and the
source o f the activation was removed as bombs rained down from above. A new
form o f warfare was being waged where the enemy was never seen, but yet
theoretically was eliminated based on computer alerts and subsequent elimination by
pilots (Edwards 1996).
The computer and information technology market was driven in the 1960’s
and 1970’s by the vast amounts of spending by DOD and NASA for R&D, and
direct expenditures on the war and for space flight. The 1970’s saw the development
of the space shuttle program and yet another clamor for an early warning and
defensive space system that would stop incoming intercontinental missiles. A pop
culture event sparked the new focus on the ability to shoot down incoming missiles
and aircraft before the missiles hit American soil. “Star Wars,” an epic futuristic
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film, hit the screens in 1976 and fueled the thought that, through technological
countermeasures, we could remove the threat of nuclear missiles and other weapons
o f mass destruction falling on American soil. Large sums of federal money were
poured into R&D to private federal government contractors for this endeavor,
dubbed the “Strategic Defense Initiative” (SDI), allowing for society to reap the
benefits through faster, smaller, and better computing technology (Edwards 1996).
The private sector was now benefiting from the space flight initiatives of the
Apollo program and subsequent space shuttle programs, coupled with the advances
in technology from the Vietnam War and looming threat of the Cold War. Federal
government contractors like IBM, and others involved in communications such as
Motorola and AT&T, all started marketing the advances in technology, which had
been developed with federal dollars, to private sector businesses. Computers during
this time period started to become faster and smaller. Mainframe computers that once
took up an entire room started to shrink, and their processors started to increase in
speed and efficiency.
The 1980’s saw a profound development in both the use of computers and
technological advances. As R&D in the defense and space agencies focused on SDI
and the military’s push into Artificial Intelligence (AI), the business world was
experiencing a boom in the development of smaller “desk top” computers suitable
for use in the office environment. Word processing and spreadsheet software brought
along the realization that computers were now a necessity in the private sector work
environment.
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Private industries led the way for computer development in the 1990’s.
Silicon Valley, an icon for the development o f microprocessors, provided the needed
technology and manufacturing to increase computer use throughout the 1990’s.
Advances in software came from corporate giants like Microsoft, as well as smaller
companies all searching for their niche in the market. The mid-to-late 1990’s
witnessed a major increase in the use of the internet. First brought into use by
academic researchers motivated by their desire to share information, the business
community increasingly saw the internet as an important marketing tool, and as a
new market itself. “Dot.Corn’s” sprang up and created a new and lucrative market
place, both in terms o f selling wares and as a means of communication to reach more
potential customers.
The historical development of computers and information technology
provided not only the technological commodities at issue in the KDPS case, but it
also established a specific relationship between the federal government and private
sector with respect to the development and deployment of this technology. The
federal government contracted with private sector companies for R&D services and
manufacturing of computer and information systems technology for use in military
and space agency applications. Because the federal government contractors retained
patent rights to the technologies, they were able to adapt these technologies for other
private and public sector applications, thus creating a lucrative market, while bearing
none of the R&D costs. Also, the federal government’s heavy involvement in
funding the development o f computer and information technologies for use in
military engagements and space exploration provided the conditions for its
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involvement in further deployment of such technologies in other “wars,” as we will
see in the next section.
Wars on Crime, Drugs, and Terrorism
The war on crime, and subsequent war on drugs, saw their beginnings with
the creation o f then President Johnson’s Crime Commission, and subsequent Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). The Crime Commission produced
a lengthy report entitled, The Challenge o f Crime in a Free Society, outlining the
shortcomings o f law enforcement efforts in the 1960’s, and the technological needs
o f the police in the nation overall. From this 308-page report came some 200
recommendations, of which 11 specifically dealt with technology issues, and in
particular, the technology needs of the police. The Commission found that “crime is
a national, as well as a state and local phenomenon” (Seghetti 2002:2). This allowed
for the proposal by President Johnson for more aid to the police in the form of grants.
From this benchmark action by the President came the flow of federal money to the
police. With the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (Safe
Streets Act) o f 1968, Public Law 90-351, came the release of federal money for the
police. Title 1 o f the Act established the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) targeting the release of federal money for programs,
equipment, and technology.
“The enactment of the Safe Streets Act and the creation of LEAA ushered in
a new era of federal assistance to state and local governments for crime control”
(Seghetti 2002:2). This effect had a two-prong reaction. Not only did it provide
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funding for law enforcement, and in particular the advancement of technologies, but
it also expanded the federal government’s involvement in local law enforcement.
Criticized for mismanagement and other problems, the LEAA was disbanded after
twelve years. In its relatively short life, roughly $7.5 billion was disbursed to law
enforcement in the form o f grants and other in-kind services, such as training and
direct supply o f equipment (Seghetti 2002).
Important to this work is that this act marks the beginning of the concept of a
war on crime. Pepinsky (2006) writes on the notion of the “war on crime” and its
importance in terms o f political survival for politicians. In the United States, we have
always rallied around our leaders in times of war, so it was with the war on crime
and the subsequent funding and programs that followed.
In a militarized society, such as the United States, politicians tend to hang
onto their jobs by creating public enemies and by appealing for popular unity
against threats to public security. Being tough on foreign enemies and tough
on crime is a proven path to political success. (Pepinsky 2006:9).
The use of the term war also conjures up the notion of defeating the enemy at any
cost and by any means. Work in Potter and Kappeler (1998), Kappeler and Potter
(2005), and Bohm and Walker (2006) has shown that law enforcement efforts in
these wars bring about policy decisions, practices, and procedures that can be seen as
violating rights and contrary to the perceived “good efforts” of law enforcement. Use
of tanks and peacekeeper-type vehicles as a means of executing search warrants and
other activities aimed at the “war on crime” or “war on drugs” has stretched court
workloads to the breaking point. More importantly, though, it provides for the
release o f money. In other words, the costs of these wars have allowed for the
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transformation of many police agencies to the status they enjoy today because of the
funding sources. If it were not for the release of funding under the war of crime,
many departments would not have had or acquired the money necessary to automate
or purchase computers.
Not only was the concept of the war on crime an important by-product of the
Safe Streets Act, but one of the key goals of the Act was to advance the use of
technology within the police profession. This Act led the way for computerization
for local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. One outcome of this federal
money and the move to modernize the police was the advent of the National Crime
Information Center (NCIC), which is administered by the FBI. The NCIC is a
centralized index of fugitives, stolen property, and missing persons. Work began on
the NCIC in the late 1960’s, and it represented the first practical and combined
computerization efforts that linked together federal, state, and local police agencies
(Seaskate 1998). Additional work on telecommunications followed with the
development of “911” as the number dialed for emergencies. From the development
o f the concept of dialing one number to enhanced E911 systems of today, the
benefits of that early money from the Safe Streets Act have had significant effects on
all computer development within law enforcement.
Other legislation followed the Safe Streets Act, adding to the funding
available for police and the use of computer technology within the profession. The
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 revised federal sentencing and forfeiture
procedures. Chapter IV of the Justice Assistance Act of 1984 established the Office
o f Justice Programs (OJP), which would be the leading grant-making administrative
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agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ). Other bills, such as the Crime
Control Act of 1990, authorized $900 million in the Edward Byrne Memorial State
and Local Law Enforcement Assistance programs. Byrne grants were used to
provide training for programs in crime prevention and illegal drug enforcement. In
Kalamazoo County, Michigan, Byrne grant money was used for innovative programs
such as the “Community Prosecutor Program” and the staffing of a curfew violator
center to provide swift action when dealing with juvenile offenders taken off the
streets by the police. Byrne money was also used by local law enforcement for
computerization efforts and other programs focused on investigative techniques.
Development of the war on drugs also provided further money and impetus
for implementation and use o f computer technology by local law enforcement
agencies. Concerned over the heightened use of illegal drugs in the 1960’s and on
into the 1970’s, federal laws were enacted to assist law enforcement in the fight
against illegal drug use and trafficking.
The Harrison Act o f 1914 was the first law to make narcotics illegal, but the
most comprehensive and far-reaching act was Title II, Public Law 91-513, entitled
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act o f 1970. This law, and
its subsequent revisions and amendments, provided for the scheduling o f illegal
drugs, or what are referred to as dangerous drugs. It set the stage for many state drug
laws and subsequent enforcement of these laws. It also established federal
punishment guidelines and was the catalyst for the creation of the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA). It is one of the most far-reaching pieces of legislation
concerning illegal drug trafficking. It also established guidelines for prescription

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
drugs and penalties for violations o f this section. This led to the development of
computer databases that linked pharmacies and law enforcement agencies in efforts
to track addictive and harmful prescription drugs.
Other subsequent legislation added to the effects of the 1970 Act. These laws
included the Anti-Drug Abuse Act o f 1988, which established the concept o f a drugfree America as a goal. A key provision of that act was the establishment of the
Office o f National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) to set priorities, implement a
national strategy, and certify federal drug-control budgets. The focus of this bill was
on research and the prevention of illegal drug use. Additional bills have added
funding available to law enforcement over the years. In 1997, the passage of the
Drug-Free Communities Act provided funding to fight illegal drug trafficking and
also provided funding directly to neighborhoods to fight illegal drug activity
(Whitehouse Drug Council 1999).
Funding to fight illegal drugs included the efforts by federal agencies (DEA,
FBI, Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms) to automate and share data between law
enforcement agencies at various levels. During the 1970’s, 1980’s, and 1990’s,
money was provided through the federal government for computer and information
systems technologies. The legislation for fighting the war on drugs brought with it
additional funding for technology, much like that of the legislation that focused on
the war on crime. Again, raising the status o f the efforts to stop illegal drug activity
to a war status brought with it the public support needed to fund these activities.
The war on drugs, the war on crime, and the war on terrorism have occupied
our evening news for decades. On the contemporary scene the “War on ...” gets its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

beginning in the Johnson Administration with efforts in the Great Society and as a
result o f his 1967 Crime Commission. Since then, politicians have used the rhetoric
to gain support for programs and subsequent funding to fight crime, illicit drugs
(both trafficking and illegal use), and domestic terrorism. The notion or concept of
“war” allows us to escalate the social problem to epidemic proportions. Elevating
something to war status gives it a special status. Crank and Caldero (2000) borrow
from an earlier 1931 study by E. J. Hopkins, who notes that police often engage in
illegal behavior based on the perceived corruption of a noble cause. They can
develop a “war theory of crime control,” suggesting that the police are somehow
waging a war. In a war, the means justify the ends, so by whatever means available
to get the job done. This leads police towards a perceived mandate to accomplish
their mission. Feeling this pressure by the public to wage war, causes police to seek
results and find solutions at whatever cost. Police will tend to lean towards
circumventing existing policies, but more importantly, will circumvent the law to get
results. By waging war and attempting to eliminate both crime and drug trafficking,
police can feel pressure to take matters into their own hands. Results of these
activities can be seen in court decisions where evidence is dismissed or suspects are
released without trial. Overzealous police, working towards the noble cause, can use
creative, on the edge methods to wage war.
The Harrison Narcotic Act was one of the first laws passed that made
narcotics illegal. Since then a debate has ensued over determining the proper
institution to enforce such anti-drug laws. The question is posed, is it a law
enforcement responsibility or a medical psycho-physiological problem? Should the
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issue be addressed in the courts or addressed in the hospitals and clinics? The debate
continues to be fueled by sociologists’ claims for both sides to handle the problem. It
has recently, though, been compounded by politics. Kappeler and Potter (2005) note
that the drug problem has been created by politicians, politics, and the subsequent
bureaucratic need o f law enforcement to attack the problem. “Politicians pander to
public fear and frame the drug issues in the starkest, most unyielding terms”
(Kappeler and Potter 2005 :176). More important is the fact that the war on drugs
offers the opportunity for bureaucratic expansion, requiring more money, more
personnel, and greater police powers to enforce newly created laws to protect our
citizens from the dangers of illicit drugs.
Recent bureaucratic and political rhetoric has created a nexus among crime,
drugs, and domestic terrorism. Kappeler and Potter’s (2005) work provides an
advertisement that captures this link. It depicts a close-up photograph of a female,
with carefully applied make-up, emulating what appears to be a woman of wealth.
The caption over her face reads, “On Wednesday, I played tennis, went shoe
shopping, and helped smuggle a load of AK-47s into Columbia.” The bottom of the
advertisement reads, “Drug money helps support terror. Buy drugs and you could be
supporting it too. Get the facts at the antidrug.com. Get help at the National
Treatment Hotline, 800 662-HELP” (174). Government sponsored advertisements
like these help create, perpetuate, and sustain the belief that this connection exists.
The additional subliminal message here is that to stop drugs is to stop crime, and to
stop drugs and crime will ultimately stop domestic terrorism.
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Law Enforcement as part of the war on drugs has grown by leaps and bounds,
supported by initiatives focused at stopping drug trafficking. Since Reagan made it a
priority, efforts have focused on reducing use, stopping the supply, removing the
source, preventing border entry, and promoting aggressive enforcement on the streets
of America. The fallout has been racial disparities in enforcement and court
sentencing, gender disparity, and law enforcement corruption. Billions of dollars
have been poured into enforcement, courts, and penal sanctions, appearing to be to
no avail (Kappeler and Potter 2005).
Despite the best efforts and the spending of billions of dollars, society seems
no closer to ridding itself o f illegal drugs, crime, or terrorism. It appears that at every
turn we simply were wrong. We cannot fight a war that we do not want to win. The
police have no more ability to stop crime than they have to stop the influx of drugs
through trafficking or to stop illegal drug use. Furthermore, likening terrorism to
drug sales or crime is like stating the Iraqi war was justified based on terrorist
activities o f that nation-state. (Kramer, Michalowski and Rothe 2005). What the war
on drugs and crime did do was add police and federal agents to the streets, assist in
professionalizing the police through training and education, increase the use of
technology to stop trafficking and other crimes, provide military equipment and
training to the police, and create a draconian prison system where “lock ’em up and
keep ’em” mentality caused a huge incarceration rate at an enormous economical
cost. Even a review of a 2005 publication from the federal government entitled How
Goes the “War on Drugs ”?: An Assessment o f U.S Drug Problems and Policy, could
not outline the government’s continued plan in this alleged war. The first chapter
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begs the question “Successful at achieving what goals?” (3) Rhetorical in nature,
nonetheless, it points to the lack o f goals throughout the last two decades. The
publication admits that the current goal is one focused at the drug user and efforts to
control drug use.
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act o f 1994
Not since the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act o f
1968 and the creation o f the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA)
has law enforcement been impacted more and has been provided with more funding
than with the passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 (Crime Bill). In 1994, then President William J. Clinton signed into law House
Resolution 3355, creating Public Law 90-351. The signing of the bill brought
millions of dollars to law enforcement agencies. This money was targeted for
victims’ rights monies, policing, courts, training, and technology.
While portions of the Crime Bill focused primarily on community policing,
certain segments allowed for and encouraged the development of technologies for
the police. Under the guise o f community policing, the Crime Bill called for
technical assistance to trickle down to the states and local governments. One of the
key proposals under the law, though, was the deployment of an additional 100,000
police officers working in community policing activities throughout the United
States. “From 1995 to 2003, the COPS Office provided more than $6.9 billion to
nearly 13,000 state and local law enforcement agencies to hire over 118,000 officers,
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deputies, and troopers” (Dunham and Alpert 2005:37). Falling short of this goal, the
selling point o f the initial bill was this addition of officers on the street.
Title XIV o f the bill entitled “Community Policing—Cops on the Beat”
aimed to “develop new technologies to assist state and local law enforcement in
reorienting the emphasis o f their activities from reacting to crime to preventing
crime” (Public Law 90-351). This section was to provide technical assistance to local
police for technologies and was administered by the U.S. Attorney General’s Office,
Office o f Justice Programs. The funding was funneled through the USDOJ, and then
to the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office and NIJ. Over the next
decade, over $9 billion was spent “to help police agencies implement COPPS—
community oriented policing and problem-solving—by adding officers to the beat
and providing technical assistance, technology, equipment and training” (Peak and
Glensor 2002:24). Title XIV, then, established two key areas. First was the attempt
to add 100,000 more officers on the street, under the guise of community-policing
activity, and second, it provided for technical assistance and monies for local police
to purchase computer equipment.
The release of the money was to begin in the 1995 federal fiscal year with the
initial release o f the grant money for more officers. Initiatives in the technologies
area o f the law were slower to develop, as was the establishment of the COPS Office.
Once the office was established, it started releasing publications and solicitations to
fund research in both the advantages of technology use and the promulgation of the
concept o f community-policing. The research under COPS was focused on such
things as the advantage of in-car computers, the use of CAD to measure officer
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activity, and the impact o f other computer technology for use in criminal
investigations, such as automated fingerprint capturing and other biometric devices.
Research in the amount of time spent by officers in a particular area was beginning
to be looked at as a means of supporting the community-policing concept. This type
o f work could be done only with the assistance of computer technology. In essence,
the COPS office was established to bring about the growth of community policing
and the use of technologies in support of advancing community policing. Grants such
as “Advancing Community Policing” were released for technology initiatives. “The
COPS Office was charged with aiding in the increased deployment of officers to the
streets and promoting community-oriented policing” (Nunn and Quinet 2002:84).
Other local and state community policing projects such as “Integration, Organization
and Technology” were funded under this umbrella. Publications from COPS-funded
research began to surface around 1997 and continued into the 2000’s. Publications
such as “The Evolution and Development of Police Technology,” “Police
Department, Information Systems Technology Enhancement Project (ISTEP), a
COPS Publication,” and “Policing Smarter Through IT: Lessons in Enterprise
Implementation” were available through the COPS internet website and NIJ research
publications.
The Crime Bill was a huge boost in financial support for local police to begin
their automation efforts. Released by the federal government as a means to control
crime under the authority of the Crime Bill and community policing initiatives,
monies were provided in the form of grants. Through the COPS Office, solicitations
were released that allowed local agencies to compete for these federal dollars. These
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dollars were tied to community policing efforts. The Crime Bill became “the
statutory basis for creating the COPS office and authorizing it to spend $9 billion on
grants to state, local, and other public law enforcement agencies and supporting
functions” (Skogan 2004:3).
Money for computer systems was clearly tied to community policing efforts
but was to be available at the local level and put towards developing, implementing,
or sustaining a community policing presence. The literature began to grow
concerning the connection between community policing and technology (see Peak
and Glensor 2002; Dunham and Alpert, 2001, 2005; Roberg, Crank and Kuykendall
2000; Skogan 2004). Chu (2001) noted that IT supports the concept and precepts of
community policing, and in fact, the use of computers supports the individual
officer’s efforts. For example, the use of the internet to post crime information, the
use of computers for presentations, and the use of computers in police cruisers
supports the individual officer’s efforts in community policing. It only strengthens
the ability of officers to gather information and provide that information to their
constituents.
Pattavina (2005) sums up this connection:
[The Crime Bill] formalized federal IT development aid to local jurisdictions
at an unprecedented level. Under the MORE (Making Officer Redeployment
Effective) program, the OCOPS delivered more than $1.3 billion to nearly
4,500 police departments for the acquisition and implementation of IT
systems. The principle behind this commitment was the notion that improved
information systems would work as force multipliers by reducing the time
burdens imposed on police officers by data-gathering requirements.
Participating departments were required to commit to increased street time
for police officers to secure MORE funding. Initially, the OCOPS reserved
the right to withdraw funding, or to require reimbursement for funds
disbursed, if departments were unable to live up to their commitments. This
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condition was later relaxed, but the principle that more effective use of IT
enhances police performance was well established and accepted. (Pattavina
2005:7)
The belief put forth by the COPS office, and through the release o f money for
IT efforts, was that crime analysis was a useful tool for the officer and departments,
and that computers would somehow save the officer valuable time to be redirected
towards community policing efforts. Thus, the “carrot-and-the-stick” analogy began
to grow. In order to receive federal money for computers, one must agree, at least in
principle and on paper, to the expansion of community policing efforts within the
department. A federal agenda, then, was caste by the passage of the Crime Bill and
the release o f funding through the COPS office.
COMPSTAT was also used as a precept to computerization. Supported by
COPS under the guise o f crime analysis, COMPSTAT was touted as a management
tool and, more important, as a means to reduce crime. Through the use o f crime
analysis and detailed computer generated reports, commanders were held
accountable for crime in their precincts/areas and subsequently responsible for
lowering those crime rates. This concept expanded through the late 1990’s and early
2000’s. Heralded for crime reduction in New York City through the 1990’s (Bratton
and Knobler 1998; Pattavina 2005; Dunham and Alpert 2001, 2005), it nonetheless
has come with great skepticism as well (see Willis, Mastrofski, and Weisburd 2006).
One criticism was that this type of technique leads to “cooking the books” type of
practices. When holding one accountable for activities reported to police, one only
has to change what is reported to the police to alter the numbers and alter the
perception that crime is on the rise. Inaccurate recording of numbers, not taking a
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report, or changing an offense to a non-criminal incident are all practices that have
been used to “adjust” numbers to fit the desires. Criticisms notwithstanding, the
concept still generated the desire within the police profession to computerize in order
to generate needed information and to allocate resources to stop or deal with crime
problems.
From the COPS office came publications like “Police Department
Information Systems Technology Enhancement Project (ISTEP),” “Policing Smarter
Through IT: Lessons in Enterprise Implementation,” “Making Officer Redeployment
Effective (MORE): Using Technology to Keep America’s Communities Safe,”
coupled with evaluation pieces such as “National Evaluation of the COPS Program:
Title I of the 1994 Crime Act” or “Using COPS Resources” and “Relations Between
Known Crime and Police Spending in Large United States Cities.” The ISTEP (U.S.
Department of Justice 1999) publication attempted to build the case that IT was
directly related to community policing, and by following an information usage
pattern, it would become obvious to the police that in order to properly function as a
community-oriented police department, IT was needed to assist. Additionally, the
document points out that “A long-run ISTEP objective is to provide police
departments with specific recommendations concerning the products that are
appropriate and suitable for particular needs” (U.S. Department o f Justice 1999:17).
Manning (1997, 2003) never believed that the community policing effort was
anything more that an attempt by local police to get federal money. Calling
community policing a “rhetorical giant” (1997, 2003), he admitted that the Crime
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Bill provided important funding for automation efforts. Reflecting on the evolution
of IT for the police and its funding sources, Manning (2003) pointed out that
at each stage, the advances were unplanned, politically driven, and centered
around an imagined efficient force that in fact was traditionally organized,
committed to a professional model of practice, and (while emphasizing crime
control) devoted primarily to the appearance of service via demand
management and reactive patrol. (P. 129)
Manning supported my contention that the COPS period was nothing more than the
local police’s attempt to get federal funding to support their local IT efforts. In fact,
he noted that there exists a pattern o f unplanned politically driven activity supporting
this belief.
Pattavina (2005) pointed out that when implementing IT projects, there exists
a vast array o f competency; a lack o f standardization; differences in philosophical
outlooks; a gap between researcher theory and practitioner experiences; and a lack of
standardized equipment, processes, and training. Disparate systems exist throughout
the profession and throughout the nation, creating problems in IT projects. Vast
numbers o f vendors in the field of police computer equipment (CAD, RMS, MPC)
lead to confusion on the part of the police as to who can provide for their needs and
whom they can best deal with.
Vendors seek to sell only the most expensive version of their products and
are not in the business of advising police and other criminal justice agencies as to
what the most cost-effective and beneficial package would be. “To some extent,
there is a severe need for an ‘honest broker,’ that is, an agency that would advise
police agencies and assist them in selecting those products that would truly meet
their particular needs” (Pattavina 2005 :140).
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Benefit o f Computers Portrayal
Not only did the release of the federal funding instill a belief that
computerization was necessary, but the profession was bombarded by NIJ, extant
literature, and professional periodicals with the benefits of computerization. Nunn
and Quinet (2002) provided a glimpse of what the profession faces when considering
computerization:
Journalistic profiles of technology use in police agencies evoke cinematic
Robocop imagery. Vendors offer anecdotes of improved performance,
convincing employees of agencies to seek the newest information
technologies (IT). Periodicals such as Government Technology, Government
Computing, and Law Enforcement Technology regale readers with narratives
describing the miraculous enhancements made possible by local area
networks, wireless systems personal digital assistants, data mining, mobile
digital terminals, cellular digital packet data (CDPD) systems, and the like.
(Pp. 81-82)
For example, Washington Technology published articles such as “High-Tech
Crime Fighters, Law Enforcement Officials Add IT to Their Arsenals” ( Washington
Technology 1998). Police Chief magazine and Law Enforcement Technology
magazine continue to publish articles on the benefits of computerization. Articles
focused on all realms o f the computer system, from the benefits of computerized
CAD to RMS and mobile systems, started surfacing in the mid-1990’s and continue
to be published today.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act
While the institutional level activity of the 1990’s set the stage for computer
development, other events propelled the police into computerization and
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modernization o f their communication and computerization capabilities. The events
o f September 11, 2001, created a call for better communications and sharing of data
between law enforcement agencies at all levels. Legislators rushed to create
legislation that would allow for funding for better communications, but also changed
the law pertaining to how U.S. law enforcement officials could collect, retain, and
analyze information on U.S. citizens. A practice limited by intelligence oversight
legislation passed as a result of the Chicago convention unrest in 1968 and the
realization that the FBI was keeping files on citizens that were not immediately
involved in criminal or counterespionage activity. In other words, the federal
government was keeping information in files with the belief that somehow the
person was subversive towards the government4
The PATRIOT Act added two important facets for local law enforcement.
One was to strengthen the ability for local law enforcement, with the help of federal
agencies, to increase its ability to conduct wiretaps, since locals appeared to be
stymied in their ability to conduct wiretapping. It also brought with it further funding
for the advancement of technologies for the police. This act, coupled with the
establishment o f the Department of Homeland Security, poured money into local

4 1 do not have the ability to go into lengths concerning the intell-oversight
legislation or the backlash from the concerns of the activity at the convention or the
McCarthy era and impact upon learning the FBI was keeping innocuous files on
citizens not involved in criminal activity. New technological advances somehow
made these practices safer and more sterile from misuse, which was the apparent
perception by the legislators. This, along with the fervor of the events surrounding
9/11, led to the passage of a bill that reduced the rights of the citizens of the U.S.
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emergency responders and their departments for the purposes of inter
communications and interconnectivity between all emergency responders.
As part o f the war on terrorism, the PATRIOT Act has provided for another
catalyst in the development and perpetuation o f computerization in law enforcement.
The PATRIOT Act and the Homeland Security Department began in earnest to
attempt to tie together the communications of all law enforcement agencies in the
U.S. The impact o f this bill and the development of a federal department has yet to
be measured. Most attention is paid to the Act because of the controversy
surrounding its loosening o f collection of intelligence on U.S. citizens and the ease
with which wiretaps may now be used. Both appear to be another catalyst for further
money for the police to purchase large computer systems, thereby opening the door
for computer vendors to sell their product and take advantage of the police as they
have in the past.
As with the development of the computer, the institutional factors in the war
on crime, drugs, and terrorism allowed for the establishment of bases of funding for
the legitimation of the actions of the police. The creation of a “war” status allowed
for an attack by the police on illegal “drug trafficking” and “crime” problems.
Couple this with the creation of the war on terrorism on a developing domestic front,
and the police were placed in a position to demand the tools they deemed necessary
to fight these wars. These tools were seen both in the area of computerization and in
the area o f weaponry (see Kraska 2004) and other equipment. The need to attack a
problem on a war-like plane catapulted the perceived needs of the police to
computerize the profession, and thereby provided them with the perceived tools
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necessary to get the job done. Bratton and Knobler (1998) writes o f the need for
computerization as he attacked the crime problem in New York City. The
COMPSTAT model required newer, better, and faster computer systems to keep up
with management’s demand for accurate data. As we will see in the next chapter, the
chief at KDPS believed in this model of COMPSTAT and wanted to automate the
department to use Bratton and Knobler’s model o f management and the directing of
resources to control crime problems.
Professional Association Involvement
Following the release of COPS’ office publications and the covering of
computerization in professional periodicals, an increase of coverage concerning the
benefits of computerization and the police was surfacing among the professional
associations. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) published “Information
Management and Crime Analysis: Practitioners’ Recipes for Success” in 1997.
Annual PERF conferences continue to discuss the benefits and potential failures of
computerization in the profession (PERF Conference Agendas 2002).
In 1999, the preeminent professional police association, the IACP, convened
a special committee on police computerization. Dubbed the Law Enforcement
Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC), its members comprised
representatives from the IACP Technology Division, National Sheriffs Association,
National Organization o f Black Law Enforcement Executives, and PERF. In 2002,
they presented to DOJ and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) IT Initiatives
section, a strategic plan. The “Strategic Plan FY 2003” was presented as a building-
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block document spelling out the need for standards in the law enforcement
community concerning computerization. Essentially the plan provided for the
promotion of IT standards, providing advice on technical aspects o f IT standards and
justice IT initiatives, as well as sharing practical experiences.
Important in this document is the connection between this council, the federal
justice departments, and the IT industry. The publication indicated that in order for
this council to accomplish the above initiatives, it needed to do the following:
A. Influence and facilitate the development o f IT Standards for justice
communities to enable information sharing and interoperability.
B. Educate and encourage the law enforcement community to adopt
established standards, as well as involve industry in the process.
C. Act as conduit to collaborative justice IT initiatives, to identify, promote
and collect standards specifically pertaining to enforcement communities
[their emphasis], (Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, 1)
It goes on to indicate that federal funding was received for this LEITSC endeavor
and justice department members as well as industry representatives would be
included for the creation of standards.
This was another institutional catalyst that propelled the police profession
into the quest for computerization and large computer systems. Specifically, the
internet web site discusses systems such as CAD, RMS and MPCs. It perpetuates the
notion that the police must have these systems in order to function as a modem day
department. The fact that these preeminent associations belong to this consortium
lends credence to the fact that police must have these large complicated computer
systems. Backed by the federal government with grant funding, the notion is that it
must be an appropriate activity, otherwise the federal government would not fund it.
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New Federalism
The concept of a new federalism comes from the changes that occurred
within the Nixon and Reagan administrations, which first started to gain attention in
the Eisenhower era. Reshaping of the outlook on the federal government began with
the presidencies of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson. Both began to
nationalize policy innovations, change public expectations o f federal government
services, and alter political incentives for politicians. They essentially expanded both
the beliefs o f the constituency and the services provided to them. We, the citizens,
began to believe the federal government was the answer to our woes and, in fact,
federal programs (Great Society, War on Poverty, New City, and other depression
era programs) were the avenues to a better life. Monies were poured into programs to
rejuvenate the economy, and to both create and expand social assistance programs.
Eisinger and Gormeley (1988) argued that “federal involvement in the domestic
policy concerns that so greatly fueled federal expansion in the 1960s and early 1970s
began to contract in the eighties leading to a transformation in the system of
intergovernmental relations . . . ” (p. 3)
The new federalism, and in particular that of the Reagan Administration, was
to do the opposite. According to Conlan (1998), “Reagan attempted to do much the
same in reverse” (p. 111). Tax cuts and increased defense spending cooled the
rhetoric for federal programs and changed the form in which federal money was
released to the state governments and federal bureaus. Under the guise that social
programs were inefficient and ineffective, the new federalist approach sought to
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eliminate the federal government’s involvement and funding in social programs
(Conlan 1998; Eisinger and Gormley 1988).
Controlling programs through the use o f the “purse strings,” Reagan, with the
Director o f the Office o f Management and Budget (OMB) David Stockman, began
this trek with reforms in the 1981 budget, whereby they consolidated some eighty
categorical grants into seven block grants, coupled with the elimination of General
Revenue Sharing. Followed in 1982 by a sweeping plan for restructuring the federal,
state, and local responsibilities, the change in grant structure and responsibility was
to place more responsibility on state and local governments. Programs that had been
more closely monitored and controlled by the federal governments were to be turned
over to the states and then trickle down to local governments. These changes were
seen as a broader political and ideological goal of Reagan’s against public sector
activism and the modern welfare state. They, nonetheless, changed for decades the
method, means, and direction of receiving federal monetary support (Conlan 1998;
Eisinger and Gormley 1988; Wibbels 2005).
Not only did the method change, but the money spent in these areas
decreased drastically. Spending for federal grants-in-aid for state and local
governments was reduced 4.4% from 1980 to 1981, and 12.4% from 1981 to 1982.
Slight increases were experienced from 1983 to 1985,5 with decreases of 7% and 6%

5 Increases here are often assumed to have covered Reagan’s initiative for the war on
drugs. Assistance for local law enforcement was provided through the states as a
means to target and fight against illicit drug trafficking in the United States.
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for 1986 and 1987 (Eisinger and Gormley 1998). These decreases represented huge
cuts in social assistance programs.
Important here is the change in which federal money was to be provided to
local governments. Under a very narrow and specific approach, federal money in
categorical grants was doled out for specific reasons and priorities. Under the new
federalist system, money was fonneled down through the states in the form of block
grants. This removed many of the stipulations, guidance, and regulations previously
encountered when asking for or spending federal money.
An interesting phenomenon occurred to the police profession though, as new
federalism again began to surface with the 104th Congress (1995-1997). The first
Republican-led House and Senate for decades believed they held a “Contract with
America” and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich believed there was a mandate for
reform. Under the constraint of the Graham-Rudman-Hollings bill calling for a
balanced budget, Congress again tightened the belts of social programs and
reinvigorated the Reagan notion of better government is less government. The twist
to this is that in 1994, the Crime Bill was passed, calling for billions of dollars to be
spent in crime control. It appears that the only areas that conservative ideologically
based governments in the U.S. will support are issues of crime, punishment, and anti
drug initiatives (Conlan 1998; Eisinger and Gormley 1988; Manning 2003).
Market Deregulation
Not only did the U.S. experience a new federalism approach to federal
funding and grants, but it was also experiencing a deregulation phenomenon at the
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hands of the conservative-based ideological politicians and the public in general.
Tired of the recession and stagflation of the 1970’s and early 1980s, regulation at the
federal level was being blamed for the inability to pull the country out of the
trenches. Despite the fact that the rest of the world was experiencing the same
economic conditions, the conservative-based arm of the government, led then by
President Reagan, was moving swiftly to deregulate some of the major modes of
transportation and communications in the U.S. These deregulating efforts would
provide the catalysts for other monopolistic endeavors (Himmelberg 1994; Eisner,
Worsham, and Ringquist 2000; Stiglitz 2003; Kahn 2004).
As Himmelberg (1994) notes, the enthusiasm for deregulation often starts
with discontent for big business. Developing out of the belief that big business in the
U.S. was tied to a “military-industrial complex” (p. xv) based on the actions
surrounding the Vietnam War, growing support to break these ties was connected to
the belief that the government existed at the “behest of big business” (p. xv).
Stigler’s (1971) “Theory of Economic Regulation” notes that regulations are
designed and operated for the benefit of the regulated parties. The creation of
barriers by these large firms is the most important factor in the regulatory process.
They seek and demand control of the entry of competitors, and the government’s
reaction is to provide the protection based on the perceived belief—controlled by the
business—that to have competition would create economic, or in the case of
communications, disastrous effects. Under a utilitarian notion of the greatest good
for all, large firms seek protection against competition and control of the market
through the government’s efforts. Eisner et al. (2000) refer to it as cartel
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management. The ideological left demanded deregulation as a means of getting out
o f supporting these large firms that derive huge profits from wars like the Vietnam
War.6
The left ideological movement was not the only party interested in
deregulation. “Partisans o f the New Left neither initiated nor acted as the only force
demanding deregulation. Deregulation, the returning of industry to the marketplace,
appealed to many conservatives and to many people who had no strong ideological
bent” (Himmelberg 1994:xv). What occurred was the repulsion of the notion of
government involved market regulation. The thinking was that government should
not be involved in the economics of industry. What followed was a reformatory
movement that dismantled regulation for transportation, airlines, communications,
and other industries. As Himmelberg (1994) states, “These now were to be subject to
the vicissitudes of the marketplace” (p. xvi) and “a central feature of the decade’s
politics” (Eisner et al. 2000:41).
The 1980s saw a vicious attack on deregulation in efforts at stymieing
monopolies held in communications, airlines, trucking, and the automobile industry.
As noted above, the conservative-based projection was to allow for the market to
control the industries, removing the influence of big government. The trucking
industry saw deregulation under Carter, while the airlines and communications were
attacked under Reagan’s term by then Vice President George Bush. “By the nineties,

6 Insightful here would be a reminder of Rothe’s (2006) work on Haliburton and
Vice President Cheney’s involvement and the collusion and support for big business
in the Iraqi War. The saga continues thirty years after the end of the Vietnam War.
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it had become an article o f faith with many Republicans, and quite a few Democrats
as well, that the market, by itself, could handle almost any problem—that
government, by definition, made things worse” (Stiglitz 2003 :102).
The belief was that the competitive nature of the market would not allow for
the creation of monopolies because no one in the market would dare set high prices
for fear of competitors undercutting their prices. This was not the case. In fact, all
theories that free market competition would thwart the creation o f monopolies were
wrong. By the 1990s, the airlines had created a hub-and-spoke type of monopolistic
system where large airlines controlled certain airports. For instance, TWA dominated
St. Louis; Northwest, Minneapolis; and American, Dallas/Fort Worth. “Not
surprisingly, the airlines often used this monopoly power to raise prices and increase
profits” (Stiglitz 2003:103).
The banking and financial institutions provided another glowing example that
deregulation created monopolistic endeavors. Stiglitz (2003) notes that the banking
and S&L debacles o f the 1980’s, 1990’s, and even 2000’s (Enron et al.) should
indicate the potential pitfalls and failures of deregulation and that “this experience
should have taught us, for instance, that deregulation is difficult to do well. And that
when it is not done well, the mistake can be extremely costly” (Stiglitz 2003:103).7
What transpired with deregulation was the creation of opportunities for
oligopolistic endeavors. Stiglitz (2003) stated the ignoring of anti-trust policies

7 The S&L debacle shows what can go awry when deregulation fails. The S&L cases
may have been examined by many not only for the failure of deregulation but from a
criminogenic perspective as well.
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created the opportunities for some of the largest cases of collusion in big business
history. The 1990’s was replete with examples of collusive price-fixing, bid-rigging,
and conspiracy cases by large corporations. Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) was
fined a record $100 million for price fixing, while other large corporations were
fined for similar activities. Microsoft had created their empire by forcing out
competition and leveraging their dominance over the computer industry. So what
appeared to be sound theoretical basis for deregulation, in fact, opened the door for
the creation of new monopolies and further criminal behavior at a cost to consumers
(Stiglitz 2004; Eisner et al. 2000).
At the institutional level, these deregulatory actions set the stage for
decreased involvement of government intervention, thereby allowing for the
computer companies to operate without controls and essentially creating and
controlling pricing for their products on their own. Pricing was set by the industry,
not by the consumer. Prices for software were controlled by one vendor, while prices
for the hardware were controlled by another vendor having ties to the software
vendor. Collusive price fixing was involved when the vendors added additional costs
when handling products from one vendor to another. As an institutional condition
affecting the computer system debacle at KDPS, deregulation allowed computer
vendors to operate at will, controlled only by their close competitor with whom they
were often closely associated and which, in the past, allowed one vendor to receive a
contract and then the other vendor to get the next contract.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95
End o f the Cold War
The late 1980’s and early 1990’s also saw another shift in direction at the
institutional level involving computers. That was the crumbling of the giant U S S R.
With the removal o f the Berlin Wall and the growing move for independence,
coupled with a move towards a capitalist economy, the end of the Cold War signaled
the end o f the SDI initiative. The United States found itself without a major war, a
major target, and an SDI program that never met its goals. NASA also saw a major
obstacle in that the space shuttle Challenger explosion saw America’s confidence in
a social institution deflated (Vaughan 1996; Kramer 1992).
Companies formally focused on DOD and NASA contracts were forced to
seek out new areas for R&D, coupled with the development of other market
segments. Several areas impacted the use of computers by the police in this regard.
Communications and the use of mainframe computers created a new market for
vendors in public safety and, in particular, the police. Computerization of analog
communications systems in both telecommunications and voice communications
began to change. Again, Motorola and other vendors (AT&T, Bell Corp. etc.), saw
an increase in a certain market segment and focused on those segments for
developing additional client bases. These client bases were the police (Edwards
1996; Wadman and Allison 2004; Alcorn 2003).
The end o f the Cold War provided another catalystic event that propelled the
police profession into the computerization era. This event allowed for the expansion
of market segments based on the dwindling need of the military. As the enemy
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changed, so did the direction of the vendors. They began to focus on other
professions. Benefits such as faster, smaller, and more efficient mainframes along
with ruggedized laptop computers were just some examples o f the types of computer
equipment being sold to the police. These were a direct result of the change in the
market resulting from the end of the Cold War and movement to other markets.
Analysis
In the early 1990’s, authors started writing about the impact of computers on
police (see Manning 1992). It was clear by then that the profession was following in
the path of the social movement of computerization. By the mid 1990’s and into the
2000’s, computers and their various uses were firmly entrenched in society and
within the police profession and were being used by an ever-increasing number of
police departments (Chu 2001; Manning 2003; Pattavina 2005). The police
continued to enjoy the advances developed for the military in mobile computing.
Ruggedized computers, developed for military use in tanks and other vehicles that
endure combat situations, allowed for more robust MPCs. Computers that could
withstand extreme temperatures, operating twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year,
were brought into production and made possible for the police by the technological
advances of the military and space programs. The development of computers for the
police profession was propelled by the social movement within the United States for
better, faster, more reliable computers. As one would expect, the profession was
merely trying to keep up with the movement around them.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Crime Bill also fueled the expansion and use of computers within the
profession. As noted above, the Crime Bill’s main focus was on community-based
policing. Emphasis was placed on getting 100,000 more police officers on the streets
as community police officers. The Crime Bill added more though. Title XTV of the
Crime Bill entitled “Cops on the Beat” advocated the following:
(4) Develop new technologies to assist State and Local Law Enforcement
agencies in reorienting the emphasis o f their activities from reacting to crime
to preventing crim e. . .
(8) Develop and establish new administrative and managerial systems to
facilitate the adoption o f community-oriented policing as an organizationwide philosophy. . .
Subsection “E” provided for further technical assistance calling upon the U.S.
Attorney General to provide assistance as needed. Specifically it provided:
(E) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE(1) The Attorney General may provide technical assistance to State
and units of local government, and to other public and private
entities, in furtherance of the purposes of this part.
(2) The technical assistance provided by the Attorney General may
include the development of a flexible model that will define for
States and units of local government, and other public and private
entities definitions and strategies associated with community or
problem-oriented policing and methodologies for its
implementation.
(3) The technical assistance provided by the Attorney General may
include the establishment and operation of training centers or
facilities, either directly or by contracting or cooperative
arrangements. The functions of the centers may include
instruction and seminars for police executives, manager, trainers,
and supervisors concerning community or problem-oriented
policing and improvements in police-community interaction and
cooperation that further the purposes of this part. (105)
Other provisions called for direct application for grant funding from local
governments to the U.S. Attorney’s office through OJP.
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Several factors arose out of this legislation that are key to explaining what
occurred to the police with computer purchases. First and foremost was the release of
huge amounts o f money targeted not only at putting officers on the streets, but also
for technical advances through the advancement of the community-policing
model/effort and what some called a movement towards a community-policing
paradigm (Peak and Glensor 2002). Second was the ability o f local governments to
apply for, and receive, direct federal funding towards these ends. Third was the
development of new technologies focused on crime prevention, advancing
community policing, and attempting to save officers’ time on the street. This would
thereby allow more time with the community they were serving. This was an
apparent attempt to give rise to Trojanowicz, Kappeler, and Gaines’ (2002) work on
getting the police back in touch with the community.
The money released through the COPS office and NIJ was substantial. Over
the next decade, over $9 billion was spent “to help police agencies implement
COPPS—community oriented policing and problem-solving—by adding officers to
the beat and providing technical assistance, technology, equipment and training”
(Peak and Glensor 2002:24). The appeal of this money drove police executives to
apply for and receive money for developing their computer systems. The COPS
office was established to bring about a growth of community policing and the
advancement of technologies in support o f the community policing initiative. Grants
such as “Advancing Community Policing” were released for technology initiatives.
“The COPS Office was charged with aiding in the increased deployment of officers
to the streets and promoting community-oriented policing” (Nunn and Quinet
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2002:84). Other projects such as “Integration, Organization and Technology” were
funded under this umbrella and were divvied out to local and state agencies for their
use.
Publications from COPS money research began to surface around 1997 and
continued through the 2000’s. These publications became available on the much
visited COPS internet web page by those interested in receiving grant funding.
In essence, what was dangled in front of the local police profession’s
proverbial noses was that to receive federal funding under the Crime Bill, the
department needed to be pro-community policing oriented, requesting funds for that
endeavor, and if they needed money for technology, it must be used in support of
community policing efforts. The ISTEP (U.S. Department of Justice 1999)
publication was a 165-page publication on how to implement community policing,
followed by some vague instructions on how to implement computer systems for the
benefit o f community policing activity. Essentially this publication was a “highlevel” look at community policing’s potential through information systems. The
publication indicated how important IT was to community policing. For example,
“Technology acquisition, implementation and integration are the essential
ingredients for program success” (U.S. Department of Justice 1999:161).
Several key institutional level issues begin to surface in the ISTEP
publication, one of which was the problem with vendors in developing and
implementing a computer system. The COPS office began to realize there was a lack
o f experience within the profession and that most police agencies were relying on the
vendors for advice. As indicated in the ISTEP publication,
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Most agencies built their information systems on the advice and counsel of
the vendors selling them equipment and systems. Internal technical expertise
for assessing needs and matching equipment and systems to those needs was
essentially nonexistent. (U.S. Department of Justice 1999:158)
As will be discussed later, this is exactly what occurred to KDPS as they ventured
into their system with DM Data. KDPS relied on the vendor for information and
project management and leadership and had no internal expertise to guide them.
The ISTEP publication also supported the notion that what the vendors were
doing was a problem but was, to them, normal business practices.
What seems clear from the reported experience of departments that are
seeking to fill these needs is that the approaches taken should not be defined
and driven by vendors. Any company marketing hardware and software must
place the development and dissemination of its own products as its primary
objective. That is normal and appropriate. (U.S. Department of Justice
1999:17)
Clearly this document supports the notion of a capitalist market, in that vendors are
free to sell their products at whatever cost and by whatever means. Buyer beware is
the anthem and means of approach.
Additionally, the federal government realized the dangers of venturing into a
project like this, both financially and technologically. Realization is given to the fact
that these systems are expensive and “the costs are substantial” (U.S. Department of
Justice 1999:163).
More importantly, once on a path in technology acquisition and use,
departments may find that their “sunken costs” prohibit them from changing
course as both their needs and technology change. (U.S. Department of
Justice 1999:163)
Accordingly, these systems are expensive and take years to fully develop,
implement, and structure. Systems of this magnitude also need external support, and
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normal city and county administrative structures often place over such programs
managers who are not familiar with police operations or needs. This can lead the
vendors to take advantage of the police. The publication also indicated that
In virtually every site studied, concerns were raised about how much vendors
direct and control the process o f defining and implementing technology.
Absent an internal capacity for better understanding organizational needs and
refining RFPs for vendors, police departments can indeed be in a dependent
and at times awkward position with respect to technology purchases and use.
Often those who may be charged with technology oversight in the city or
county governmental system in which the police department is imbedded
may themselves have little understanding of the dynamics and needs of police
departments and their constituents. (U.S. Department o f Justice 1999:163)
Sunken costs; outdated technology due to the time span in which it takes to purchase,
implement, and maintain these types of systems; dangers in dealing with and being
driven by the vendors; and lack of technical support within both the department and
local governmental body were all realized as problems.
Another 1998 publication, sponsored and funded by NIJ (Seaskate Report
1998), indicated problems with the purchase and implementation of computers by
local departments. This report blamed fragmentation by the local police for a major
problem with computer systems and computer vendors. Because of this
fragmentation, the market for supplying police agencies with computers is expensive
to develop. In essence, R&D is a product of the vendors, not the police, and is
thereby passed on in terms of costs when vendors sell their products to the police.
This report also points out the lack of technical knowledge and ability of the staff at
police agencies, and the lack of any guidelines because of this fragmentation. More
important is the realization that in 1998,
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fragmentation means no one has authority to establish standards for law
enforcement technology and equipment. The police on their own have
developed no national organization for this purpose. Criminal Justice has no
national regulatory agency. (Seaskate 1998:7)
Again, we see the acknowledgment of the lack of regulations, guidance, or real
federal input for the purchase, implementation, and maintaining complex computer
systems. Similar to the previously examined publications, this report provided
another “high-level” attempt at helping muddle through these systems. It addresses
such issues as establishing needs, R&D, and other non-specific details (Seaskate
1998).
Federal grants under the Crime Bill, while noted above, were being released
directly to local governmental agencies, but provided little, if any, guidance for
technological implementation. For example, a 1998 COPS MORE (Making Officer
Redeployment Effective) grant solicitation provided for the release of money for
technology, equipment, and support resources for their equation of
“TECHNOLOGY/EQUIPMENT/CIVLIANS = OFFICER TIME SAVED AND
DEVOTED TO COMMUNITY POLICING” (1). Further, “grants awarded under
COPS MORE 98 must support community policing. Only technology, equipment
and support resources (civilians) that increase officer presence in the community will
be considered for funding” (1). The only stipulation for these funds was that they be
used only to purchase technology, equipment, and hiring of support personnel. It
could not be used to hire officers and must be used towards a community policing
initiative (4). Additionally it could not supplant funds from the local entity. Use of
the money must be beyond the budgetary capabilities of the local government. The
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solicitation goes further to suggest the types of systems the money could be spent
for. The strings attached to this money concerned the ability to demonstrate potential
time savings on officer deployment on the street. No guidance was provided for the
purchasing, implementation, or maintaining of the technology purchased under this
Crime Bill funding.
Part of the grant called “Assurances” alludes to 28 C.F.R. Part 23 as a guide
for purchasing systems under this grant. 28 C.F.R. Part 23 refers to Intelligence
Oversight and the capturing of information on non-criminal related information of
citizens of the U.S. Essentially, it prohibits the collection of information on matters
not criminal, and the use of equipment to that end.
A review o f the various solicitations for release of monies through the COPS
office called for the purchase of technology and equipment, but provided no
guidance, rules, or regulations for purchasing or implementing these type of systems.
Money was also being funneled to local law enforcement in the form of Local Law
Enforcement Block Grants (LLEBG). This money was provided to local law
enforcement with little guidance regarding expenditure or stipulations on what to
spend the money. This money was not to be used to replace local operating funds,
but rather used to purchase equipment. Nationally, items like bulletproof vests, new
handguns, and other non-lethal weaponry were purchased with this money. Also, a
great number of police agencies used this money to purchase and implement
computer systems. In the early 1990’s, the formula for receiving these funds was
based on population and crime rate. By 2002, the formula was based on the number
o f UCR Part One crimes reported to the FBI and consisted of two stages. The two
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stages involved allocation to the states first, and local governments second, based on
Part One crimes reported compared to similar cities reporting to the FBI. Program
funds under LLEBG could be used for hiring officers, paying overtime for extra
police activities (saturation patrols, hot-spot policing, etc.), and procuring technology
and equipment. Again, little if any guidance/regulations was stipulated, but instead
they indicated that no tanks, aircraft, real estate, yachts or armored vehicles could be
purchased with this money (Program Brief, U.S. Department of Justice 2003).
As noted from the Seaskate Report (1998), no effort had been made to protect
police agencies, in general, from the vendors that sell computer systems. In that
report there was a call for some sort of regulatory agency on a national level. In
2002, a consortium o f professional associations came together to form a protective
body pertaining to purchasing, implementing, and maintaining computer systems.
The consortium mentioned above formed LEITSC in an attempt to provide standards
upon which police and criminal justice agencies could rely. These standards, and
other literature, were posted on their internet web page and are accessible to the
public. In 2003, they published their Strategic Plan and also produced several
standard guidelines for CAD and RMS. The Strategic Plan was a “high-level” view
of intended work on providing the profession guidelines for purchasing and
implementing a computer system. The CAD and RMS standards were very
rudimentary in that they avoided any specific language and, more importantly,
lacked any information on how to deal with vendors or problems when they arise
through a faulty RFP or purchasing system. For the layperson, they may seem
adequate and a good place to start, or a good reference point, but for someone who
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has been involved in these types of projects, they were very superfluous and shied
away from conflict with any o f the vendors.
O f interest for the theoretical basis of state-corporate crime, is for the first
time we see the involvement o f a professional association. It was funded by NIJ,
backed by professional associations, and made up of groups from various agencies
and vendors.8 Top executives, realizing problems existed in dealing with computer
vendors, banded together in hopes of setting standards for an otherwise unregulated
endeavor by the police profession. The result was a sterile, benign, and ineffective
standard that appears to be bureaucratic “eyewash” used to justify the existence of
the federally funded consortium. Additionally, the standards remain in the draft
stage, even though the project was funded by a 2003 grant (BJA #2003-MU-BX0068, U.S. Department o f Justice 2003).
One other association, the Association for Public Safety Communications
Officers (APCO), provides a source of reference for computer automation. An
international association, it provides conferences, training, seminars, and a current
internet web page pertaining to computerization and communications. Known
primarily for its involvement in communications and setting standards in that area, it
also provides guidance in the form of vendor listings, consultant listings, and
vendors’ internet web pages and contact information. Vendors and consultants
heavily sponsor APCO’s internet web page. The page does provide listings of

8 One member of the consortium is a retired CEO of Tiburon. Tiburon is considered
a top-tier vendor in the public safety computer systems industry and is a competitor
to most of the vendors LEITSC is trying to guard against.
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specific computer vendors in order to send RFP’s to them and request current
information in reference to their products. APCO historically has not set out to
provide guidance on computerization, but instead has focused on RF frequency
distribution and other RF concerns.
Catalysts for Action
M otivation
The motivation for computer vendors to pursue local police departments as a
potential market was provided by several factors. The various crime and drug bills,
such as the 1994 Crime Bill and subsequent supporting amendments coupled with
the 1970 Controlled Substance Act, provided the catalysts and motivators for a war
like attack on crime and drug problems. This also, in turn, provided the potential for
tremendous profits to be made, along with the new federalism which made these
monies available with no federal oversight or accountability. In addition, the end of
the Cold War and concomitant decline in military and NASA contracts provided
further impetus for computer vendors to cultivate new markets for their products.
Hence, local police departments became “suitable targets” for the state-corporate
crime that ensued at KDPS.
Local police departments were motivated to pursue adoption of computer and
information systems via the monies provided by the various crime and drug bills, and
through the solicitation of their applications for grants under these laws by the
agencies created to administer these programs. This motivation was further
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reinforced by professional law enforcement organizations with the help and
encouragement of federal funding agencies.
The federal government was motivated to facilitate state-corporate crime like
that which occurred at KDPS due to its historical role in the development and
deployment o f computer technology and information systems in other wars and the
race for space.
Using the Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) Catalysts for Action (Table 1,
Appendix B), the above factors enter into a causal chain of events that set the stage
for state-corporate crime between computer vendors and the police profession. The
motivation and catalysts for movement within the profession towards
computerization is seen on several fronts. The movement towards “high-tech”
gadgetry, coupled with the advances in technology from the space industry and
military, provided for a swift movement in the computer industry. The 1980’s and
1990’s was a boon for the industry and a boost more specifically for the computer
industry. From the police profession standpoint, it was only natural for them to
attempt to stay current and utilize the myriad of different computing devices. This
included hardware and software advances together with faster and seemingly more
reliable systems. These advances were seen in the form of personal desktop
computers as well as mainframe computers. Advances in technology allowed the
police to move into the mobile computing age, using MDTs followed by MPCs,
advanced by broadband RF connections that allow for internet access even in police
cruisers.
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The police profession was motivated as well by the release of money through
the Crime Bill. As long as the police, at least in principle andprim a facie, supported
the belief in community policing, the bill provided a large pool of money for the
police and the advancement of technology within the profession.
Reagan’s streamlining o f the categorical grants to block grants was also a
propelling motivator. As the strings loosened around the money and lump sums in
the form of LLEBG monies were sent to police agencies, advances on many fronts
were experienced. Suddenly, federal money for bulletproof vests, non-lethal
weaponry, and computer systems technology was available at the local level. The
states in essence were bypassed during the distribution of the funds. Gone were the
days where funds needed to trickle down through the states, so administrative costs
could be skimmed prior to proportioning out the money.
The economic climate continued to grow through the 1990’s as well. This
allowed for large operating budgets and the chance for police agencies to borrow
money for these large computer systems. As Clinton balanced the budget and turned
money back towards certain social programs, local governments began to gain
stability in their budgets, which allowed for funding of large projects such as
computer and technology initiatives.
The professional associations also added to the motivation of the police to
automate. More importantly, their internet web site promoted the use of large
computer systems. Standards for CAD and RMS were the prime focal points of the
internet web site. The IACP and National Sheriffs Association are two of the most
important to the police profession. Many use their literature internet web pages and
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other information as cornerstone guidance in how to manage their police
departments. If the associations support large computer projects, then it must be an
appropriate action for all police departments.
Opportunity Structures
The opportunity structure that allowed computer technology companies to
reap tremendous profits at the expense of taxpayers was provided by two
institutional factors—the drug and crime bills, and the relationship that was
established between the federal government and private government contractors in
the development of computer and information technologies. The crime and drug bills
provided the money, while the historical development of these technologies left the
marketing o f such in the hands of private companies.
The institutional/cultural conditions also provided opportunities for the
computer vendors. As the IT field expanded, so did the market opportunities for the
vendors. These opportunities arose in the police profession. As the economy
continued to improve throughout the 1990’s, the market allowed for expansion of
larger corporations and the birth of smaller companies trying to capitalize on the rise
o f interest in computers. Low interest money was available for investments, and
companies started to focus on the police as a viable market. DM Data was a privately
owned company, not reporting earnings to stockholders; it nonetheless experienced
dramatic growth in the 1990’s. Anecdotal emails indicated that most users thought
the company grew beyond its capacity to support its current client base.
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Intergraph is a publicly traded company and as such reports earnings and
losses to its stockholders. Of interest here is the expansion and growth the company
experienced through the 1990’s and into the early 2000’s. In 1997, Intergraph, Inc.
formed IPS, a subsidiary company focused only on public safety and those needs.
Immediately, this portion of the company began to show profits. Figure 1 represents
the quarterly profits of Intergraph, Inc. and IPS. A review of corporate and
subsidiary components of Intergraph, IPS, disclosed a definite relationship to the
release o f federal funding, and in particular the release of the Crime Bill. Note the
drop in profits before and during 1995, and then notice the spike in profits following
the release o f Crime Bill monies. Intergraph, Inc. also purchased a smaller company
involved in the transportation industry, adding to a growing portion of their software
development.
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Figure 1. Quarterly Gross Profits Intergraph, Inc. and IPS, Q1 1994-W1 2006
(Michalowski and Kramer 2006).
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Not only do annual reports indicate growth through the favorable economic
times of the 1990’s, but also a closer review indicates that at each passage of a bill,
such as the Crime Bill, Intergraph, Inc.’s and in particular IPS’s revenues grew. As
Figure 2 indicates, subsequent to the passage and after the monies had been released,
IPS experienced an increase in profit. An increase is observed with the passage of the
1990 Crime Control Act, the Crime Bill, and the PATRIOT Act o f 2001. These
graphs are most telling as they indicate a clear nexus to the passage o f federal
legislation and their profit increases.
Intergraph Corporation Net Asset Value, 1986-2006
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Figure 2. Intergraph, Inc. Monthly Net Asset Value, July 1986-July 2006.
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Other factors affected the opportunity for vendors as well. As crime began to
drop in the mid-1990’s, issues like community policing and New York’s
COMP STAT program began to take hold and be held in esteem as if they were the
reason crime was dropping (Bratton and Knobler 1998). Money flowed from the
community policing efforts, increasing the vendor’s ability to land multiple lucrative
contracts. As COMPSTAT was touted to the rest of the profession, the realization
was that the agency must have computers to generate the crime numbers and crime
analysis capabilities similar to that of New York City. Since COMPSTAT could be
viewed as a community-based program, vendors started to sell their products as a
means to conduct or initiate COMPSTAT programs.
Professional associations such as APCO and IACP, together with
professional periodicals, provide other catalysts for vendors as they continue to cover
computerization and the benefits departments can reap from CAD, RMS, and mobile
computing. Both the IACP and APCO internet web pages provide a list of vendors’
names and means by which to contact them. While this may be seen only as a helpful
means of providing a listing of known vendors, it also provides an implication of
support from the associations. Vendors go to great lengths to be listed on these
associations’ internet web pages. While provisos may indicate the association does
not support them, nonetheless the appearance is that they can be trusted since they
are listed on the internet web pages.
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Lack of Controls
Lack of controls to prevent state corporate crime like that which occurred at
KDPS can be attributed to two institutional factors. First, the new federalism which
mandated that states be given federal money with few strings attached, can account
for the lack of federal oversight and regulation o f monies disbursed under the various
drug and crime bills. In addition, market deregulation caused the control, usually
provided by free competition, to be undercut by corporate mergers that resulted in
oligopolistic conditions. This in turn allowed corporate vendors to deliver defective
computer and information systems to local police departments, resulting in
squandering o f taxpayer dollars and, in some cases, deaths of citizens.
As noted above, several federal publications have indicated that while they
support the development of IT initiatives for the police, especially when supporting a
community policing movement. There were and are, nonetheless, no controls offered
at the institutional level for vendor state-corporate crime.
Manning (2003) supported the fact that despite the best efforts to move the
police towards a community-based profession, it still remains a reactive force driven
by demands rather than focusing on problem-oriented solutions. Several factors
contribute to this, but one, as alluded to in Seaskate Report (1998) report, is the
fragmentation o f the profession and the autonomous air under which they choose to
operate. As Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) told of the unchecked, unfettered
activities o f the Department of Energy, in some respects the police operate in that
fashion—holding only to the local purse strings, but yet controlling under the
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potential threat o f rising crime. In essence, “give us the money or crime will rise”
attitude pervades the profession, a political game that is played out all too often at
the local and state levels.
A review o f the federal solicitations and previously mentioned publications
related to the development of IT within the profession disclosed no regulatory body
within the profession or at the federal level. The closest the profession has come to
providing guidelines or standards is the LEITSC internet web site and accompanying
publications. These are only guides and are at such a level as to be of little help or
assistance to the lay police officer assigned to carry out the task of automating a
department. Both standard guidelines (CAD and RMS) provided flow charts,
diagrams about how information should flow, and other comments related to how the
information should pass through a system. As a previous project manager, I realize
that on a large-scale system such as the DM Data and IPS systems, the information
provided is o f little use when discussing issues such as contract negotiations,
milestones, deadlines, and payment schedules with vendors.
Federal solicitation guidelines refer to such things as purchasing
requirements, lobbyist restrictions, equal employment amongst contractors and other
issues pertaining to the award of the money, and how draws of the money are
obtained. Even after award, nothing is provided in terms of regulations, rules, or
guidelines from the federal government for the spending of this money on IT
equipment. The requirements were to be in the form o f an analysis as to whether
more effort on community policing was generated from the use of the technology. To
date, KDPS’s 98 COPS MORE grant remains open. The department has been unable
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to determine whether using MPCs saved time, or if efforts were redirected towards
community policing specifically. When consulted about how to provide an answer to
close the grant or how to find time saved by officers, I advised them to respond to
the COPS Office that we were unable to determine any time savings or redirected
efforts towards community policing as a result of the purchased computer
equipment, essentially knowing there will be no retribution by the federal
government for not answering the requirements of the grant.
M edia as Watchdog
One institution that has failed to shed any light on the fact that millions of
dollars have been poured into computer systems by federal, state, and local police is
the media. Scant attention has been given to the automation of the police profession.
Any attention has always provided a positive spin. Particularly in the 1990’s,
comments from the media were favorable for the automation of the police. Most
reports focused on the automation of 911 systems, mapping and tracking of police
cruisers with the arrival o f GPS, and the ability to map and track cellular telephone
locations (Manning 1992; Chu 2001; Nunn and Quinet 2002; Pattavina 2005).
Washington Technology (1998) offers a synopsis of the media portrayal of
police use of computers. “High-Tech Crime Fighters, Law Enforcement Add IT to
Their Arsenals” provides a summary of the development of the computer for the
police, predicting that the market for in-car computers will reach $217 million by
2002, and that CAD and RMS continue to become more sophisticated, receiving a
boost in the 1980’s and 1990’s through advancing technology. Bob Scott, Executive
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Marketing Manager for Intergraph Federal Systems indicated a push in the late
1990’s towards smaller markets: “We are starting to push down now into more
midsize and small communities” ( Washington Technology 1998:1). Other favorable
comments for the use of computers by the police were provided throughout the
article. Articles like these bombarded the profession in the mid to late 1990’s.
Local coverage that provided for the ever-advancing technology in the local
police agencies, also has focused on the positive and has been controlled by the
police themselves (Manning 2003). Police can put their own spin on issues,
particularly issues they believe they want, need, or desire. Computer systems are one
of those items. As Manning (2003) notes, “Media coverage may produce changes in
police practices” (p. 101) and may lead to sweeping changes in both how police view
their mandate and how the public views the police. For instance, the beating of
Rodney King by the Los Angeles Police Department and subsequent trials and riots
changed the entire profession in one night. The point here is that the police have
been creating allies of the public to automate and computerize the profession.
Standing behind the pretext of better, faster, and safer communities, police contend
that computerization in the form of CAD, RMS, and MPCs makes them better,
faster, and more responsive to the needs of the citizens they serve. In essence, the
police have manipulated the public through the media to their advantage, in order to
acquire computers.
Interestingly, the national news media has not captured or focused in on the
fleecing o f either federal or local programs. Clearly the media has either missed what
is occurring with IT projects or has failed to focus energy on such stories. Little has
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been written about the difficulties encountered by automation efforts, which has been
primarily due to the controlling o f the stories by the profession.
The fact that we are spending massive amounts of tax dollars on these
projects and they are not working is a dark secret in the profession. This adds to the
complicity o f state-facilitated activity. Certainly no one at the national level wants to
admit there are problems. Even though publications released from COPS and DOJ
reveal potential problems and the controlling of the industry by the vendors, they do
not attempt to control the activities with rules, regulations, operating procedures, or
guidelines specific enough to protect the profession. As we will see in the next
chapter, the cloak of secrecy and the “dark secret” prevail at the organizational level.
The media is not enlightened at the local level, administrators fail to admit failure,
and the cost o f these projects continues to rise with the vendors controlling the
process.
Table 2 in Appendix B depicts the institutional level of analysis under the
Catalysts for Action. Following the flow of Table 1, we can see causal factors under
motivation, opportunity structures, and controls. These historical instances set the
stage for the organizational occurrences between the vendors and KDPS and what
will be exemplified in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
While it is clear from the previous chapter that the institutional environment
set the stage for potential state-corporate crime, what will be discussed in this
chapter is that most social harms that were created between the computer vendors
and KDPS took place at the organizational level. Three organizations will be
discussed in this chapter, two private corporations and KDPS. The two private
corporations are those involved in the sale of computer systems to KDPS, namely
DM Data and IPS. What will be discussed in this chapter concerns the organizational
activity both internally within each agency, plus the interaction between KDPS and
each of the private corporations.9
The first part of the chapter will discuss organizational theory as it relates to
deviant and criminal activity. Several salient theories will be discussed as they relate
to explaining what occurred between the private companies and KDPS. This will be
followed by a brief historical summary o f what occurred between the vendors and
KDPS from the mid-1990’s through 2006. Next, I will utilize the catalysts for action
(Table 1, Appendix B) and that framework to explain what occurred and how the

9 As a side note, while I will attempt to discuss and analyze each organization
separately, there will be times when I must discuss what happened in one
organization simultaneously to what was occurring in the other organization.
Virtually one reaction caused another reaction within one organization, which caused
another reaction in the other. I will try to keep them separate, but “spillover” in my
discussion may occur.
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state corporate crime went unnoticed, was ignored, or was exacerbated. Table 3 in
Appendix B provides the explanatory intersections in the Kauzlarich and Kramer
(1998), Kramer, Michalowski and Kauzlarich (2002), and Michalowski and Kramer
(2006) model between the vendors and KDPS, and how it was the intersection and
multiple causations that created a situation in which computer systems were bought
and paid for, failed to perform, or, even after due diligence, another system was
purchased and it too was plagued with performance issues.
Historical Synopsis
KDPS entered the automation realm in the early 1980’s with its own customdesigned version o f CAD, followed by an in-house designed RMS. These systems
were designed, implemented, and maintained by City IT staff. They used a
mainframe Burroughs brand computer with terminals available throughout
headquarters. Computing was reserved for headquarters MIS purposes, and police
reports were hand written. With the advent of the personal computer, circa 1983,
KDPS added several Apple lie computers to track the daily activity of officers on the
streets. Officers on patrol would compile a daily activity report (DAR) accounting
for every minute of their time. Each DAR had to add up to 720 minutes, or it would
be sent back for correction! On the DAR were such things as bar checks, number of
arrests, time spent on calls (which did not necessarily mirror those times on CAD),
number o f traffic stops, and number of citations issued along with the number of
reports written in the 720 minutes. The point here is that in the 1980’s the KDPS
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chief recognized the need for management information and the importance of
tracking officer activities for future use in political battles.
In the late 1980’s, the department saw the need for a new mainframe and new
packaged “turnkey solution” computer system. The department wanted to replace the
in-house system, which was cumbersome and designed on a COBOL language
platform, making it all but impossible to retrieve information from it if you were not
a computer programmer. KDPS purchased software from Command Data Systems,
which sold their product using a Digital Equipment Company (DEC) VAX
mainframe. As part o f this system, KDPS installed Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs)
in their police cruisers allowing for dispatching and the querying of license plate and
offender information from the cruisers. Additionally, through the early-to-mid
1990’s, KDPS started to automate the transmission of their crime information to the
State of Michigan. The report, known as the Michigan Crime Reporting System
(MICRS), is a monthly requirement from the state, which allows them to report to
the FBI the state-compiled UCR information. This was an expensive endeavor in that
KDPS had to pay Command Data (later bought by several companies and ending up
being owned by Tiburon, Inc.) to customize the RMS side to send this information.
MICRS is substantially different than simply reporting UCR or MBRS information
to the FBI and calls for customization of the reporting fields to the state.
In the late 1990’s, KDPS again began looking for another computer system.
This desire was fueled by the looming Y2K phenomenon (which never occurred) and
the fact that Tiburon advised the department’s present system was not Y2K
compatible, but they could bring it into compliance for $700,000. Rather than spend
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the money on an upgrade and replace the aging VAX mainframe, KDPS
administration decided to search for another system. KDPS purchased a product
called CPLIMS from DM Data, Inc. in 1997. This system would replace the aging
VAX system with an IBM RISC 6000 mainframe, running the Informix database. It
would also replace the aging MDTs with MPCs in the cruisers. The initial price was
approximately $472,000, but grew significantly as KDPS brought the system on line.
The cost increases were due to upgrades on the RISC, and additional software not
included in the first contract. Initial documents from KDPS to City Hall indicated
that this system would be designed to last ten or more years.
In 2001, KDPS again decided to replace their entire computer system, due to
the lack o f performance from the DM Data system coupled with a battle with the
company over costs o f an upgrade on the system. In the fall of 2002, KDPS signed a
contract with IPS for $1.5 million for a total replacement system. The architecture
for this system would be a “client-server” system whereby PCs are connected to
servers in a separate room and the servers act as quasi-mainframes. The
technological advantage of a system like this is that if a server were to fail,
theoretically, the PC at the desk would continue to function and synchronize with the
server once the server was brought back on-line. This type of platform was very
appealing based on the previous experience with frequent crashes of the standalone
mainframes. IPS sold the CAD system as “never failing” because of this type of
client-server platform. CAD went live in June of 2003, followed with RMS in
October 2003, and MPCs in the spring of 2004. KDPS utilized the previously
purchased MPCs from the DM Data contract since they saw little use and it was
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viewed as a cost savings and adequate for what the officers did in the cruisers.
However, attempts to use the RF system of the DM Data vintage MPCs was quickly
found to be inadequate and it was replaced with a high-band private network using
Sprint, Inc. PCMCIA modem cards in the MPCs. KDPS was able to dismantle an
aging RF 800 MHz system and convert to a maintenance-free system using cell
phone towers and broad-band capabilities. Officers had immediate access to the
internet, and report writing in the cruisers was a viable option.
A final note on the IPS system is that, since KDPS’s first attempt at a
commercially purchased computer system, there had been a desire to go to a
“paperless” system. In other words, KDPS wanted their officers to stop hand writing
reports. All reports were to be completed on the computer. In 1988, the then Deputy
Chief Edward Edwardson touted the potential for this in the Command Data system
when he asked for funding from the City Commission. This potential, under the
Command Data system, never reached fruition because of lack of storage on the
mainframe, and a deep-seated resistance from within the KDPS. Attempts at
paperless reporting were again tried under the DM Data system, but the overall
system was never stable enough to try this. Under the IPS system, the administrative
mandate was a paperless reporting system. When the RMS system went live in
October 2003, the department finally realized the paperless potential and has stopped
hand writing virtually all reports.
This is but a brief synopsis of the computer purchases made by KDPS. It
nonetheless sets the stage for further explanation to follow. At each turn, KDPS,
based on my involvement and knowledge, believed they were doing the appropriate
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thing by purchasing another system. The last system, where I was the project
manager, was not the least expensive, but was the most supported by its customers,
which are other departments, coupled with the appeal of client-server architecture.
Organizational Theory
At the organizational level there are several theories that can be ussed to
explain state corporate crime. The most popular o f these theories are rational choice
and blocked-opportunity models (Michalowski and Kramer 2006; Coleman 1989;
Gross 1978). Additional theoretical approaches can also be found in the expansion of
the blocked opportunity model in institutional anomie, defective organizational
internal structural approaches, and political economic concepts.
Rational choice theory is a mainstream criminological theory that follows a
utilitarian philosophical approach in that some sort of rational decision-making is
occurring that allows for the opportunity to break the law. In essence, the offender
has weighed the costs as opposed to benefits of offending and believed the penalties
o f the offense did not offset the benefits received from the deviant act. Paternoster
and Simpson (1996) refer to this as a subjective expected utility theory. They contend
that a decision to offend is a balance between costs and benefits, and the rewards are
based on the perceived outcomes of the offender/decision maker. Several
assumptions need to be made here, one of which is that the decision maker is at least
minimally rational, that the offender is guided by expected consequences of his or
her behavior and decisions. Another assumption is that the critical agent in the theory
is the individual.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124
More important is the notion that the individual can act on behalf o f the
organization and commit corporate crime. These offenders though are “affected by
the characteristics and imperatives of their business organization” (Paternoster and
Simpson 1996:553). Moreover, this means that the individuals are concerned with
the perceived risks o f their decisions for themselves, for the firm or organization, and
the presence or absence o f inducements or restrictions within the context with which
they are operating.
Blocked-opportunity models of organizational deviance follow Merton
(1957) and Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) earlier work. “This approach argues that
organizations break the law because they are blocked in some fashion from having
access to legitimate means to achieve organizational goals” (Michalowski and
Kramer 2006:37). As Vaughan (1996) argued, this deviance, or attempt to
circumvent these blocked goals, can then be normalized. The routinization of
activity, and the push for goal attainment coupled with the potential for missed
deadlines and missed earnings can lead to the normalization of criminal or deviant
activity. As Gross (1978) puts it:
Given a situation of uncertainty in attaining goals, and one in which the
organization is judged (directly, or indirectly by sales or other indicators) by
its success in goal attainment or performance, one can predict that the
organization will, if it must, engage in criminal behavior to attain those goals.
(P. 57)
Internal defective standard operating procedures (SOPs) can also be a source
o f blocked opportunities. Defects in SOPs can lead to internal organizational access
to legitimate means or goal attainment. Hopkins (1978) argued that corporate crime
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can be an outcome o f defective SOPs, frustrating workers and turning them towards
illegitimate means to achieve organizational goals.
Political economic criminological theories have also been used to explain
organizational crime (Barnett 1981; Box 1983; Chambliss 1989; Currie 1997;
Messerschmidt 1986; Michalowski 1985; Young 1981). In a capitalist economy,
corporations pursue goals of profit; they seek out their share of the market subject to
constraints imposed by that market and the state. According to Barnett (1981),
“When management chooses to pursue corporate goals through circumvention of
market constraints in a manner prohibited by the state” (p. 5), corporate crime can
occur. For others, the core concept of political economic crime—profit maximization
and private accumulation—can explain corporate crime (Currie 1997;Young 1981;
Quinney 1975). Currie (1997) notes “all other principles of social organization
become subordinated to the over-arching one of private gain . . . cultural value—
even personal identity—become increasingly eroded or obliterated” (p. 37).
Michalowski and Kramer (2006) point out there can be limitations to the use
o f a political economic approach in explaining deviance, in that it is not unique to a
capitalist society. Socialist societies have also operated under a capital accumulation
system. This notwithstanding though,
If a political-economic analysis is focused on the dynamics of the
accumulation process under different forms of economic organization, rather
than only its manifestations under capitalism, a political-economic
perspective can be a useful guide for examining how the intersection o f

political and economic organizations can generate deviant outcomes.
(Michalowski and Kramer 2006:38)
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While each theoretical approach can provide explanations for organizational
deviance, an integrated approach can best describe the intersections of activity in and
around an organization. In this study, an integrated approach is useful because of the
various dynamics involved between a governmental organization, a non-profit, and
two private corporations within the context of a capitalist market. This does not
imply that a non-profit organization does not have goals like the private companies,
but those goals are different and employees are driven by different motivations and
constraints.
Each of these theories is consistent with the catalysts for action using the
various schema, motivation, structure, and controls, as a means of explaining what
occurred at the organizational level. As the chapter progresses, I will analyze
organizational activity in one of the three agencies as it went through computer
automation efforts. The next section deals with DM Data and the activity
surrounding the purchase, implementation, and final dismissal of that product and
company. The following section deals with IPS and the transition to a newer, more
expensive, and what is believed to be, a more robust stable system. The final section
deals with the internal organizational setting within KDPS. At each step, what is
revealed is the social harms and criminal activity that occurred at the intersection of
involvement between the private vendors and one government agency.
DM Data
The DM Data system was doomed from the beginning. Brought into the
organization under the city’s “Reduce the Costs of Government Services” campaign,
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the initial purchase was plagued by short cuts, under cuts, and promises made by DM
Data that were never kept. The project was led by a KDPS captain whose admitted
purpose of being involved was to get promoted to a chiefs position, and who saw it
as a way to show he could bring in a project under budget and still provide the
automated services required by the department. DM Data saw it as a way to add to
their customer base, take on the largest consolidated public safety department in the
United States as a customer, and make money off the initial contract and subsequent
maintenance agreements (personal communication with DM Data sales
representative). Expanding the customer base meant more money, and taking on
KDPS meant they would have a “show case” location in a medium-sized public
safety department.
An agreement to purchase the DM Data system was signed on February 26,
1997, and the Kalamazoo City Commission approved the funds on March 31, 1997.
The initial purchase cost was $472,706 (Agreement for System Purchase 1997). The
costs quickly rose, however, to $1,101,934, by June of 2000, according to a ledger
kept by the KDPS Accounts Receivable Administrative Assistant. This is important
as the events unfold, because we will see that KDPS poured money into the project
in an attempt to make it work.
Work on the project began in June of 1997. Several setbacks immediately
occurred, which were organizational issues for both DM Data and KDPS. The initial
captain who convinced everyone to purchase the DM Data product retired. After
signing o f the agreements and contracts, it was discovered that a project manager
from both DM Data and KDPS were cut from the project as a means to trim costs.
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DM Data at the time had separate specialists in CAD, RMS, and MPCs. This
required conversations with different people, none of whom understood where KDPS
was in terms o f project implementation. Additionally, the City’s IT department took
back all IT personnel from outlying departments and put them at City Hall under the
direction of the IT Director. KDPS lost its only IT professional in that move. This
left one dispatcher who was working in KDPS’s Computer Services, and one police
officer who had worked in computer services for many years to complete the project.
A third person was added, another dispatcher, to assist midway through the project.
The officer later retired, leaving only the two dispatchers and a crime analyst.
The implementation portion of the project plodded along through the rest of
1997 and 1998. During that time frame, hardware was shipped, tables were
configured, and the software was customized for use by KDPS. Both parties were
satisfied with the progress of the implementation phase, but KDPS raised concerns
over the coming Y2K problem and the fact that the present Tiburon system was no
longer going to function.10 An April 1999 date was set to attempt to switch over to
CAD.
On April 5, 1999, the DM Data CAD system was turned on in the dispatch
center of KDPS. On April 13th it was shut down because of numerous problems the
dispatchers were having utilizing the program. Even though they had previously
been trained on its use, it did not function properly or reliably enough to continue

10 In actuality, the Tiburon system continued to function well into 2003. KDPS staff
shut it down after headquarters was moved to a new location. No system
performance issues were noted at Y2K and it was still functioning and providing
query information just prior to being turned off.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

129
using it. On April 14, 1999, the supervisor o f dispatch and the jail, Lt. Robert Gay,
sent a congenial letter to the president of DM Data, Douglas Dorfman, indicating the
difficulties and the fact that KDPS could no longer use the system until
modifications were made. In this letter, Gay identified 15 serious problems with the
CAD software and operation of the system. Dorfman responded back in an email
assuring all items would be corrected. Of significance in this letter was the item
identified as “Problem #1” requiring “Police and Fire Environments Must Be
Combined” (Lt. Gay letter, April 14, 1999). In essence, KDPS operates by
dispatching both police and fire units to a fire because the police are also firefighters
and must be dispatched simultaneously to the fire with the fire apparatus. KDPS is
unique in this requirement, and DM Data was advised of this at contract signing. The
DM Data product required dispatchers to use one screen to dispatch police, switch to
another screen to dispatch fire rigs, and then switch back and forth during an event to
track all the units. This single screen dispatching ability was a requirement and part
o f the contract with DM Data. DM Data assured KDPS it would be accomplished
before implementation but was not. Again, it was identified on April 14 as the
number one problem. In response, Dorfman wrote an email message dated Friday,
April 16, 1999, that stated two key enhancements were required that would be done
by June. These two enhancements included:
CAD CCT Enhance to allow concurrent taking of a call and dispatching of
fire and up to three PSO units from one screen

CAD PD allow option to auto restack without question
Fire rig status must be shown on one screen.
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This issue was never resolved with DM Data, and it remained a two-screen
dispatching schema until it was shut down in June of 2003. Work continued on the
CAD systems through the summer and early fall of 1999. Some issues were resolved
and others were not. Meanwhile, additional dispatcher training was conducted to
ease the pressure and stress of the change on the KDPS personnel.
In October 1999, the CAD system was again brought up and this time left on
for the dispatchers to use. While problems were encountered throughout the
remainder of 1999, many were attributed to the lack of knowledge on the system,
resistance to change, and working out the “bugs” that accompany a new product.
However, problems persisted with individual stations crashing or CAD locking up,
taking the entire CAD system down, and requiring a reboot o f the system. Single
stations would often have to shut down and reboot to bring the system back up.
In the spring of 2000, under the advice and request of DM Data, KDPS
purchased an upgrade to the RISC 6000, along with an upgrade on the Informix
database in use. These purchases were made through DM Data. RMS
implementation followed this purchase. The RMS platform was much more stable
and not plagued with the issues encountered by the CAD system.11
As the same time as the implementation of RMS and the attempts to stabilize
CAD, KDPS sought and received a COPS MORE grant of $548,946 for mobile

11 This is partly because of the lack o f complexity involved in an RMS system. A
RMS is simply a flat or relational database with a graphical user interface. It does not
require the tracking or real time information or the interconnection of GPS or
mapping systems. The CAD is infinitely more complex, but more critical to the
operations of public safety.
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computing equipment. KDPS was awarded the money in March of 2000 and
purchased mobile computers and the accompanying software through DM Data.
KDPS selected, again with the advice and support o f DM Data, XPlore brand
computer tablets. These tablets were to be mounted in the police cruisers and would
use an existing 800 MHz RF system already in place from the use of MDTs.
Additionally, in-car modems were purchased through DM Data from DataRadio.
Both the modems and tablets functioned properly in a stand-alone mode. In other
words, on their own they worked as sold, but with the DM Data software they never
functioned at a reliable performance rate. Implementation of the mobiles started in
late fall of 2000 and on into 2001.
By the summer of 2001, KDPS had spent $1.5 million dollars with or through
DM Data. This was less $124,000 that was still owed for the mobiles. This money
was being withheld pending full functionality of the mobile computers, a situation
that would never occur. The overall system, though, was anything but acceptable.
CAD was still not working properly. Status monitors had been installed in attempts
to alleviate locked up terminals and PCs. The status monitors were to show precise
locations o f the officers on calls and would/should update when changed by the
dispatchers, or changed by the officers in their cruisers through the use of the
mobiles. The status monitors, which were simply terminals tied directly to the RISC,
were plagued with delays and slow changes and failed to properly acknowledge
changes in the officer’s status. The RMS seemed to be stable, but little attention was
given to this side of the system, as KDPS staff members were preoccupied with
problems in CAD and the mobiles.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

132
By September 2001, Gay had left and been replaced by Lt. Robert Oliphant.
Lt. Oliphant took over the dispatch center in January o f 2001. Important to note here
and discussed in more detail later was the fact that no one person was clearly in
charge of KDPS’s automation efforts. The two dispatchers, working at maximum
capacity, worked for the captain of Service Division, while Lt. Oliphant worked for
the Captain of Operations. Lt. Oliphant had little input into the day-to-day say-so of
what the two computer service people did. Lt. Oliphant attempted to deal with CAD
issues because it impacted the dispatchers, but he had little input into how much or
what time was spent on fixing CAD. By September 2001, KDPS had already
experienced the first social harm mentioned in the introduction, and that was failure
to dispatch emergency service to the citizen suffering from a heart attack that led to
his death. I was about to experience the second catastrophe.
On September 11, 2001 (something telling here), I took over as the
supervisor of the dispatch center. I was a sergeant at the time, later promoted to
lieutenant, but assumed the supervisory role over the dispatchers and the products
they used. By October 16, 2001, through observations, I noted that full
implementation of the system was not progressing and the system was not
functioning properly. I sent an introductory letter to Dorfman outlining who I was,
and that I was put in charge of the system. Below are excerpts from that letter:
It is unfortunate that my first contact with you is under a dark cloud. Our
system still does not work. . . . Throughout the weekend our system would
either lock up on them (dispatchers), or, as I confirmed later, would kick
them out of the system completely causing them to have to re-log into
CPLIMS and start again. On 10/15/01, one of my dispatchers was attempting
to send out a fire alarm and in the midst of dispatching the appropriate
companies and crews, the system locked up.
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In the last year our department. . . has undergone significant change in
administration and management philosophy. We believe we are the best at
what we do. Your system detracts from that image because it has not met our
needs and continues not to operate correctly even though we went “live” with
the system in the fall o f 1999. The basic CAD system does not provide for
sustainable service and the MPC’s crash or lock on a routine basis . ..
My charge is to get it working. I hope that means working with DM Data on
a successful project and seeing it through resolution. Let me add that on
another charge I have is a consolidated communications center for
Kalamazoo County. We are at the point in that project that we are having site
visits from other agencies. I cross my fingers every time someone enters that
CPLIMS doesn’t crash, lock up, or kick the dispatcher out of the system
while we are demonstrating our capabilities.
. . . Chief Daniel Weston has directed me to contact our legal staff with
regards to the performance of CPLIMS and the response of DM Data. Two
factors play into this directive. The first being the failure to adequately supply
the product we purchased. CPLIMS is not working. Secondly, the safety and
well being of the citizens of Kalamazoo, Michigan. . . . I have been instructed
to seek other vendors that can provide a product to meet or exceed our needs.
These above steps can be obviated by the correction to the system. We have
been assured on several occasions that a “fix” was on the way or put in place
with no results . . . (email dated October 16, 2001)
This email was followed by several days of silence from DM Data, followed by
several subsequent telephone calls. DM Data’s response was to send a programmer
to KDPS in December 2001. DM Data assured KDPS they were working on the
problems remotely, but little satisfaction was observed, so pressure was put on them
to send a programmer (email correspondence October and November 2001).
Later correspondence between KDPS and DM Data indicate a battle over
whether issues were fixed or not. Subsequent emails read like this:

October 24, 2001:
Not able to review the MPC message- fixed
Call Review- fixed
Page down not working consistently- could not replicate
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CAD-NI gives system lock up- fixed
Call taking- Displays only fire calls- fixed
During call taking system locked up- fixed
CAD Statue update is slow- fixed . . .
October 25, 2001
Extra character was displaying “NO CALLS FOR SERVICE FOR THIS
STATION’- fixed
From police dispatch side- pressed F5 for Fire screen and received
inf5:readmode error - fixed
There was further correspondence between myself and DM Data employees on
November 30, 2001 and December 4, 2001, indicating KDPS was still having
problems with CAD and the MPCs. DM Data responded that great strides had been
made in fixing the system, and Dorfman believed DM Data was on the way to fixing
all problems, because the night before KDPS dispatchers had only one Informix
error. I countered MPCs were still not working, and dispatch hardly took any calls
the night in question as it was November and cold, slowing calls-for-service.
In mid-December 2001, DM Data sent Raja to KDPS to fix the problems.
Raja personally promised me that he would take CAD down for only 2 to 3 hours.12
Raja was to upgrade the Informix database and fix any lingering problems not fixed
by the upgrade. Additionally, he intended to demonstrate DM Data’s new graphical
user interface (GUI) version of CPLIMS. This upgraded CPLIMS product was to
finally provide KDPS with a version able to dispatch police and fire units on the
same screen. In sum, CAD was down for over eight hours and when brought back

12 When the CAD system would crash or be down for some time, dispatchers would
revert to green cards. By December 2001, each station had a stack of cards available
because the system crashed often. This put dispatchers under tremendous stress and
pressure beyond their normal day-to-day stressors.
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into operation, had as many if not more errors as there were prior to the upgrade.
Additionally, a demonstration of the new product crashed and locked up. It provided
nothing new and did not replace the need for dispatchers to switch screens to
dispatch police and fire. In essence, this attempt was a disaster, and in fact, my
response back through the department was, for the first time, that this system will
never work and the staff at DM Data were not capable of making it work. A
subsequent telephone call to DM Data made by me on the morning after Raja’s visit
was trite and to the point. I called the visit an absolute disaster and noted that KDPS
was better off the day before his visit. Clearly the two organizations had reached an
impasse. DM Data was attempting to blame the way we used their system, and we
were blaming them for their product not working.
On January 10, 2002,1 sent Dorfman an email indicating our continued
problems. This email was in partial response to an email Dorfman sent to Racine,
Wisconsin, another DM Data user, dismissing the problems at KDPS. That email has
somehow gotten lost, but I remember the content of it and the reasons for the terse
response in the email.
From:Reifert
To: Dorfman
I am in receipt o f a communique between you and Lt. Bender at Racine WI.
Surely you must realize we all communicate with regards to the operation
and performance o f your system . . .
. . . I sent out a survey to my officers yesterday to capture 12 hours of MPC
usage and how they were working. Out of twenty laptops in service, even
though we have 45, one worked. Everyone else had an error or the computer
locked up so they had to shut it down. This is after your staff responded and
“fixed” Kalamazoo.
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Our “consoles went down” last night. . . You wrote (to Racine) “Raja offered
to restart Informix in order to rapidly clear the issue.” Again acting like we
caused the problem. The problem is caused by your program and the
integration to Informix.
The email continued with my hounding DM Data for the product not working, and
Dorfman questioning my qualifications as a project manager. This was one of the
last emails sent to me by Dorfman. Thereafter, communications came to almost a
halt with DM Data. The programmers and KDPS computer services staff did,
however, continue to talk.
Not only had KDPS been monitoring the MPC usage, but the dispatcher
group leaders, a quasi-supervisory position within the dispatch center,13 were
required to complete a DAR for their shift. Between October 2001 and February
2001, over sixty-five DARs indicated problems with the CAD system. Comments
included such things as:
CPLIMS is still extremely slow and tonight, though we were very quiet, the
status monitor was still delayed 10-15 seconds.
Computer locked up at about 1600 hrs. no one was able to do anything for
about 15 minutes. Page down not working.
Status monitors again were slow in updating. About 1100 red side (police)
and fire side were unable to put a unit busy without being kicked out.
CPLIMS continues to be a problem with slow status monitors freezing up etc.
It seems that if we are slow it can keep up but any time it gets busy CPLIMS
either slows down or stops.
At least two Informix errors . .. CPLIMS continues to be slow, locks up so
we have to have Info (administrative channel) put in a test dispatch to clear it.
I f 2 (sic) dispatchers are trying to do the same thing (unknowingly) a red box

13 Because o f union constraints, the group leader position, held by senior dispatchers,
could not be considered a supervisor but was charged with leading the shift and
providing information and problems to the shift commanders.
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pops up and then throws you out to the main menu. These are all problems
that have been occurring for years, and were supposedly fixed. The fixes
seem to last a day or two and revert back to the old way.
In February o f 2002, the Group Leader asked me if they could stop documenting
problems with CPLIMS because it was “old hat” and got them nowhere.
Shortly after the December 2001 trip to Kalamazoo, Raja resigned and went
to work for IBM in New Jersey. He told KDPS staff that he was being docked pay by
Dorfman and his brother, Sam Ramasamy, Vice President in charge of Engineering,
DM Data, until he could get KDPS fixed and running smoothly. Shortly after that the
programmer in charge o f MPCs with DM Data resigned.
On March 4, 2002, Ramasamy sent me an email indicating, “I am very happy
to inform you that the problem you were experiencing with Informix has been
resolved. . . . I am getting a lot of pressure from the management to get the payment.
We sent an invoice a while ago . . .” By this time most communications has ceased
as KDPS staff, including myself, had given up on trying to work with DM Data. The
payment he was alluding to was a $124,000 payment being withheld by KDPS for
the MPCs. DM Data was notified that no payment would be forthcoming until the
MPCs were working.
On March 28, 2002, Dorfman sent the captain o f KDPS Service Division an
email outlining a proposal for payment and resolution of problems at KDPS. This
email was sent after a lengthy conference call demanded by me since nothing was
getting fixed since the March 4th email. In this email were comments such as:
I am extremely confident that we are capable of maintaining a stable system
in Kalamazoo. It is unfortunate that it has taken as long as it has to gain out
current momentum.
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We have to have the MPC bill paid on or before April 18 (Thursday).
A bill will be sent out tomorrow for you (sic) license and support for 6/1/025/31/03 in the amount of $58,386.43.
Proposal
In order to leave you with assurance that we will continue to aggressively
work to meet your expectations, I offer the following proposal:
Until the Informix locks/errors cease for a period of 120 days, Kalamazoo
will receive License and support at no charge (in monthly blocks). This
means, if we have our last Informix issues on April 20, Kalamazoo will not
be liable for paying license and support until September 1st.. .
Also, any major MPC problems proven to be caused by our software within
the same 120 day period would also reset the clock.
In exchange for the above consideration, Kalamazoo must render payment, in
full, for the MPC software and the funds must be received by DM Data no
later than Thursday, April 18.
KDPS’s comment on this was absolutely not. No payment until the MPCs started
working.14
On April 23, 2002, Captain Martin received an email from Dorfman. Excerpts
are as follows:
Due to a number of reasons (Kalamazoo being one of the key reasons), Sam
Ramasamy has been removed as our Vice President of Engineering . ..
Our new development management team . . . is in our new facility at DM
Data India.
As soon as they complete a work plan, I’ll forward same to you.

14 By now consideration to take the MPCs out of the cruisers was foremost in my
mind and those o f other staff members. The cost to maintain the tablets in the
cruisers was outweighing their usefulness, as the officers were routinely not even
turning them on when they came on duty.
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Also, please be informed that DM Data Corporation has been acquired by
Prolease Corporation on April 9. http://www.prolease.com/041202.htm. This
acquisition fundamentally changes the paradigms of our operation.
Significant resources (capital and people) have already been availed to us.
Also, we now have to act almost like a public company. We now have to
answer to another authority that demands successful performance.
What had been hinted to in telephone conversations was revealed in this email. DM
Data had been sold, and the pressure to pay the outstanding invoice was an attempt
to balance DM Data’s accounts prior to the sale. Shortly afterwards, KDPS was
notified that the President of Prolease, Warren Talbot, would be stepping in for
Dorfman, who had been relegated to consultant status within the company.
On May 2, 2003, a catastrophic event for KDPS occurred in the dispatch
center. As the dispatchers began to log off and sign back on, they were greeted with
a message on their screen that said, “License Expired contact DM Data for
Assistance.” It seemed that the software from DM Data had an embedded code
which stopped it from working if KDPS had not paid their maintenance fees.15 This
code was hidden from both the users and the system administrators. Essentially the
dispatch center’s computers were being systematically shut down by the DM Data
software. KDPS was able to keep one work station working throughout the day
based on the ability to quickly diagnose the problem. KDPS quickly sought and was
granted an immediate injunction from the Circuit Court in Kalamazoo, Michigan.

15 No one in KDPS knew of this fact. Apparently, despite the fact that KDPS
purchased the software and thought they owned the software, it would shut down if
KDPS or other users did not pay the agreed upon maintenance costs. In this case, it
was over $58,000. KDPS in essence was being held hostage by not paying the
maintenance costs. Previous conversations had led KDPS to believe the system
would not shut down.
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The injunction called for DM Data to produce the code to restart the computers in the
dispatch center. The injunction would be in effect until both parties could reach a
resolution. KDPS staff were able to get the system back running once the judge
signed the injunction. The license renewal software was received from DM Data
later that night, but was viewed with skepticism by KDPS computer service
personnel who thought it would actually take the system down instead of reviving it.
The codes sent by DM Data were never used. Computer programmers from KDPS
devised a “work-around” for the license issue and shutdown of the CAD computers.
Organizationally, DM Data has been bought several more times and is
presently owned by Archonix, Inc. KDPS personnel stayed on the user group email
listing and received limited information from time-to-time pertaining to the CPLIMS
system. As o f this writing, the court injunction and potential lawsuit between DM
Data and the City of Kalamazoo remains open. No permanent resolution has been
achieved; however, it appears neither party is anxious to resurrect this part of their
histories. The last conversation between the City Attorney’s Office in Kalamazoo
and myself indicated the best course of action was to issue lie. By not bringing it up
before the courts, it would probably just die after a short time period. In June of
2003, KDPS walked away from the $1.5 million they had paid DM Data for a new
system. The hardware was given to City Hall, and the last contact with DM Data was
in May o f 2004.
This, then, is a short synopsis of what occurred between KDPS and DM Data.
The above description pinpoints the important issues confronting both organizations.
The relationship was cordial, congenial, and almost friendly at the start. Both
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agencies were starting/treading new ground and were eager to make things work.
KPDS was patient in the efforts of DM Data to correct the problems, and DM Data
seemed to be genuinely trying to rectify the problems encountered by KDPS. KDPS
poured money into the project as DM Data convinced them that new hardware,
upgraded software, and training would “fix it all.” KDPS was so taken in by DM
Data that they decided to partner with them in their venture into MPCs. KDPS
sought special funding to put another $528,000 (MPCs) into the project. Still by
2002, it was apparent the system would never work and relations soured deeply
when KDPS (I, on behalf of) attempted to pressure DM Data into fixing the system.
The emergency restraining order was of course the “last straw,” but KDPS was
already well on their way to purchasing another system.
Intergraph Public Safety
In the spring of 2002, KDPS started actively pursuing another computer
vendor to replace DM Data. Those dynamics will be covered in the next section. In
this section, I will cover the contact with IPS, the initial problems encountered, the
subsequent path to complete implementation, and the ongoing problems encountered
with IPS.
IPS staff provided a demonstration of their products to KDPS in the spring of
2002. In the summer of 2002, KDPS released an RFP for bids from vendors to
replace the DM Data system. IPS responded and subsequent negotiations landed an
agreement between IPS and KDPS. In October of 2002, letters of intent were signed,
and in November the city commission approved the signing of an agreement and
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expenditure o f funds to purchase a new system from IPS. The initial contract
purchase was slightly over $1.5 million and included replacement of PCs in the
dispatch center, including monitors, and the purchase of five servers to facilitate a
client-server architecture for the system. A review of emails disclosed work was to
begin immediately, as KDPS was fearful of the DM Data system collapsing around
them.
An initial kick-off meeting was held between KDPS and IPS the first week of
December 2002. In that, meeting a scheduled rollout was planned with CAD being
rolled out in May o f 2003, RMS in October of 2003, and MPCs later in 2003 and
into 2004. IPS had assigned the project management aspects to Tim Kick, and I was
the project manager for KDPS. The two agencies began working towards their goals
and deadlines (emails between Tim Kick and Steve Reifert, November-December
2003).
KDPS had been given a deadline to produce a usable digital map for IPS to
convert for its system.16 The deadline was the first week of February 2003. KDPS
met that deadline, and then communications between Kick and myself slowed. In
March 2003, an IPS sales representative visited KDPS to introduce himself as
KDPS’s new accounts representative. We discussed our deadlines, and he showed
alarm that things were not progressing much faster in order to meet the summer
deadline for CAD cutover. Kick sent hardware to KDPS, but that was his last email

16 The map is a digitally created map of the City of Kalamazoo. The industry
standard for most digital maps is created using ESRI software, but IPS has their own
mapping software, so all maps created by KDPS had to be converted to IPS mapping
software.
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KDPS received (email dated April 21, 2003). Verification of hardware shipment and
other necessary correspondence for installation by IPS would not be received until
after a new project manager was assigned. Shortly thereafter, he resigned from IPS.
KDPS soon learned its project had seen little attention as Kick was out “job hunting”
according to IPS management (telephone conversations between IPS management
and Steve Reifert, April and May 2003).
IPS rebounded with the assignment of a project manager named Tracey
Moyer. She was a fifteen-year employee with the company, and would end up seeing
the project through to completion. IPS realized it could not meet the May 2003
deadline, but pledged to a June CAD cutover. On June 13, 2003, KDPS brought the
IPS CAD product live. This cutover included training and customization to fit
KDPS’s specific needs. Allowing for a transition period, the CAD system seemed to
be working properly. Later in the summer, however, KDPS experienced their first
unexplained problem with CAD. Dispatchers were receiving errors on their status
monitors. The error would show as “EXT” which meant there was an external error.
This caused the units to be out of synchronization with each other and the inability of
one dispatcher to dispatch certain units. The initial calls to IPS Help Desk provided
no relief. Moyer became involved as well as other IPS staff. This problem lingered
for months. Dispatchers constantly complained of the problem. Initially the “EXT”
problem was isolated to the times on the PCs in the dispatch center being out of
synchronization with the other PCs and the servers. Further blame was put on the
operating systems o f the PCs that were running under the new Windows XP
operating platform. It was then blamed on a “netclock” installed in the server room
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to synchronize the 911 telephone system and the IPS computer system. KDPS staff
and IPS staff worked on the problem vigorously, but it still lingered as a source of
problems with CAD. It was an unresolved issue that was causing complaints from
the dispatchers. IPS claimed to believe it was a unique problem with KDPS, and they
could not explain what was occurring. A subsequent check by KDPS computer staff
revealed that IPS had received other complaints of this nature from other police
departments and were working on the problem at IPS headquarters; however, IPS
had not disclosed this fact to KDPS. KDPS staff members, myself included,
identified this as the first time IPS had intentionally withheld information from
KDPS on a general problem with its CAD system.
In October 2003, KDPS went live with RMS. Cutover was uneventful with
KDPS welcoming the change from the DM Data product.17 Two major problems
soon surfaced with the IPS RMS product, I/LEADS. The first was a problem with
the spell check system in the narrative portion of the product, and the second was the
inability to produce MICR18 information/reports. The spell check issue was fixed in
July o f 2006, and the MICRs reporting was finally completed in the spring of 2006.

17 KDPS still maintained the VAX system until cutover to IPS RMS. KDPS was
running the Command Data VAX, DM Data CPLIMS and IPS RMS simultaneous
for months. The fear was that if one went down, KDPS could revert back to a
fallback system.
18 MICRS is the Michigan Crime Information Reporting System that is Michigan’s
response to reporting UCR, information to the FBI. It is an automated computerized
reporting system that requires, by law, Michigan police agencies to report crime
information electronically to the State of Michigan. Michigan, through the Michigan
State Police, then reports that information to the FBI for UCR data.
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The spell check issue revolved around the narrative portion of the police
report produced on the RMS. With the purchase of the IPS system, KDPS was to go
paperless with their police reports. Officers were to type their reports on a PC, or
eventually on their MPCs. If printed reports were needed (i.e., by the court,
prosecutor’s office, or the City Attorney’s office) they would be printed at a later
date. The first episode o f the spell check failure was noticed several days after
bringing the system on line. The officers would type their narratives, hit a spell
check button on the screen, and their narrative would disappear. The officers would
have to start over and retype the narrative portion of their report. Several trouble
reports were sent to IPS in reference to this (emails between Reifert and Moyer). At
first, IPS denied knowing what caused this, but later Moyer confided that they knew
o f the potential for the loss of the narrative with the spell check button, but withheld
the information because they did not want to miss a deadline.
The MICRS issue was more complicated and stemmed from the requirements
o f the State of Michigan and FBI’s UCR mandates. In the contract signed by IPS and
KDPS, it called for, and was agreed upon by IPS, the provision of electronic
reporting of MICR data from KDPS to the State o f Michigan. IPS admitted, by
August 2004, they did not have the capability to produce this report, and they would
have to customize the I/LEADS section to produce the report on a monthly basis. It
was not until August of 2005 that KDPS was able to send this report error free to the
State. KDPS did not send any information in 2003; it sent information in 2004 but it
was only 85% correct (an acceptable percentage to the State) and was finally able to
send final data in 2005.
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Another problem was encountered in April 2005. KDPS experienced what
IPS and IT staff said could not occur. On a Saturday morning, the entire CAD system
locked up. In March of 2005, the KDPS dispatch center became a consolidated
dispatching center with three agencies using the IPS CAD system. Kalamazoo
Township Police dispatchers, as well as the Kalamazoo County Sheriffs Department
dispatchers, were all co-located with KDSP dispatchers in the center. Thus, a CAD
failure took down the emergency response system for the entire county. It took over
three hours to bring the system back up. No explanation was ever given by IPS, and
the only follow-up from the company was whether it was working or not.
While the problems encountered with ISP seem less significant, they
nonetheless, took considerable staff time to correct and increased the resistance of
both officers and dispatchers to the system. As I will cover in the next section,
coming off a debacle like the DM Data system, officers and dispatchers alike were
extremely skeptical. In a culture resistant to change (Banks 2004; Crank and Caldero
2002; Manning 1997, 2003; Dunham and Alpert 2005), officers were virtually
looking for reasons for the IPS system to fail.
KDPS
KDPS was not new to automation efforts, having begun its trek in the early
1980’s. What perhaps contributed to the problems with its transition to the DM Data
product were the conditions within the organization when KDPS first started
negotiating for a new system. The City of Kalamazoo had a tumultuous 1990’s in
terms of city managers, and in the mid-1990s, one of the five managers the city had
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during the 1990’s believed it was his charge to “reduce the cost o f government
spending,” a program he developed and attempted to use to make sweeping changes.
The fervor for reducing expenditures trickled down to all managers in the city. When
KDPS was confronted with the perceived need to replace their computer system, one
o f the driving forces was the overall cost. At $472,000, even in 1997, an entire
computer system was seen as a bargain. Tiburon, Inc., which owned the rights to the
Command Data system KDPS was replacing, was quoting KDPS $700,000 for an
upgrade. So, it is apparent that if the total system could be replaced for almost half
the cost of an upgrade, the city would be getting its money’s worth. One way or
another, KDPS needed to upgrade or replace its existing system and the cheaper way
would be the wisest and most in line with the culture of reducing government
spending.
Another situation that plagued the DM Data project was the lack of
leadership and technological knowledge within the department that was necessary to
take the project to fruition. City IT staff had been pulled back into City Hall, leaving
no formally trained computer specialists in the department. Those remaining
included a dispatcher who was learning as she went, and a retired officer who had
returned because he was knowledgeable in the use of computers and was a
programmer on the first system KDPS developed. Another dispatcher was added to
the group as well as a crime analyst (civilian position) who was familiar more with a
DEC/VAX platform than RISC 6000. The retired officer left around 2000, leaving
the two dispatchers and the analyst to fend for themselves.
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The two lieutenants that filled in as supervisors of dispatch did not have the
computer staff working for them. The dispatchers working as computer service
personnel worked for the Service Division Captain. Neither lieutenant had a great
deal o f technical knowledge, and neither (both admitted to me later) had any interest
in the computers or automation efforts of KDPS. Both told me later they despised
working with DM Data, and found themselves alone trying to figure out the
problems with little assistance from city IT. By 2001, the city IT staff and the
computer services people in KDPS had alienated each other so that neither group
communicated with the other, causing still another problem in the DM Data project.
In 2001, when I took over as the dispatch supervisor, I had three problems
that needed to be attended to. The first was the DM Data product that did not work.
The second was personnel issues that needed to be addressed. KDPS had two
dispatchers without any computer training, trying to push a project through to
fruition with no city IT assistance. City IT would not talk with them, and they would
not talk with city IT. Each, of course, blamed the other for the division. Thirdly, the
computer services were isolated from the computer users and the associated
problems. The supervisor attempting to get things “fixed” did not have the people
working for them, causing problems in direction and supervision, etc.
Two additional organizational factors that influenced IT, and computer
projects also exacerbated the above problems. The city was about to move KDPS
headquarters to a newly renovated building at the expense of some $12-16 million.
All networking and desktop PCs would need to be moved and redesigned to suit the
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new headquarters.19 Additionally, the chief o f KDPS wanted a consolidated dispatch
center at the new KDPS center whereby KDPS, Kalamazoo Township Police, and
Kalamazoo County Sheriffs dispatchers would all work at this central location.
Plans were needed to move the headquarters, design a networking system for the
new building, and accommodate the addition of new dispatch consoles in the new
center.
One decision made by the management of KDPS (emails between Chief
Weston, Captain Martin, and Sergeant (at the time) Reifert 2001-2002) was to
replace the two dispatchers with trained computer specialists. In other words,
academically/technically trained computer specialists who could maintain and
implement a new computer system would replace the dispatchers who had performed
these tasks. This attempt came with some backlash as the unions fought over work
that was theirs, and blamed the city for not training the dispatchers as computer
specialists. In the fall o f 2002, the crime analyst and one of the dispatchers retired.
The other dispatcher was sent back to dispatching after a deal with the union. In the
winter of 2002-2003, one trained computer professional was hired by KDPS. That
employee was still working at KDPS at the time of this writing. This professional
was able to bring the DM Data platform under control. Informix errors stopped, and

19 These new requirements included fiber optics, Cat V wiring, and the attempt to
avoid service disruption when the headquarters moved because of the 911 system
and other computer users.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

150
the platform was much more stable. It still locked up on dispatchers, but problems
were significantly reduced.20
Organizationally, the issue with the new IPS CAD system created the air of
“this won’t work either,” as both IPS and KDPS computer staff struggled to get
control o f the “EXT” errors. KDPS went months before it found out from other users
(e.g., Lakeview, Colorado) that the “external” error being received on the dispatch
consoles were known to IPS, and in reality numerous “help tickets” were assigned at
the IPS Help Desk for repair of the problem. The problem was repaired the first part
of 2004 with a two-prong approach. A new program designed by KDPS staff to
synchronize the PCs was developed, and IPS created a “fix” to avoid the errors. On
an organizational level, this, coupled with the spell check error, was viewed as a
serious leadership issue at KDPS along with the purchase of another faulty system.
Analysis
As Michalowski and Kramer (2006) and Kramer, Michalowski and
Kauzlarich (2002) note, it is the societal arrangements that shape the goals and
means o f economic institutions and the constraints they face. These arrangements,
structure, dynamics, and cultural meanings direct control and shape the direction and
means of production. As Michalowski (1985) pointed out, in a capitalist society the

20 The IT professional was able to utilize her talent to transform an unstable system
to a somewhat controlled usable platform. She still insisted on replacing the older
system, but was nonetheless able to get the DM Data system under control. KDPS
administration quickly realized the benefits of having academically trained,
knowledgeable personnel from outside the department working on the system.
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ways and means o f production are not only based on a competitive arrangement, but
the government also plays a role in ensuring the stabilization and perpetuation of this
means of production. As Chapter IV indicated, the controls, or lack of controls, in a
capitalist economy provides for guidance of the market. These controls both
provided the impetus for growth, development, expansion, and sustenance of the
economy, but also open doors for criminogenic activity. At the organizational level
the internal structure of specific economic political units with the external
political-economic environment on one hand, and with the way in which the
work-related thoughts and actions of individuals who occupy positions in
those units are conditioned by the requirements of the positions they hold and
by the procedures of the organization. (Michalowski and Kramer 2006:39-40)
The following is an analysis using the catalysts for action framework.
Remember this will identify the key factors that facilitated or inhibited
organizational deviance. It is the intersections of these factors that led to the overall
social harm. There was no single event that led to the harms inflicted on society by
the events which unfolded at KDPS. It is also important to remember that this
analysis is based on “the proposition that criminal or deviant behavior at the
organizational level results from a coincidence of pressure for goal attainment,
availability and perceived attractiveness of illegitimate means, and an absence of
effective social control” (Michalowski and Kramer 2006:40).
Motivation
At the motivational level, we can see the actions of both IPS and DM Data
are based on a capitalist competitive culture where the quest for money is the
ultimate goal. Both companies operate in a relatively small market. While there are
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hundreds of police departments in the United States (BJA), most cannot afford a
computer system that costs millions o f dollars. This squeezes the market even
smaller, with a potential client base consisting of medium-to-large departments.
At the corporate cultural level, each company sought out and competed with
other companies for KDPS’s business. DM Data, in efforts to increase its client base,
dramatically undercut many others to get KDPS as a client (personal interview with
company sales representative Jim McCullough).21 DM Data undercut other bidders
by coming in extremely low on its bid. For example, Tiburon quoted an upgrade at
over $700,000, while DM Data came in at just over $400,000 for a completely new
system. DM Data was willing to undercut the other vendors based on knowledge that
continuous maintenance contracts would add millions of dollars to the existing
contract. For example, DM Data set up its license so that if a client did not pay the
maintenance fee, the system would shut down as happened at KDPS, which led to
the court injunction between DM Data and the City of Kalamazoo. Agencies using
the DM Data product were held hostage to pay the maintenance fees or face
shutdown of the entire system.
IPS was no different in their approach. IPS readily admitted it wanted KDPS
business since it is the largest operating consolidated police, fire, and emergency
service operation in the United States, and it sought to do whatever it took to get
KDPS as a client. Other factors also entered into the equation with IPS. It was

21 This was confirmed by other vendors who bid in 1997 for the KDPS contract. New
World, Inc., was particularly upset by the undercutting DM Data committed to get
the contract. In fact, New World warned in 1997 that KDPS would have difficulties
with DM Data as a result.
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seeking to expand its client base to the state of Michigan, as it had lost its only
Michigan-based client, Troy, Michigan, to a consortium approach several years
before. IPS originally bid $2.1 millions dollars, but during negotiations came down
to $1.5 million. Based on its 1997 split from the Intergraph Corp., Inc., IPS was
striving to increase its client/customer base numbers. Intergraph, Inc. realized there
existed a separate potential use for its mapping product, but in a different, more
concise way. It started purchasing other smaller companies to acquire their software,
and thereby expanded into a larger market, increasing the potential for acquiring
federally funded contracts under the Crime Bill and Patriot Act.
Project management is also affected by corporate pressure, goal attainment,
and a culture of competition and quest for money. Project managers are tied to
deadlines, cutover dates, and project fruition. So these deadlines are tied to financial
gains as well as financial losses. For example, IPS project management would
receive a bonus for making deadlines and a penalty for not making deadlines. This
provided for motivation to ship software even when the company knew about the
defects. For example, IPS shipped the CAD system with the known “bug” causing
the external errors. Another example was the shipping o f the RMS product with the
known “bug” causing the narrative to be lost when the officers used the spell check
button to correct their reports. In both cases, Moyer told me that IPS believed these
problems were of little concern for the overall implementation of the project. In other
words, IPS believed the problems were not significant enough to miss deadlines.
Missed deadlines meant missed bonuses for the IPS project manager, and missed
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payments to the company (personal communications between Reifert and Moyer
2004-2005).
KDPS faced economic pressure as it moved away from the Command Data
system onto the DM Data system. Under the City of Kalamazoo’s “reduce the cost of
government service” agenda, KDPS was pressured from city administrative officials
to bring in a system that cost significantly less than that proposed by Tiburon, Inc.,
owner o f the Command Data system. To achieve this goal, KDPS administrators
sought out and purchased a system that initially came in at $300,000 less than the
cost proposed ($700,000) for an upgrade to the Tiburon system. The Service
Division captain was commended for his ability to bring this project in at such a low
cost. He left before he saw what became of the project, but was willing to cut comers
to achieve organizational goals. Within KDPS, there was no one in a subordinate
position who was willing to stand up and tell the captain he was wrong for
attempting to purchase a system at such low cost.
Opportunity Structures
Under opportunity structures, most of the catalysts for action (see Table 1,
Appendix B) existed between the three organizations. Not one catalyst was
responsible, but, as noted previously, it is the intersection of several that can be used
to explain what occurred.
Instrumental rationality existed when both of the private organizations dealt
with KDPS. At this level, the agent is seen to seek out the course of action that will
achieve the desired goal. Whether this path is one o f reason or is fueled by selfish
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ends, it nonetheless places goal achievement above all else. Organizations can act in
this manner as well. The interaction with DM Data is the best example here, when
their representatives used emails and memos to indicate that they had fixed many
problems even though the problems had not been fixed. Six emails were located,
along with several memoranda, where Dorfman, Ramasamy, or other technicians
indicated problems had been fixed, when in reality they had not. On several
occasions they would send emails to people higher in the echelon of command in an
apparent attempt to circumvent those standing in the way o f getting their money. For
instance, Dorfman stopped sending me any correspondence after I indicated on the
phone KDPS’s displeasure with Raja’s December 2001 trip where he took CAD
down for eight hours. Several correspondences that he sent to Captain Martin
advised the problems had been fixed. In the April memorandum, he said that the
problems were fixed, and he requested the rest of the money. That very day, KDPS
staff members met to discuss a course of action because nothing had been fixed. By
then, KDPS had decided to drop the DM Data project for another vendor.
Additionally, Dorfman and Ramasamy would call the KDPS computer
services technicians in efforts to get them on their side and attempt to divide and
conquer by splitting the forces within KDPS. This ploy did not work, however, as
KDPS staff members had come to the realization that the DM Data product would
not work.
IPS staff personnel also practices instrumental rationality, as when they
attempted to meet the goal of completing projects on time for the sake of bonuses
and getting contracts by any means. One example of this was IPS’s claim that they
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could provide the MICRS reporting required by KDPS and agreed upon in the initial
contract. Two and a half years later, that part of the project was completed. The
expectations o f KDPS were that the product was capable of MICRS reporting off the
shelf, and there would be no lag time in implementation. Instead, KDPS failed to
report crime information in 2003 and for most of 2004. The 2005 report was not
complete, and only in 2006 was the department able to fully provide the necessary
MICRS report.
Defective SOPs on the part of IPS also led to difficulties when the project
between KDPS and IPS first started. As previously mentioned, the first project
manager for IPS essentially failed to provide any service to KDPS, and what he did
do was not timely and put the project behind for months. Had IPS had some sort of
procedure in place to monitor their off-site project managers, the project would have
been on time and the questions of whether the right vendor was selected and whether
KDPS leadership was capable of ever getting a working system would have been
avoided.
Additionally, like most police agencies, KDPS had no SOPs for a project like
this. Essentially, SOPs at KDPS were written after-the-fact in response to some
needed security issue for wrongful use of part of the system. Little if any information
or documentation was sought on a project of this type. Managers and administrators
were essentially flying-by-the-seat-of-their-pants.
Normalization of deviance was a big factor for both DM Data and IPS. DM
Data’s constant claims that the system was fixed were taken as if it (DM Data)
believed things were satisfactory, and only a few within KDPS (namely, me) were
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concerned with the operations. Conversations with the computer service people at
KDPS were often pleasant at the individual/technician level. In other words, the
computer staff from KDPS and the programmers from DM Data were on a friendly
basis. They had been working closely for three years and knew each other by their
first names and even details of each other’s families.22 The message very quickly
from DM Data was that, if they could get me out of the way, everything would be
fine. DM Data would also solicit other customers to contact us to see if they could
help. One loyal DM Data user called me from an Eastern seaboard town, claiming
that he could fix our problems because his system ran perfectly. The offer was
refused, but he claimed to be trying to work on DM Data’s behalf in order to help
them get our issues resolved. This was also borne out by DM Data’s later refusal to
contact or talk with me, instead choosing to go “over my head” to talk with my
superiors.
IPS normalized their actions as well. To Moyer and other IPS staff members,
the time synchronization issue, the spell check problem, the delays in the projects
due to the project manager, the MICRS issue, and the insistence to stay on track and
on time were a glossing over of the problem. Moyer’s explanation of the spell check
problem was that IPS did not think it was a “big enough issue” to stop the
implementation process. When asked why she did not tell us about the problem, she

22 This is based on telephone conversations and personal emails I witnessed myself.
At one point after Raja’s visit, one of the computer technicians at KDPS heard that
Ramasamy was withholding Raja’s pay until KDPS was fixed. She started to become
very emotional, as if she was going to cry. She later learned that Raja was
Ramasammy’s brother, which made her feel worse.
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said they thought it would be fixed shortly, and they could ship the fix quickly
enough to avoid problems. The MCIRS failure was both a defective SOP and a
normalization of deviance. Nothing stopped the contract negotiator from promising
MCIRS reporting while at the table, and nothing stopped IPS from shipping the
product when it was not functional. They promised for months, and eventually years,
that they were near a fix, but the problem was very “complex” involving multitude of
code and other programming. They also reminded KDPS they had other clients, and
they had other priorities. This, of course did not stop a vice president from promising
KDPS it would get fixed at as soon as possible. In fact, they promised they would
put one person on the project to get it complete.23
Michalowski and Kramer (2002, Table 1, Appendix B) note in their catalysts
for action under Opportunity Structure that computers and technologies can
themselves be a catalystic factor. This was the case for KDPS. In 2001, when I took
over the computer projects, the two people working in the computer services section
had not had formal training. Neither had any terminal degrees in computer science,
and their training was usually that provided by the vendors. Both took several
courses conducted by DM Data and courses at the local community college. Neither
had any formal training in networks or database management. Essentially, KDPS had
two people who liked working with computers at the helm of a multi-million dollar
system. Organizationally, KDPS management and administration knew that neither
could handle the present system, and neither could handle the purchasing and

23 This information was gleaned from numerous telephone calls and emails between
myself, KDPS’s Chief and IPS project managers.
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implementation o f a new system. Additionally, management and administration
readily admitted to their own weakness in implementation, operation, and purchasing
computer systems. As others have noted (Manning 2003; Nunn 2001) the police
professionals lack the knowledge and skills to operate in the computer system
domain. Lack o f knowledge on the part of KDPS personnel was a serious problem in
the DM Data system project. Both in management and leadership, KDPS failed to
properly manage that system.
When I hired computer professionals in late 2002 and early 2003, the errors
experienced by dispatchers and other users of the DM Data system were drastically
reduced, and in some instances ceased. The platform stabilized, the errors slowed,
and CAD and RMS seemed to operate more reliably and faster. The mobile product
still would not work, but that was a programming issue the professionals could not
resolve. One other example that points to the need of professionals happened the day
KDPS filed for the injunction to keep DM Data going until KDPS could transition to
the IPS system. According to one computer technician at KDPS, the code sent by
DM Data to keep the system going would have actually caused irreparable damage to
the system. The code was wrong and could have had catastrophic consequences.
KDPS never found out as the code was circumvented, but a review of what DM Data
sent as a “fix” showed problems would have been experienced if it had been
implemented.
The personnel issue involving the computer technicians also fits the model as
an internal constraint for KDPS. These were dispatchers turned computer
technicians. They did not have the skills needed to implement a system or sustain a
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system. Their only recourse to what was happening with DM Data was to support the
DM Data programmers. That is how the project grew from $400,000 to $1.5 million.
Money was thrown at the project based on the advice of DM Data. No one at KDPS
had the knowledge or ability to question what was occurring. Throwing money at it
in hopes of fixing the problems seemed like a logical route. City IT staff took a
“hands off” approach, as feelings between the two staffs were tense (to be discussed
in the next chapter). KDPS administration moved to replace the two dispatchers, but
that too was problematic from an interactional standpoint.
Controls
The overarching factor noted under catalysts for action in terms of
operationality o f control was that throughout both projects there were no controls.
No factor stood out more than the lack of controls facing any of the organizations
involved. Reviewing emails, correspondence, legal documents, and other
communique disclosed a clear void in any control mechanisms concerning the
vendors’ actions. Likewise, KDPS had no structure, no policies or controls
concerning working with the vendors other than contractual language, which
concerns the initial purchase, and in the case of DM Data, nothing after that. KDPS
did provide some contractual safeguards in their contract with IPS for payment
structuring based on performance standards. Percentage payments were paid based
on performance standards for implementation. Payment to IPS was actually held up
by KDPS for the failed performance of the MICRS reporting. In the end, IPS
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received all its money with no penalties for delays or failed performance (spell
check, crashing, delay in implementation, etc.).
There were, however, several catalysts that added to this condition. A culture
o f compliance existed with KDPS, whereby the fact that the computer did not work
or function properly perpetuated throughout the organization. Several authors have
previously noted this condition (Chu 2001; Palmiotto 2005; Manning 2003; Edwards
1996; Nunn 2001) where the culture accepts the fact that technology does not always
work as reported, and oftentimes does not work at all. Not only were KPDS
personnel used to the computers not working, they were use to hearing the rhetoric
indicating that a solution for them not working was “right around the comer.” This
cultural acceptance was especially true with the DM Data product, but also added
immensely to the “nay-saying” that occurred when the IPS system was purchased
and then implemented. The spell check issue was a debacle that supported the notion
that the IPS system would not work. Additionally, the CAD system had difficulty
integrating the map of the streets of Kalamazoo. This was not part of IPS’s problems
or issues but was based on inaccurate and incomplete digital maps of the Kalamazoo
County area. These maps were the responsibility o f KDPS to provide. The problem
was that within the Kalamazoo County area, digital maps were often incomplete and
inaccurate. Dispatchers knew nothing of the digital map problems and chalked it up
to the system not living up to the promises made. In the end, a more complete and
accurate map was developed, but the damage was done and the skepticism remained.
The communication process added to the lack of controls and perpetuation of
the problems between the agencies. In both instances, DM Data and IPS were in

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

162
different parts o f the country, so little if any face-to-face communication occurred.
At first with DM Data, email was just emerging as a reliable form of
communications for KDPS, so contact was via telephone. Later, and in particular
with IPS, emails were the preferred method of communication. Both forms of
communication are impersonal and less confrontational. All the emotions that go into
a face-to-face conversation (anger, frustration, displeasure, etc.) are avoided. I will
talk more about this in the next chapter, but this too led to a lack of control. This
worked well for the vendors because they could escape the confrontation. They could
avoid the anger and other emotions by keeping their distance and communicating via
electronic means.
All these led to the fact that there were no apparent controls over the vendors.
As noted in the previous chapter, the institutional environment was a catalyst that
allowed the computer vendors to cause social harm. At the control level, the
organizational setting of KPDS and the reward structures of the vendors perpetuated
the social harms of the vendors. At the organizational level, the reward structures of
the vendors were based on making money. Contract award, deadlines,
implementation schedules, purchases of more software and hardware through the
vendor, and maintenance contracts all meant more money and were all tied to that
quest. DM Data was a privately held company. All the money made went to the
owner and his employees. At IPS, which is a publicly held company, the incentive
structure rewarded performance based on bonuses. This money went directly to the
employee and was an incentive to do a good job, but was also a catalyst for deviance.
Examples o f this are seen in IPS’s deception on the MICRS reporting, the failure to
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tell KDPS about the spell check and time synchronization, and the catastrophic
failure of a CAD system that “couldn’t go down.”
Further perpetuating the social harms by the vendors was the denial that
anything happened as a result of their actions. IPS paid no penalties for failure to
provide a timely MICRS report. They faced no penalty for the CAD malfunction, or
other smaller delays in implementation. Even with a court injunction, DM Data faced
no real penalties. In the end, at the advice of the City Attorney’s Office of
Kalamazoo, a decision to let the court injunction lay and “it will just go away,”
added more credence to the notion that nothing really happens to the vendors. IPS
received all its payments plus extra purchases and an annual maintenance agreement
of over $100,000 a year.24 DM Data received all but $124,000 payment in for the
MPCs that never worked. While a substantial amount of money for a small company,
one must also realize the initial contract was for $472,000 and grew to over $1.5
million. KDPS just walked away. There were lawsuits to recover the losses, no
further discussions; instead, communications just stopped.
Conclusion
Like the Challenger disaster, the Ford Pinto case, the Valujet crash, the
Imperial Chicken Factory fire, no one would say “stop.” No one would step up and
say, “Stop the process.” At each level, warning signs were evident. DM Data’s

24 The IPS system’s initial cost was approximately $1.5 million. That was financed
for ten years, which is what KDPS believes it needs to run the system before looking
for another one. Annual maintenance costs put the total expenditure at somewhere
closer to $2.5 million.
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failure to bring a system up after two years should have indicated there were some
deep-seated problems. The answer was to pour money into the project to keep it
going. Lack of knowledge and technological savvy led to this problem. Still, no one
at KDPS said stop. Even after years of attempts to stabilize a failing system, some
were still willing to pour money into the ailing DM Data system.
The police profession is up against an entrenched corporate culture and
reward structure that feeds off the weaknesses of the profession. When police
agencies like KDPS25 attempt to turn their untrained dispatchers into computer
systems personnel, weaknesses develop that can in turn be exploited. For example,
DM Data convinced KDPS that newer hardware and newer software were the answer
to the functional problems of their system. So, KDPS purchased both through DM
Data. DM Data convinced KDPS, when KDPS was purchasing MPCs, that in order
for the system to work, KDPS should buy the computers, software, and RF system
through DM Data. Rather than deviate, KDPS purchased the MPC system from DM
Data. At each turn, DM Data made money as they sold additional equipment and
software to KDPS. DM Data had so much control over the MPC project that the
mobile computer supplier, XPlore, was told not to talk to KDPS personnel unless it
had first gone through DM Data (personal communications between XPlore
employee Jamal and myself).

25 In attempts to keep this work in some manageable form, I did not expand this
study outside o f KDPS. However, during the course of my work as project manager,
I was contacted by numerous police agencies that had done what KDPS had in terms
o f making dispatchers their computer systems people. Like KDPS, they learned that
in order to make a system functional and even close to performing at top end,
academically trained and competent computer specialists were needed.
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Many o f the same factors were incorporated into IPS actions and work
structure. My conversations would have to occur with my counterpart at IPS. I could
not talk with other project people unless talking to the IPS project manager (Moyer)
first. This insulated the other employees from what was occurring in the project and
the possible leaking of price or cost information. This was particularly evident while
attempting to bring the MICRS reporting online. Messages from Moyer indicated it
was progressing, we were within days, and were very close. In actuality, the
programmer admitted later to KDPS systems personnel that he had on occasion been
pulled away for other projects, further delaying KDPS and further delaying the
process.
As with the other case studies previously noted, no one would say stop. The
process continued to the point of injurious actions. The most injurious of all the
actions was the loss of life and the confusion created by CAD crashing on key
dispatches, such as the warehouse fire. Second was the loss of money and time spent
on these projects. While I can address the dollar figures involved in purchasing and
sustaining a system, no one in KDPS ever calculated the loss of time and energy
spent by employees. To a certain extent, the employees should be working on the
project, and that is an expected cost. On the other hand, significant overtime
expenses were experienced by KDPS, and thus the city, through both implementation
projects. I initially attempted to calculate the overtime expenses experienced through
the DM Data project but stopped when administrators realized we would never
recover those losses.
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The organizational level was obviously where the most harm occurred in this
interaction between vendors and KDPS. The catalysts for action reveals the
intersections of deviance that caused the bilking of the taxpayers out of millions of
dollars. The integrated theoretical approach better explains what occurred within
each organization. It was the intersection and interplay that caused the social harms,
not just one action, but also the culmination o f numerous actions that inflicted the
damage.
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CHAPTER VI
INTERACTIONAL ENVIRONMENT
As Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) have indicated, the interactional or faceto-face environment is one of the most difficult to examine or explain. Assumptions
about behavior and motivation must be based on overt actions. No one took the time
during either o f these projects to observe and explain behaviors exhibited by
participating members. Until now, no one took the time to piece the puzzle together
to add the dimension of personal interaction. Everyone understood the seriousness of
system failure, but what of the behavior of those involved? To what degree did
actions o f those involved add to the debacle and social harms involved in the
purchase, implementation, and maintenance of the two computer systems at KDPS?
Social-psychological theories and, in particular, differential association
theory have been used to explain criminal actions at the individual level. Calling
upon Sutherland’s (1934, 1945) earlier work that the individual learning process is
what leads to deviant activity, others researchers (Clinard 1946; Cressey 1953; Lane
1954; Geis 1967; Albanese 1982; Kramer 1982) have used it to further explain
white-collar and corporate crime, including state-corporate crime (for example, see
Michalowski and Kramer 2006). What is interesting is that previous work (see
Chapter II), in the realm o f individual culpability and individual interactions has paid
little attention to the micro level o f interactions. As I noted earlier, this work brings
the notion o f state-corporate crime down to a micro-level of analysis. My point is
167

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

168
that until now we have relied on differential association as the major means of
explaining the face-to-face encounters that led to deviant activity. I contend, though,
there are several other micro-level theories that can be used to explain the behavior
o f the individuals involved in the present case from IPS, DM Data and KDPS. Using
an integrated approach, each theory lends credibility and micro-level explanation for
the actions of those involved. As Chapters IV and V have shown, it is the
intersection of actions and the conditional institutional and organizational factors that
led to the social harms encountered at KDPS.
This chapter covers the third category in Table 1 (Appendix B) of the
catalysts for action. It deals with the face-to-face interaction of those involved from
all three organizations. It covers the motivation, the opportunity structure, and
controls of the individuals involved. It is a micro-level examination of what occurred
between the actors as each computer system was purchased, implemented, and
maintained. What follows is an explanation of the individual behavior using four
sociological theories that utilize a micro-level approach to social interaction, namely,
differential association, strain theory, dramaturgy, and social constructionism. Each
theoretical outlook provides insight in explaining the action of the individuals
involved. This will be followed by accounts of actions that fit the Kauzlarich and
Kramer (1998), Kramer, Michalowski and Kauzlarich (2002), and Michalowski and
Kramer (2006) catalysts for action in Table 1. As with the previous chapters, the
interactional environment will be outlined in Table 4 (Appendix B) and then
discussed at length.
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General Theories
Differential association theory of criminal behavior traces its roots back to
Sutherland’s work (1934, 1940, 1945) and espouses the notion that criminal behavior
is a learned phenomenon. This behavior is learned through interaction within
personal groups and is associated with learning specialized skills and detailed
knowledge of criminal behavior. Support for such a theoretical explanation exists
and helps illuminate the actions of individuals at DM Data and IPS.
Differential association theory does play a role in explaining some behavior
of the individual agents employed by the computer vendors. Not one account
representative I met from any of the companies had started working at that particular
company. They had all started with a different vendor, but their work was still
related to CAD, RMS, or mobile computing. This was shown when KDPS released
the RFP for the system IPS was awarded. Part of the bid process was a
demonstration. Each company assigned a sales representative or accounts
representative to our project. Each representative admitted to working for another
company involved in selling systems to the police. Each had moved to another
company for more money, or the company they started with had gone out of
business. It appeared that each had learned the language of the computer system they
sold, and each had apparently learned how to sell or negotiate contracts with the
police for these system s. On several occasions, the salespersons would represent

themselves as former police officers or having had some involvement with law
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enforcement, as a means of strengthening their negotiating position as if to say, “It
has to work or I wouldn’t sell it to the police.”
It appears a culture of sales people developed within the selling of the
computer systems. Even within both vendor organizations there were members who
had started at another company and went to work for IPS or DM Data. None of the
accounts representatives from IPS had originally started at IPS. Each had started with
another company selling computer systems and most were systems to police
agencies. Following what others have shown some learned behavior that is kept from
others is developed at the sales level and perpetuated through the industry.
Manipulation, cunning, or other tactics, appear to be taken from company to
company by a cadre of sales people, eager to make money from the government, and
in this case the police.
Others have attempted a “general theory” of crime, focusing on the individual
as the responsible actor. For example, Hirschi and Gottfredson (1987, 1989) argue
that it is a lack of self-control and the pursuit of self-interest that push individuals
into crime and criminal behavior. Weak ties to social institutions, weak or no
socialization, and the need to achieve immediate gratification forces individuals into
crime and can be used to explain behavior in white-collar crime cases.
Agnew (2005) also argues for a “general theory” of crime, indicating that
there are several factors that lead to criminal behavior. Again connected to social
institutions, Agnew argues it is irritability/low self-control, poor parenting practices
coupled with no/bad marriages, subsequently tied to a negative school experience(s),
limited education, peer delinquency and then lack of opportunities brought on by
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unemployment or low-paying jobs. Agnew’s “general theory” work is merely a
culmination o f his other work related to strain theory (1985, 1992). Strain theory
relates to the failure to achieve socially positive goals, or the blocking o f such goals
for certain individuals. These blocked goals, coupled with poor child rearing and
positive interactions within the family, can lead to criminal behavior.
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) and other authors (see Michalowski and
Kramer 2006) have questioned the relevance of a general theory of crime for
studying or explaining organizational deviance (see Friedrichs 1996; Reed and
Yeager 1996; Steffensmeier 1989). None of the above conditions describes or
remotely relates to the type of individuals involved in the computer systems projects.
For KDPS, the employees and actors are police professionals who certainly do not
see their actions as criminal. They did not lack adequate childhood socialization or
access to social institutions and opportunities as they learned their profession.
Likewise, the employees of IPS and DM Data would certainly deny any o f the above
conditions existed for them. These criminological theories simply do not explain the
individual criminogenic actions of those involved in this case. General theories are
important to consider, as I move into the more specific theories that actually explain
what is occurring at the interactional level.
Benson’s (2003) work provides for some insight into why these theories do
not explain the actions o f those involved in the KDPS case. Benson interviewed a
sample of 30 convicted white-collar offenders, and then reviewed the police files.
First and foremost, the offenders interviewed denied any criminal intent in their
actions, and several denied that what they did constituted a crime at all. Ten
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offenders Benson interviewed were involved in some sort of fraud or false
statements, much akin to what transpired with KDPS and the computer vendors.
These offenders almost completely denied doing anything “criminal,” but may have
admitted that a fraud or false statement had occurred, but they were not culpable.
“Seven o f the ten claimed that they, personally, were innocent o f any crime, although
each admitted that fraud had occurred” (Benson 2003:129). Each proposed a
“scapegoat” theory where they blamed another for their actions, or blamed
prosecutors for conducting a “witch hunt” where they were made the scapegoat for
the actions because prosecutors had to get someone. This perspective plays an
important role in explaining the actions of those in the KDPS case.
In the case of the computer vendors, most DM Data and IPS employees
certainly would consider themselves law-abiding citizens just trying to make a living
and reap the profits and benefits of selling their computer systems. Project managers
and engineers were just trying to achieve organizational goals by meeting deadlines
and releasing products, and to them there was no criminal intent in their actions. In
essence, the individual actions of those involved would not have been seen as a
criminal act or harmful in anyway. For example, IPS was interested in securing
KDPS as a customer. One thing that stood in the way was the MICR report. Rather
than admit they could not provide the report and that it would take substantial work
to do so, in contract negotiations they said they could provide the report. The
conversation was matter-of-fact, and went something like this:
Steve Reifert: We’ve got to have MICR reporting. It’s required by law and
necessary to provide monthly reports to the State of Michigan.
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IPS Negotiator Taylor Edge: We can do that easy. It’s just a NIBRS based
report right?
S.R.: Yes, but customized for Michigan.
T.E.: We’ve done it before for Troy, Michigan, and I ’m sure we can do it for
you.
While this represents some paraphrasing, nonetheless, it captures the essence of the
face-to-face interaction, and the end result was that IPS lied. There was no hesitation
on their part, but as was described in the previous chapter, it was far more difficult to
provide the report than they indicated.
Dramaturgy
While differential association theory and Benson’s work provide some
insight into the behaviors of the key players in the KDPS case, Goffman’s (1959,
1974) dramaturgical perspective offers a more in-depth understanding of the
interactions between representatives from KDPS and the two computer vendors. I
turn to that work to further explain the interactional encounters of the agents
involved in the case.
Manning (1977, 1997, 2003) has utilized this dramaturgical perspective when
studying police and their social organization, and explaining the “front stage” and
“back stage” performances o f the police in various settings. Additionally, the settings
are “framed” (Goffman 1974) to further explain the dynamics of the setting and
performance of the agents.
Dramaturgy is best seen as a perspective, or way of seeing, using a theatrical
metaphor to explore how the communication of messages to an audience
conveys information and creates impressions that shape social interaction. . . .
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It implies an audience to which such performances are directed, who must
frame messages, judge the credibility of the performances (its equivocality),
and determine its communicative “core” . . . and depends on some notion of
“information” . .. because information is the core of what is controlled,
given, and given off in performances. (Manning 2003:4)
The focus of dramaturgy lies in symbolic action. It involves the
representation o f a context to another individual. What is represented is what is
critical along with how it is represented. For example, Manning’s work with police
officers (1977, 1997) disclosed several “stages” where officers acted a particular way
based on their audience. In other words, the officers acted one way while in uniform
and in front of citizens, acted differently when not in front of citizens and with their
peers, and acted yet another way when out of uniform and away from the “stage.” It
represents what message is trying to be portrayed and how the symbolic meaning of
that message is, or may be received. For instance, a physician/patient discussion
would be far different than a physician/physician conversation, or perhaps a
conversation between a physician and a family member. Front stage and back stage
performances take place routinely with differing performances based on our
audience.
This symbolic action is reflective and reflexive. Reflection has to do with the
resulting behavior, and sets the “stage” for a review of the past and an imagined
future response or action. “Social interaction is a communicative dance usually based
on trust and reciprocity” (Manning 2003:5). This dance requires or obligates the
sustenance o f the performance, for without the performance or the playing out of
each frame, we have no finality, no conclusion, no interaction upon which to
interpret the other(s) actions (Goffman 1974; Manning 2003).
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The question remains, though, how to understand these performances within
a framework. Manning notes:
At times, we consider ourselves as entertainers, players, and part of our own
unfolding drama, but the metaphor o f drama is not only about individual
consciousness; it is about the structure of relations and the structure and
dance o f images. It “captures” our times, defines them, and perhaps reflects
them, but we are also captured by the imagery of our times . . . we develop
secondary observation schemes that make our “raw observations” more
understandable—we frame them and thus make them understandable we in
the short run. (Manning 2003:5-6)
Through interpretive use, reflection, and the recollection of similar events, we
proceed through performances, interpreting meanings through the portrayal of the
symbols both in the meaning of the words spoken, as well as how they are spoken.
The meanings, though, can only be interpreted through social reality, an
intersubjective creation, dependent upon interpretation, interaction, communicated
meaning and the notion of previously experienced analogous actions.26
Not only can we set ourselves up for misinterpretation of the “other’s”
actions, theatrical stages allow for deceptive messages to be sent rather easily.
Goffman (1974) explains the ease of fabricating frames, and in turn our inability to
easily accept and frame responses based on the actions, words, or symbols portrayed.
Manning (2003) points out that semiotics allows for an “easy fit” of deceptive
practices and dramaturgical explanations (see also Manning and Cullum-Swan
1992). Interpretation is what allows for ease of lying or deception. Whether
intentional or not, w e yearn for the truth o f the matter, realistic or not, and w ill tend

26 For the constructing of reality, see Schutz’s (1967), Berger and Luckmann (1967),
Spector and Kitsuse (1977), and others on the social construction of reality.
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towards a positive acceptance of what is being said or acted out. This is what is key
though, because humans can tend to be misleading (stages), but yet we need, crave,
and desire the acceptance of, or notion of, “truth.” Semiotics is well suited for
modem life and owes much to theatrical presentations and phenomenological
creations. Since semiotics relies on an often unexplicated context, and this
(appearing to be real) is the fundamental tool of modem politics and business, it is
necessary to frame situations drawing on distinctive notions of reality and to mark
them off from each other (Manning 2003).
While a dramaturgical theoretical approach is not a theory one would
normally use to study deviance, it can provide for explanations of why certain actors
or agents behave or send certain signals the way they do. Manning (2003) admits it is
not the theory for explaining all social phenomena; it is useful in close-up wellfocused observational studies. He provides for five conditions where the use of
dramaturgy is a useful tool. One is “the secret, unknown, the corrupt and deviant,
often concealed ‘backstage,’ and not captured in official records, nor admitted in
standard survey research interviews” (Manning 2003:253). So, a dramaturgical
approach can bring insight into the actions of the agents involved both from the
vendors’ standpoint, but the inner workings of KDPS as well.
Examples of the dramaturgical performances in the two projects are many.
Just a few are chosen to exemplify how the performances added to the occurrence of
\

what went wrong. One of the issues that surrounded the transition from the DM Data
system to the IPS system was the use of dispatchers as computer systems technicians
within KDPS. The theatrical nature of the event was that management/administration
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within the department had decided to replace the dispatchers with academically and
technologically trained computer professionals. This was prompted by me, but was
supported by the chief and communicated to the City’s administration and IT
Department. The dynamics of the situation was compounded by the fact that the two
dispatchers worked for a captain outside my chain-of-command. As previously noted
in Chapter V, this created some strange dynamics in the face-to-face interaction with
these two employees, and the captain and myself. Additionally, stages were set for
the interaction between the two dispatchers and the employees of DM Data as well.
The two dispatchers were naturally concerned/offended that the administration
would replace them with other employees, and insisted on a chance to implement the
new IPS system. What ensued were various stages set by both myself, the captain,
the chief and the dispatchers which later included the latter’s union representatives.
The dispatchers were in a position where they were left out of discussions
concerning the purchase of a new system. They had heard and believed the
administration was replacing them, but no one would confirm that to them and they
felt they should be the ones to lead the department in implementing the new system,
since they had struggled through working with the DM Data system.27 Their
reactions, and how they approached conversations, were focused on rallying support
within the organization, both within their peer groups, as well as from mid-managers
and the administration. Both struggled between keeping the DM Data system going,

27

Based on personal conversations between the dispatchers and myself.
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and figuring out how to deal with myself and other managers as they began to realize
they were being replaced.
In this situation, it was decided that the administration would reassign the
dispatchers back to dispatching, and would hire at least one, if not two,
professionally trained computer systems people. My performances involved the
setting o f three stages of interaction involving the dispatchers, the
administration/management, and their supervisor, the Captain of the Service
Division. No one would tell them that they were being replaced due to their lack of
knowledge and perceived inability to bring the previous system on line. Instead,
most avoided any conversation related to that topic. I attempted to balance
conversations and interactions with the dispatchers, fully aware that I was also
involved in the replacement of them with computer professionals coupled with the
need to maintain the DM Data system, which the two presently were charged with
working on and keeping it going. On one hand, I had to convince the administration
any computer system, either DM Data or a new system, could not be maintained
unless the two were replaced, and on the other, I had to convince the two to stay
motivated to keep the system “alive.” The captain was caught between loyalty to his
two employees and the personal relationship he had with them, with the knowledge
that I was right about replacing them and that he should support such replacement in
the transition to another system.
In one meeting involving the dispatchers, two union representatives, chief,
the captain, and myself, the dispatchers and union demanded to know if and why
they were being replaced. Still, members of management would not tell them that
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they thought they could not do the job, but rather focused on dispatch and the need to
get them back into their positions, and the department’s desire to go to a new
system.

28

The union maintained the work was there, and demanded the

administration demonstrate the dispatchers’ inability to maintain the current system
or bring on a new system. While the interaction did not involve outright lies, one of
the dispatchers claimed that a previously retired captain told her she would bring on
the next system. The administration decided not to get involved with negotiating or
allowing the two to stay on in any part of the transition to the IPS system.
In conference calls involving the dispatchers and myself, where DM Data
was involved, the dispatchers remained dedicated to the department and the
replacement of the system, but their beliefs that they could maintain the DM Data
system dwindled as the department proceeded to replace the system and transfer
them back to the dispatch center. My point here is that performances both by myself
and the dispatchers were involved as we proceeded through a tense time. They were
angry that the department would replace them without consulting them, and I
believed that they needed to be replaced as well as the DM Data system. For
instance, they had an office separate from mine, and when I would enter their work
area unannounced they would stop talking, or quickly ask a question or redirect the

28 The union contended that the department administration could not simply transfer
them back as dispatchers because the system administrative duties were the work of
the union and the city would be taking their work away. They never contended the
two dispatchers were the most qualified but only that it was union work. In the end,
the union reached a deal where one position would remain in the union and the other
would be administrative or exempt from union membership. One dispatcher retired
rather than go back to dispatching. The other remains as a dispatcher at the time of
publication.
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conversation. Little conversations ensued between myself and the dispatchers
concerning their move. Most if not all conversations centered around the work with
DM Data.
Another face-to-face interactional issue was with one of the hired computer
technicians and myself. The first computer technician KDPS hired was a strongwilled person who had a desire to run things herself and who believed that her way
was the best way, regardless of the opinions of others, or the desired direction or
policies set down by the chief. In this case it was important, at least in my opinion, to
handle the relationship with her in a guarded fashion. On the one hand, she was
extremely talented, and administrators and managers at KDPS felt fortunate to have
hired her away from the private sector. On the other hand, her previous employment,
coupled with no experience with government, or in particular police operations,
funding, and budgeting experience made it difficult to sway her in the direction of
department priorities. Essentially, she lacked the understanding of the priorities of
the officers on the street, and the use of the computer system to support the officers.
Stages were set when I would have to interact with her, as opposed to interacting
with others in KDPS. For example, discussions pertaining to police arrest, use of
force, traffic stops, etc. were topics for the officers, not for the computer technician.
More important were the interactions between project team members with the
vendors and KDPS personnel. In the case of both vendors’ employees, whether
project managers or computer programmers, each had a front stage and back stage
(Goffman 1959). The front stage was what was seen and communicated, and thereby
interpreted by KDPS employees. The back stage involved the inner workings of each
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o f their organizations. More importantly, as previously noted, much of, if not most
of, the actions o f the vendors on a personal level was tied to money and the making
o f money. Whether it was the contract negotiator promising the ability to create a
working MICR report, or the push of the project manager to bring in the RMS on
time for the acquisition of bonuses, each had a front they put up for KDPS, and a
back stage where the reality of their promises and claims actually lay. On the DM
Data side, the constant claim that the system was working, and “we are well on our
way to having all problems fixed” (Dorfman, DM Data), is a front stage presented to
KDPS. Later revealed by his own employees, Dorfman was just trying to appease
KDPS and receive the money owed on the system. He had no intentions, nor did he
think it possible, to ever “fix” KDPS’s system.
As stages were set by each vendor, and its employees, so too were my stages
dealing with the vendors’ employees. With DM Data, my front stage was one of
frustration, anger, and contempt, and I conveyed an attitude that “we’ll stop at
nothing to get it fixed.” In a “center stage,” in front of KDPS employees, I was
concerned that the system would crash and dispatchers would be left with no system
and would be dispatching using cards to track officers. In a back stage, my front to
the administration was that DM Data would never work and we needed to do
whatever it took to migrate to another system. Meanwhile, taking over as IT director
for the city, I had another stage to occupy. As a manager, not a computer person, I
had to put the front up that I understood everything the IT employees were doing.
While in most cases I understood, many were technically beyond my understanding,
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and I had to work hard to learn, or put up the front, that I knew what they were
doing.
Additionally, there was another front I used with the chief. The chief, a very
demanding manager, was a supporter of the computerization, technological
modernization of police work, using computer technology to increase the efficiency
o f this department. His quest, like mine, was to find and implement a computer
system that worked. Both of us worked diligently to achieve an allusive goal. The
chief always believed he needed to push and rarely allowed for a “settling down
period” to work out the bugs (spell check, project manager debacle, and MICRS
reporting), thereby creating tension at every level, particularly my level as project
manager. In my performances, I believed I always needed to provide some sort of
answer, whether I knew the answer or not. This created frustration, as the answer
was not always clear cut. In the socially created world of the police, they believe that
using computers is a simple task that requires opening the box and starting it up. It
should, by all accounts, work. Even beyond the deviance of the vendors, such
systems do not work that way. While I was never deceptive in my remarks to the
chief, the burden placed on me forced me to push things through when perhaps we
should have waited.
Through these dramaturgical performances, face-to-face interaction was a
staged, almost routine affair where fronts and performances were enacted to cover or
conceal motives and actions. Managers staged actions to attain their sought-after
goals. Vendors played out scenes in order be awarded a contract, keep a job until
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another could be found, meet deadlines to achieve organizational goals, implement
systems that did not work to receive payments, and the drama continued throughout.
These performances allowed for the deviant activity that occurred at the faceto-face level. Dramaturgical performances allow for ease of lying and deception. At
issue is the social need for the acceptance of these performances as truthful. The
social-psychological need for the acceptance of face-to-face encounters, generally,
overshadows the notion of dishonesty or deception on the part of the performer. In
essence, the agent needs the communication to be the truth, and accepts what is
being communicated as truthful. This allows for the communicator to provide
potential untruthful and deceptive communications, almost knowing that the message
will be taken as truth.
Constructionism
The importance of signs, symbols, semiotics, and a dramaturgical approach is
seen at the micro-interactional level, but requires that the audience is able to see or
hear the actions of those involved. How has the introduction of electronic messaging
influenced this process? Electronic mail allows for rapid communication in written
form. In Grodin and Lindlof s (1996) book, Constructing the S elf in a M ediated
World, they beg the question of whether mediated communication affects our lives
and relationships. Using an example of a romance via internet (electronic mail and
Instant Messaging), they question what effect this electronic means of
communication has on the forming of relationships. In their example, both parties are
exaggerating and staging an imaginary situation that is different than their normal
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day-to-day activities. The use of electronic communication allows them to portray a
different persona, which in turn can lead to calculated misleading and deceptive
practices.
Sarbin and Kitsuse (1994) agree with the notion of drama as a version of
face-to-face interaction, but further relate that it is narrative stories, influenced in
multiple ways, that form our contextual ontological construction of reality.
Constructionism is grounded in contextual ontologies. “It would be appropriate to
look upon social constructionism as an epistemology and contextualism as the
coordinate ontology” (Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994:8). The creation of the story vis-a-vis
the creation of reality are communicated and remembered as narratives, and
constructionist/contextual analysis is best reported as the narrative. So, the narratives
observed or reported in electronic mail conjure the creation or the sustaining of
reality. Furthermore, ordinary people “convey their constructions of the social world
through narratives to fellow members, to professional analysts, and even to self’
(Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994:8). These narratives follow well-developed plots with
reified constructions acquired through experience and authority but conveyed
through the stories of everyday learned life (Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994).
Narratives are also shaped and formed by the creator, and then later by the
receiver. Constructionism, like dramaturgy, acknowledges different perspectives and
interpretations of social phenomena. “The logic of constructionism fosters the
introduction o f multiple perspectives to counter the positivist presuppostion of a
uniform and objective social reality” (Sarbin and Kitsuse 1994:9). This acceptance
allows for the credibility o f multiple political views and research agendas. Examples
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include Schepple’s (1994) work on multiple views in court proceedings, and the
work in Potter and Kappeler’s (1998) anthology on Constructing Crime, or Gergen
and Thatchenkery’s (2004) work on organizational science as a constructed
phenomenon.29 For this research, the creation of multiple meanings of similar events
and the creation o f meaning via electronic messages is important in helping to
understand the dynamics of interaction at the micro level of involvement as the key
players created reality based on email messages, and created narratives o f what
occurred.
Two other works are worth noting here. Harding’s (2003) work, on The
Social Construction o f Management, Texts and Identities, provides insightful
information on the creation of the concept of “management” through the eyes of
management texts. She utilizes a historical review of the management textbook
literature to explain why managers behave the way they do and why. Perhaps more
important, they react and interpret information in the work setting. Furthering the
notion of created realities she notes:
Meaning and understanding are not naturally intrinsic to the world but have
to be constructed, and the “omniscient, rational subject” of modernism is
denied. Organizations, rather than being seen as structures having their own,
objective existence, are interpreted as representations for subjects who/which
attempt to appropriate and master the system as a field of knowledge .. .
Organizations thus are not structures but processes. (Harding 2003:55)

29 There is much research on the notion of multiple meanings and conceptualization
o f meanings. Multiple meanings and construction of what occurred is an accepted
phenomenon in the social construction literature. See Bohm and Walker’s (2006)
anthology on demystifying crime, and Kappeler and Potter’s (2005) work on the
Mythology o f Crime. This is an extremely short list; the criminological literature is
replete with other examples.
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Borrowing from Jameson (1991), she notes capitalism permeates our every
existence, brought about by a culture of simulacrum coupled with the weakening of
histories and the post-modern mutations accompanying a globalized economic
world, and forms a feedback loop that combines the economic with the cultural.
Events become pseudo-events and the post-modern creeps into our everyday
lifeworld (Haberamas 1987; Harding 2003).
Gergen (1991) calls it “social saturation” in his work on the creation of
reality, which is closely related to this research. Gergen (2001) argues that
technologies in fact bring us into communication with each other in a communicative
connection, directly symbolically, and/or vicariously with more people with more
experiences, richer backgrounds, and an ever-increasing range of interdependence.
According to Gergen (1991, 2003; Gergen and Thatchenkery 2004), technology
provides for an even richer understanding and expansion of created reality, but as in
the constructionist perspective, the realities are created and are as diversified as the
individuals using the technology.
In sum, the constructionist perspective argues that reality is created by the
agent. An acting, feeling agent interprets signals as they are received and checks that
reality with previous experiences to draw inferences and conclusions on the symbols
being received. In particular, the electronic messages being sent between agents
involved in the two computer projects at KDPS were accepted, interpreted, and
reacted to based on the construction of each individual’s knowledge and
interpretation. Responses are then gauged by that interpretation. The
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communications, then, run the risk of sending incorrect or misinterpreted messages,
and the creation of a reality that resulted in unintentional consequences.
During the timeframe where KDPS utilized the DM Data system and
acquired and started using the IPS system, the use of emails increased dramatically.
At every level and virtually throughout every business and governmental
organization, email is the mode of communication. Rather than pick up telephone,
emails are sent as the primary means of communications, as it was at the end of the
use o f the DM Data system and throughout the IPS system implementation and use.
The importance here is the lack of face-to-face interaction among key players. As
previously noted above, what is lacking is the signs and symbols we receive when
communicating face-to-face. What is left is the interpretations of the email messages
by the receiver.
One o f the most deceptive email exchanges involved those by the first IPS
project manager, Tim Kick. A review of his email messages disclosed the notion that
the project was on schedule, and he was working hard to make deadlines. KDPS later
learned, o f course, this was not true. He was doing little on the KDPS project but was
instead readying himself to transition to another job. Other email messages where
deception was involved were those used by Dorfman where he indicated they were
very close to fixing the KDPS system. Initial readers of Dorfman’s email messages
were taken in by the sincerity of them, and they believed that perhaps DM Data was
able to fix the system. This is the constructed interpretation that allows us, without
knowing the motives that were behind Dorfman’s message, to accept an email at face
value. Without a constructed knowledge of what was occurring behind the scenes
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(stages), one would be willing to accept his email messages as progress. Instead,
what was built behind the scene was a perpetuation of lies about fixing any
problems, or completing the project. Dorfman attempted this several times by
sending out messages to others at KDPS in attempts to avoid communicating with
me. At each turn, though, the message was turned over to me for a response. KDPS
was attempting to put up a united front (stage) in an attempt to pressure DM Data,
specifically Dorfman, to put more resources into fixing the problems.
The point here is that email messages make it easier to lie. The study of
kinesetics allows for interpretation of signals and signs as lies. In essence, body
language coupled with verbal utterances allows others to detect deception by an
individual. In our constructed reality, we learn early on how to make assumptions
about the communicated act, as to whether it may or may not be truthful. Part of this
is the interpretation of face-to-face encounters, and the interpretation of the actions
outside o f the spoken word. Communications beyond face-to-face interaction allow
for ease of deception.
Our created realities can often interfere with or allow for the acceptance of a
situation as honest and forthright, and “as it should be.” But it can also lead to the
creation of situations that differ by the perspective of each agent. Or, one agent can
intentionally create a situation to take advantage of the other agent to, in essence,
create a false reality o f the situation, and thereby allow for actions to take place for
the advantage o f the other. Essentially, our created situations, and thereby created
reactions to those perceived situations, create the reaction that led to state-corporate
crime. This sets the stage for deceptive email messages and other forms of
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communication to mislead and steer the direction of the project for the benefit o f the
vendors.
Model Fit

Whether it is learned behavior, theatrical performances, or a created reality,
the actions of the vendors and members of KDPS can be explained by the catalysts
for action framework. The lack of controls and motivation to make money were the
overarching activities that were seen at the interactional level. KDPS’s internal
activity at the interactional level added to the chaotic events that created and
sustained the damage being perpetrated by the vendors. At times, situational events
made it appear that this situation was out o f the control of members of KDPS. This
was partly created from the definitions of the situation (Table 1), the acceptance of
the way things were, as if they were acceptable practices, and a new experience as
“taken for granted” necessary activity.
Motivation
Focusing on two particular aspects of the catalysts for action, namely,
individual goals and competitive individualism, can explain the motivational aspects
of what occurred in the computer system projects. Both motivational factors were
highly visible in both projects. These aspects were borne out by individuals in all
three organizations and were exhibited by many involved. As noted above, though,
socialization into the computer vendors’ organizations was also apparent, but not
discussed between the vendor employees and KDPS employees. What was telling
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about the socialization aspect was how each sales representative said things that were
similar in nature. For instance, when sales people were somehow involved in law
enforcement before joining the sales ranks, they would emphasize that point while
demonstrating their product or talking about their product. Again, the perceived
inference was that, “I was a cop before, so, I wouldn’t mislead or lie to you.”
Individual Goals and Competitive Individualism
For IPS there were three people who exemplified the goats and competitive
spirit that acted as catalysts for IPS getting the contract and “running” the project
through to completion. The first was the sales representative that KDPS employees
met early on. That person had a strong drive and determination for IPS receiving the
contract with KDPS. While he was not annoying in his persistence, he was driven to
“get an account in Michigan.” When this salesperson worked with the accounts
person from IPS in attempts to negotiate a contract with KDPS, they used a variety
o f techniques to sway those involved. It was clear they were willing to cut their bid
prices, establish a payment schedule,30 and work with KDPS in whatever fashion to
get the contract awarded to them.
Both were very attentive until they were awarded the contract, after which
they delegated responsibilities of implementation to the project managers. As noted,

30 KDPS demanded a payment schedule where payment was made incrementally,
based on performance stages. No lump sum payments were to be made and only the
purchasing and project managers from the City could authorize payment once a
performance platform was met. No such agreement was requested from DM Data.
The notion was no payment if the system did not perform.
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the first project manager from IPS, Tim Kick, had other goals related to obtaining
other employment. He set the stage for his departure at the expense of KDPS, and
perhaps other police agencies, as he told me we were not his only project. Kick
clearly had individual goals not related to the project, but rather selfish goals to
acquire other employment. This, of course, derailed the progress of the KDPS project
and set things back, causing a reaction to the events by both IPS and KDPS in efforts
to get the project back on track.
An interesting exchange of email messages between sales representative,
Michael Feeney, and myself follows. Feeney is introducing the name of the person
with whom we are going to negotiate the contract, and his superior. This was
followed by a telephone conversation I had with Feeney concerning honesty, and
how to move through the negotiating process:
September 16, 2002, 9:57 p.m.
Feeney: . .. Taylor is sensitive to your tight schedule. By the way, he
is a straight shooter. H onest. . .
September 17, 2002, 7:59 a.m.
Reifert: The straight shooter and being honest is very important to me.
Nobody’s perfect and I understand that so just be honest and tell me
when we have a problem or it can’t be done. I can deal with anything
as long as we’re on the same page . . .
To my knowledge that is how the relationship proceeded with Feeney, and later
Taylor Edge. While they were both extremely competitive individuals with their own
goals, they both seemed to operate with an air of forthrightness.
The second project manager, Moyer, indicated she had been directed to get
the project back on track and meet established deadlines that had been agreed upon
by KDPS and IPS when Kick left. She attended to details with “bull dog” like
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determination and was able to get the project back on track. She was focused on
deadlines as IPS organizational goals and personal goals, both with a sense of pride,
but also clearly tied to monetary gains and meeting the payment schedule that was
prescribed and agreed upon by both organizations. Moyer had both goals as well as a
competitive sense to achieve her deadlines. Moyer was able to mobilize resources
within IPS to meet the deadlines but also made sure that I did the same within KDPS.
On the one hand, Moyer was forthright and straightforward on her approach to
project completion. On the other hand, with regards to the CAD difficulty (net-clock
and time synchronization) and the spell check issue, she failed to disclose the
problems and normalized the problems saying IPS was working on the issues, and
she did not think they would impact the project or the system.
Moyer was also quick to follow up on additional purchases beyond the scope
o f the contract. These additional purchases were in the form of license add-ons31 and
hardware or other modules of their software. I initially believed it was her
determination that drove it, but I later learned that add-ons to the contract were added
to her overall compensation and bonuses received for the project. In essence, she
benefited every time a functional aspect of the system was added. To her credit, she
did not attempt to force any product, additional functionality, or licensing on KDPS.
She just followed up with dogged determination once the request was made. As

31 License costs were based on the number of users on the system at anyone time.
CAD licenses cost $15,000 a piece. The initial purchase was four licenses, but when
the Township Police and County Deputy dispatchers were added to the system, the
cost went up. Moyer would remind me that we could put additional users on the
system until we paid the additional licensing costs.
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previously noted, she was also persistent on her deadlines and any “cut-over”
schedules.
While the personal interactional atmosphere with the employees o f IPS was
much more congenial than DM Data employees, it was clear that on occasion they
held information in abeyance and knew of difficulties in their system’s performance,
but yet they still shipped them for use.
DM Data personnel had individual goals as they entered into the project with
KDPS. Foremost was Dorfman’s admission that he wanted KPDS, the largest public
safety department in the United States as a customer. This appeared to be a goal from
both an individual company owner standpoint, but also from a competitive
businessperson angle as well. Essentially, he believed it was “bragging rights” to
have KDPS as a customer, and apparently was willing to sell KDPS an entire system
for less than a half a million dollars. Initially seen by KDPS as a “great deal,” it was
quickly discovered that the hidden costs would take the contract beyond the $2
million mark.
At the interactional level, the employees of DM Data genuinely seemed to be
sincere about project completion. Certainly the programmers who interacted with the
computer/dispatchers and me appeared to be working diligently to complete the
project with KDPS and to KDPS’ satisfaction. More of an individual goal than a
competitive spirit, the programmers seemed to be concerned with the outcome, but
also appeared to be hampered by DM Data management. DM Data programmers
never talked to me about their managers, and only talked sparingly with the
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computer technology people about their managers, and the demands placed on them
to complete their work.
The final individual goal of both Dorfman and his management staff was
their attempt to collect any final payments owed to them by KDPS. Outright lies,
“end-around” maneuvers, and manipulation of employees were used in attempts to
achieve this goal. Several members of DM Data, Dorfman, Barrett and Ramisamy
made many attempts to collect the money. They sent e-mail messages that were
clearly lies, and attempted to convince the computer technicians (dispatchers) that
they could fix the system if only KDPS paid them their money. By then the personal
contact, such as telephone calls, had stopped and been replaced by e-mail messages.
KDPS personnel also had its own individual goals. Two overarching goals
tended to drive the chief, some city IT people, and myself through the IPS project.
These goals included purchasing a system that worked, and getting that system at a
reasonable price. The former required work on checking out the vendors with other
customers, watching, analyzing and questioning demonstrations with the vendors,
and discussion amongst members of KDPS involved in the purchase of the IPS
system. It was the individual goals o f the management team that were able to bring
the project from initiation to implementation.
These motivational factors set the stage for the opportunity structures within
the face-to-face encounters of the members of each organization. These conditions,
or behavioral factors, allowed for the opportunity structures to develop and flourish,
consequently allowing for the state-corporate crime at the interactional level.
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Opportunity Structure
The opportunity structure created by the computer project was dictated by the
definition o f the situation at KDPS. At each turn of events the actions were based on
the perceived needs at KDPS. Based on those perceived needs, a condition was
created that allowed the computer vendors to take advantage of KDPS. Both the
dramaturgical setting and the social construction of each member’s reality played
into the creation o f the situation, and this, coupled with the learning environment of
the vendors, led to the creation of an opportunity of for state-corporate crime by the
employees of the vendors.
The captain at KDPS, in the late 1990’s, beleived that the purchase of a new
system, at the lowest possible cost was necessary to replace a system that was, as
reported by the computer vendor, not “Y2K” compliant. Failure to replace the aging
system would therefore create problems with the coming of the new millennium. A
climate was created that forced him to believe and act in such a way as to seek out
the least expensive computer system. His definition of the was that he would look
good in the eyes o f his superiors if he could bring in a new system under the
proposed $700,000 for the upgrade to the old Tiburon system. Thus, a situation was
created where the captain wanted to buy a less expensive system, that lacked the
reliability and proven track record of the old system, and did not assign a project
manager, with required skills and cutting necessary training. This further contributed
to the problems encountered in the computer purchase and implementation.
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The opportunity for the vendors to take advantage of this situation, created by
KDPS, led to the creation of the events that followed. The captain could not foresee,
however, the events that would follow, and that his actions would lead to the debacle
that ensued. The captain had three stages of performances occurring during his
purchase o f the DM Data system. The first was with the vendors, and his attempt to
bring in a system at an extremely low price. On this stage, the assurances of money,
the behind the scenes agreements with Dorfman and cajoling that occurred set the
stage for his interaction with DM Data (Dorfman) employees. With city
administrators, closely involved and interested in the DM Data purchase, the
captain’s performances involved the assurance that the system would work, that it
was “top notch” for the money, and the ability of his staff to bring the project to
completion under the budget constraints. At the staff level of interaction, he made
assurances that DM Data was a good product, was reliable, and would function at the
needed level, coupled with the “front” that he had researched DM Data, found it was
a solvent, stable company capable of providing service for years to come. He also
made “back stage” (Goffman 1959) assertions to his staff that a project manager and
some o f the training he cut was not necessary and that he had been assured by DM
Data staff that the cuts would not impact the success of the overall project.
A similar situational aspect existed with the IPS project and involved the
creation o f events by KDPS administration and myself, partly due to the problems
encountered with the DM Data product and the requirement to move quickly from
that system to another system. As previously noted, when KDPS intentionally
withheld money from DM Data, the software licensing expired, and the CAD system
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began to shutdown. This led to a court injunction to supply codes to turn it back on.
The codes DM Data sent were questionable as far as reliability, and certainly
questionable concerning the potential for causing a sudden “crashing” o f the system.
These conditions, coupled with the anguish suffered by the dispatchers using the DM
Data product, led to the feeling that a new system was needed and needed fast. The
belief was that, whatever system was brought in, it needed to be brought in quickly
for fear o f the DM Data system might permanently crash, leaving the department
without a working CAD system.
My reality, then, was to bring a system in quickly, but one that was reliable
and functional. Cost was not necessarily an issue, as IPS was not the low bidder on
the project, but researching the company and viewing their product pointed to the
ability o f IPS to provide what was needed in a timely fashion.32 This created an
anxiety that was played out on various stages of performance. On the one hand ,the
portrayal o f purchasing a reliable and functional system had to be played out for both
the administration and staff of KDPS, as well as city staff, which included IT
personnel from the city. This led to the assurance that it was a “good” system, but the
concern for the overall outcome when trying to bring a project of this magnitude to
completion while being concerned with training, implementation, testing, and user
satisfaction. In essence, the situation dictated to rush it through for fear of the DM

_

The term research is used to describe a “background check” on IPS. This check
included financial stability, functionality of the system, and customer satisfaction.
IPS seemed to meet all three requirements.
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Data system dying, keeping in mind the pitfalls in trying to rush a project of this
magnitude.
This situation set the stage for instances of state-corporate crime on the part
o f IPS. For example, relying on Tim Kick to push the project through, while I was
concerned with the DM Data system and hiring new employees, coupled with the
inability to test CAD for the time synchronization issue prior to use caused the
project to move too fast without any safeguards or quality assurance testing. The
inability to test for the spell check and other issues prior to use were all pitfalls that
could have been avoided with more time, training, and testing before going live with
the various components of the system. Rather than take extra time, the pressure of
the situation dictated implementation of the system before the potential problems
could be identified. This also allowed IPS personnel to implement the system with
the problems they knew about in part due to their knowledge of the problems
encountered with the DM Data product. They were well aware of the potential for
disaster if the DM Data product went down. They knew we were relying on their
product, and KDPS wanted it “live” as soon as possible.
Operationality o f Controls
Table 1 (Michalowski and Kramer 2006) shows catalysts under control
mechanisms, and the research has found each of the mechanisms under “controls”
contributed to the problems at KDPS. Personal morality is always an issue as you
approach your work. From telling lies to “cutting comers,” certain situations lend
themselves to the human propensity to take the easy road. Techniques of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

199
neutralization and rationalization exist as individuals work through problems that
arise. Obedience to authority exists and permeates organizations like KDPS that are
founded on a paramilitary structure, set up on an authoritarian, chain-of-command
where orders must be followed. This structure stifles creativity and “thinking outside
the box.” It allows for the “not my fault” attitude to permeate projects like the two
computer systems where employees easily deflect blame by claiming to have been
“ordered” to, to have just followed policy, or by stating “that’s how the boss wanted
it.” This obedience to authority allows for the diffusion of responsibility. Deflecting
blame is commonplace, ranging from blaming the vendors for their product not
working, to blaming the administration for picking a product that does not function.
Blame deflection infiltrates and affects the attitudes of workers on an individual
level. Those close to the project diffuse authority by blaming lack of knowledge,
inept workers, poor product selection, and so on.
Personal morality is a difficult concept to evaluate and can only be
determined by actions, since rarely will an individual talk to others about their own
personal morality issues. Most telling about personal morality in the two projects are
the actions of some of the vendors’ employees. Dorfman and his employees had no
difficulty in lying to KDPS staff and administration. Email messages detailing quick
fixes and saying that “we’re very close to fixing all of Kalamazoo’s problems,” were
clearly lies told to receive payment. A purchase of DM Data by an another
corporation was tied to the 2002 pay-off requests and demands, so the motivation to
lie was tied to financial gain for DM Data. The license expiration issue with DM
Data was also indicative of the overall morality of the company. Apparently, just

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

200
because KDPS paid for their product, it did not actually own it, because if the license
expired it became useless. This issue was not disclosed to KDPS.
Morality issues were also evident among IPS employees. The actions of Tim
Kick attest to his moral character. Letting the KDPS project slow to glacial speed
and leaving without notice speak to his general outlook on his employment and
employer. Moyer’s failure to disclose knowledge of the spell check issue and time
synchronization problem speaks to her lack of morality and perhaps misplaced
loyalty to IPS. Claims by IPS to be able to produce a MICRS report were also telling
o f the moral characters of the employees when it took several years to produce the
report.
Of most interest, and related to Vaughan’s work (1996), is the rationalization
or neutralization of the actions of individuals involved. From the lies as a normal
course of business for the vendors, to the rationalization for a rushed, completed
project, both paths provided for the normalization of deviance throughout both
projects. Based on a review of the DM Data project at KDPS and follow-up with
other DM Data users, the lying, cheating, and stealing that went on with that
company was business as usual. DM Data not only bilked KDPS, but there were
many other users that were left without a functioning CAD system. Plantation
Florida Police Department entered into a contract with DM Data in early 2001 for $4
million. They paid the money up front, and DM Data walked away from their project
and did not repay any o f the money. A police department taking over 80,000 callsfor-service a year was left with nothing but paper cards to run their dispatch system.
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If rationalization and neutralization o f activity is commonplace, then no
controls over the vendors, their employees, or those they offer services to existed.
Additionally, there were no sanctions, no penalties, or discipline for problems
encountered during either project. Both parties decided to walk away. For IPS,
nothing happened and KDPS continues to pay the $120,000 for annual maintenance.
The captain who selected DM Data retired, never to see the project through
completion, and never looking back. Those who inherited the project, the two
dispatchers, did what they could, but were not held responsible for the project or
what became of it. From KDPS’s apparent stance, the responsibility for the problems
did not fall on any one person, and therefore no one could be held responsible.
As Vaughan (1996) notes, “Normalization of deviance is common to
organizations and individuals alike, resulting in mistakes, mishap, and misconduct,
too often with disastrous consequences” (p. 75). So too was the normalization of
deviance in the two computer projects at KDPS. It is the environmental
contingencies and the organizational structures o f each agency, coupled with the
culture o f routines, information flow, and assumptions of the actions of others, that
lead to the neutralization and normalization o f activity (Vaughan 1996).
Conclusion
The interactional environment is perhaps the most difficult to examine. The
individual motivation or intent of an agent is the most difficult to measure. The
actions o f agents, though, are telling in as much as they suggest the motivation for
their behavior. Perhaps the actions are better measures of morals and standards than
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what can be gleaned from personal interviews or surveys. The actions do speak
louder than words, particularly when attempting to measure deviance; the actions are
what counts, not the excuses made for their actions, but what actually transpired.
As with the other previous environments, the interactional context fits the
framework under the catalysts for action (Table 1). What was discovered, like other
studies of state-corporate crime, the interactional aspects supported what occurred on
an organizational level. The individual seeking o f monetary gain perpetuated the
learned organizational behavior. This, coupled with moral turpitude, allowed for the
normalization and rationalization of the agents’ actions. Behavior performed by each
agent was further supported by the lack of penalties for their actions. Nothing
happened when they lied; nothing happened when they cut comers to meet
deadlines; nothing happened when continuous lies were told in email messages.
Failure for anyone to intervene from the government’s side, further allowed for and,
in fact, supported their actions.
Socially constructed situations also created an environment that allowed the
vendors to seek out weaknesses and exploit them. The perceived need to purchase a
system at a low cost and bring it in “under budget” created an environment of
potential state-corporate criminal activity, and further perpetuating these actions was
the departure o f the person who purchased the system. The hidden costs soon
surfaced after he left, leaving KDPS to fend for itself.
Project pressures define a situation as well. The pressure to bring a new
system on before the old one crashed, coupled with the cultural resistance of the
organization to new equipment that “won’t work anyways” and looming deadlines
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that accompany any project, create the motivation to take advantage of the situation.
The lack o f time to adequately test the equipment prior to implementation creates
such weaknesses. These weaknesses can be taken advantage of as well by the
vendors failing to disclose problems prior to shipping the product, and the
normalization o f the activity as the problem is being fixed. As Vaughan (1996)
discovered in her study, the structure and culture of each organization led to the
deviant activity o f the individual. A culture that supports “hiding the truth” to
achieve organizational goals perpetuates the conniving and deceptive practices of the
individual agent in furtherance of the organization. But, if that organization rewards
such behavior with bonuses and promotions, the behavior is reinforced as the
individual attempts to receive the rewards.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Vaughan (1996) noted that the cause of the Challenger disaster was not
merely a technical failure, but rather deeply rooted issues in the economic and
political environment, both internal and external to NASA and the private
corporations involved. In the case studies reviewed in Chapter II, we saw that the
disasters and social harms were created, not by a single event, but rather the
intersection of multiple causes. Institutional conditions coupled with organizational
dynamics led to the events that occurred in each instance. These events were also
tied to the interactional, face-to-face encounters and maneuvers between individual
actors that led to conditions resulting in social harms.
What the present study has shown is that the social harms surrounding what
occurred at KDPS and their automation efforts cannot be attributed to a single event
or a single individual. Rather, it was the deep-rooted institutional environment,
organizational conditions, and interactional factors that led to the social harms.
Multiple circumstances at multiple levels created a situation that allowed companies
to take advantage o f the police by providing faulty products or failing to provide a
functional product they promised, resulting in loss of life and costing taxpayers
millions of dollars.
The purpose of this final chapter is to discuss the results of this study. Using
the analytical framework and reviewing the results of each chapter, I will bring
204
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together the findings that point to state-corporate crime and culpability by a
multitude of people and other contributing factors. I will also discuss the issue of
generalizability and show how what happened at KDPS is not unique and is
happening in other law enforcement agencies around the nation. I will conclude with
suggestions of how state-corporate crime theory may be used in other studies and
implications of my study for what methods might be used to uncover state-corporate
crime.
State-Corporate Crime at KDPS
Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) point out that in the state-corporate crime
literature there has been an incremental development of the theory of state-corporate
crime. The theory grew out of several incidents that occurred in the late 1980’s. The
first attempt at explaining the intersection of deviance by state and corporate actors
focused on the Challenger disaster (Kramer 1990). Kramer believed there was an
intersection, a complicity, between state and corporate agents that resulted in the loss
of life. This disastrous incident could have been avoided had it not been for a catalyst
of, what turned out to be, non-stoppable events on the side o f both corporate
employees (e.g., Morton-Thiokol) and state agents (e.g., NASA). Subsequent work
by Kramer and others began to give wings to the fledgling theory by proposing the
use of an integrated theoretical approach, and examining each incident from multiple
levels—institutional, organizational, and interactional. The original authors were also
struggling with legitimation of the theory as an acceptable approach to studying
crime in this manner, and an additional praxis approach to exposing these social
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harms for what they were. What followed through the 1990’s and into the 2000’s
were empirical case studies of macro-level disasters, both national and international
in scope.
Michalowski and Kramer’s (2006) anthology demonstrates that the theory
has advanced on multiple levels, and a deeper understanding o f the incidents has
been provided, as the use o f the theory has increased. The theory has been used to
expose the fleecing o f the U.S. taxpayers in incidents like the Haliburton scandal, the
expenses o f the Iraqi War,33 the Enron case, and others. The theory has been used to
explain various events at the macro level in terms of social harms and in terms of
social and economic marginalization (see Wonders and Danner 2006, and Robyn
2006).
What my study accomplished, though, was not only expansion of the use of
the theory, but demonstrating its usefulness as a micro-level approach to studying
state-corporate crime. What I was able to uncover was that rooted deep in the
intersection o f the federal government’s involvement with computers was a
facilitation of events caused by ignorance and lack of controls. The institutional level
o f occurrences led KDPS on the path of financial loss, even though the federal
government published articles in the 1990’s in which they acknowledged the police
should be wary o f computer vendors (ISTEP, U.S. Department of Justice 1999). On

33

•

•

I am not lessening the loss of human life here. My point here is, coupled with the
tragic and senseless loss of human life, there lies beneath the surface the costs of
wars such as these. Years after the Vietnam War was over, the fleecing that took
place continues to be uncovered, complicities between government contractors and
politicians who were reaping the benefits at the cost of the country.
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the one hand, the federal government encouraged the perpetuation of
computerization by the police, while on the other hand, they warned of the dangers
of dealing with the computer vendors. It also failed to provide any guidance or
corrective actions for potential problems. Instead, what occurred was the release of
more and more funding for computerization. This increase in funding was provided
by the Crime Bill and subsequent supporting bills in the 1990’s and into the 2000’s
by the USA PATRIOT Act, which established the Office of Homeland Security.
At the institutional level, a multitude of events led to the social harms
encountered at KDPS. The development of the computer through the 1980’s and into
the 1990’s provided the desire and motivation for police departments to computerize.
The development of the computer was a positive event that led to the management of
information by police executives. At this level, though, the motivation to
computerize is immense, as evidenced by the KDPS chiefs desires in the 1980’s to
automate in order to acquire management information to better allocate the resources
of the department. The New Federalism of the 1980’s provided for easy funding of
computer systems like those purchased by KDPS. Market deregulation provided for
oligopolistic conditions in the industry, leaving vendors free to set their prices at
whatever point they chose. While some would argue the free market entails
competitive pricing, what was seen were prices so close that choosing a vendor to
implement a system had to be based on criteria other than price. In addition, this
choice had to be made without full knowledge of product functionality. Oligopolistic
market conditions meant that problems like those encountered with IPS were
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unforeseen. Also, detailed and elaborate pre-market testing often was not conducted
in the interest o f rushing the product to market and reducing production costs.
Money under the Crime Bill was released via block grants with few, if any,
controls or accountability, a method established under New Federalism. There was
the motivation for computer development and faster, smaller systems. Moreover, the
federal government pushed the police into adopting a new paradigm, namely,
community policing. The carrot-and-stick analogy fits nicely here as millions of
dollars were dangled under the noses of police executives and administrators. In
essence, the message was clear: if a police department wanted the federal money, it
must adopt community policing, even if in name only. To receive the federal money,
all local police departments had to do was apply and they could address community
policing issues later. KDPS used the argument of freeing up officers’ time as a
reason to put MPCs in its police cruisers. The freeing of time would allow for
officers to be more involved in community policing activities.34 Subsequent release
of money under the USA PATRIOT Act was provided to establish interagency
communication o f intelligence information and implement other technologies in the

34 This argument flies in the face of those issues proposed by Trojanowizc, Kappeler,
and Gaines (2002) and other authors of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. In fact,
what many argued was that a chasm had been created by the officers’ inability, or
lack o f desire, to get out of the car. Officers respond from call to call, never getting
out of their “rolling fortresses” to get to know citizens, or even worse, to get to know
what the citizens feel are the crime problems in their neighborhoods. In essence, the
police were out o f touch with the citizens due to the way in which they approached
their jobs and the lack of any requirement to get out of their cars.
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aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11). The RF systems of today are all based on
computer technology, furthering the need for computerization.
What all these events led to was facilitation o f state-corporate crime that
occurred at KDPS. The federal government was involved in the state-facilitation o f
computerization for the police. These actions provided the catalyst for the events that
occurred at KDPS. The federal government’s continued release of money and
support for computerization forced police in general, and KDPS in particular, to
continually seek out funding and attempt to modernize their equipment to keep pace
with private industry, develop policing strategies, and adopt community policing that
was the wave of the future. The federal government continued to fund these projects
at an alarming rate, even though it knew there were problems when local police
departments dealt with vendors. Under the guise of governmental deregulation, the
federal government failed to provide any sort of controls over the vendors’ practices
and their products. This allowed vendors to exploit the police as a vulnerable market.
As Aulette and Michalowski (1993) showed in the Imperial Food Products
case, and Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) found in their Valujet case study, the lack
o f governmental controls in the form of regulations, or the failure to enforce
regulations already in place, were major contributing factors for the subsequent
deaths caused by the fire in the Imperial Food Products processing plant, and the lack
o f controls by the FAA contributed to the crash of Valujet 592. Likewise, the social
harms in the KDPS case were created by the lack of federal guidance, regulations,
and oversight of police department computer projects at the same time when the
federal government pushed these departments to adopt community policing. The
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facilitation of actions by the inaction or intentional actions of the state that result in
social harms is a key factor in state-corporate crime theory. It was state facilitation,
rather than state initiation, that occurred in the KDPS case.
One issue uncovered in this study that had not previously been found in
studies o f state-corporate crime was the involvement of professional associations.
Key international police associations were involved in motivating the police to buy
computer systems. Linked to the federal government and private corporations, the
associations attempted to set up guidelines and regulations to assist police in
computerization efforts. Instead, what was produced were toothless “standards,”
developed essentially to provide the absolute basics in database design. These
organizations provide(d) nothing in terms of how to deal with vendors, nor specifics
with regards to negotiating a contract. These are the areas where the police need
assistance, rather than advice on database design concerning how many characters to
have in a name field. The efforts of the LEITSC consortium were found to be the
outcome o f a political battle, with the end result being a watered down set of
“standards” that were benign enough to not offend vendors, federal government
agencies, or the police profession.
While the institutional level environment set the stage for state-corporate
crime at KDPS, it was the organizational level interactions where the drama resulting
in social harms was played out. Outright lies and the over-emphasis on the
attainment o f corporate goals allowed the corporate organizations to lie, cheat, and
steal at the expense o f KDPS and Kalamazoo taxpayers. DM Data undercut the
competition in an oligopolistic market to get the contract with KDPS, knowing full
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well they would make up the money with other add-ons and maintenance contracts.
Additionally, company representatives persuaded KDPS administrators to pour
money into newer hardware and software, all purchased through them, thus adding to
their profits as they piled additional costs on top of the initial hardware costs. And
then, when KDPS decided to no longer deal with DM Data and to move on to
another vendor, it learned that the licensing scheme of the DM Data software causes
the system to shut down if the maintenance fees are not paid. Still, a court injunction
did not faze DM Data, as it sent corrective software to KDPS which, according to
computer technicians, was a possible “disaster waiting to happen,” and should not be
used. KDPS never found out what the “fix-it” software would have done to the
system.
The contention that institutional controls meant nothing to Dorfman and DM
Data is evident by his email message in which he stated, “. .. we now have to act
almost like a public company. We now have to answer to another authority that
demands successful performance.” This is a clear sign that Dorfman knew his
product was sub-standard, and DM Data could not fix it. Some in KDPS wanted to
believe that the acquisition of DM Data by a publicly traded corporation could
provide the catalyst for the company to fix the DM Data product to the satisfaction of
KDPS. However, Dorfman essentially vanished after the Prolease acquisition of DM
Data. There are still police agencies trying to locate him. For example, the police
department in Plantation, Florida, would like to get some of its money back for a
defective system it purchased.
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IPS provided examples of organizational deviance as well. Failure of the first
project manager, lying about knowledge of product defects, and failure to provide
software their agents stated it could, led to a path of deception for the achievement of
corporate goals, bonuses, and acquiring of a $1.5 million contract.
KDPS was not without fault as they attempted to bring on-line a complex
computer system with dispatchers who had little formal training in computer systems
or programming. The problems with the DM Data system created fear, anxiety, and
pressure to move to a new system at KDPS. This rush for a replacement system
allowed for implementation without fully testing every aspect of the CAD and RMS
systems. Two years later, IPS fixed the spell-check problem, and three years later it
fixed the MICRS problem.
At the interactional level of face-to-face encounters, dramaturgical stages
were used to facilitate the lies and cover up actions of the individuals involved.
These front and back stages allowed agents to interact with each other at various
levels. The IPS project manager, Moyer, would have to act differently with me than
she would with other IPS employees, and she would act differently dealing with my
subordinates, like the computer technicians of KDPS.
I acted differently when dealing with city employees and KDPS employees.
Stages were used to deal with the dispatchers as we sought to replace them with
trained computer professionals. Stages were used when dealing with city IT staff
when I lacked complete technological knowledge about the problems encountered
during implementation of the system and in orchestrating a move into a new
building.
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Dorfman attempted to use stages and deal with various agents both within his
agency and within KDPS. On one level, he tried to deal with me, and at the same
time tried to convince the computer technicians (dispatchers) that his staff could fix
the problems with the KDPS system. Dorfman also attempted to circumvent
interacting with me by dealing with my superiors and had telephone conversations
where he insinuated I was lacking the knowledge and ability to lead the project.
During the trying times of implementation, the spell-check problem, time
synchronization issue, and the learning curve with a new system, the chief at KDPS
would utilize dramaturgical stages to deal with subordinates, managers, and myself.
The MICRS issue was one where fronts were used to convince the department that
the IPS system would get it fixed, while on the back stages we were discussing the
ramifications of not reporting crime information as mandated by Michigan law.
The creation of different realities was also a contributing factor to the
problems at the interactional level. The social construction of phenomena
surrounding the computer projects caused difficulty when different agents interpreted
the events related to the projects based on their own perceptions of reality. The
creation of a sense o f urgency surrounded my perception of the entire project.
Operating under the pressure of a court injunction and the potential for catastrophic
failure of the DM Data system, coupled with moving into a new building and
consolidating a dispatch center, created the perpetual atmosphere of urgency and an
additional quest for perfection in the new system. Not only did KDPS need to replace
the system, but from a leadership standpoint, it also needed to be done correctly, and
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the IPS system must work flawlessly in order to overcome the stigma attached to the
DM Data system.
The newly hired computer technicians at KDPS were thrust into a position
that was unfamiliar to them, and this created tension and anxiety as they grappled
with a constructed reality, or definition of the situation, foreign to them. Their own
perceptions o f reality were based on previous experience in the private sector or non
police work. Suddenly, they were dealing with a culture where computers were
expected to work flawlessly, all the time, and without encountering difficulties or
problems with operations, despite the fact that the computers needed to work twentyfour hours a day, seven days a week, 365 days a year. MPCs are never shut down
unless they are receiving maintenance or being serviced. Otherwise, the expectation
is that they remain running despite weather factors and the multiple users that pound
on them each day.
In sum, a key finding in the present study is that it was not one single event at
the institutional, organizational, or interactional levels that created or caused the
social harms experienced at KDPS, but rather the intersection of actions of many that
created the problems. In this study, the federal government facilitated the social
harms that occurred in the KDPS case. The U.S. Department of Justice so
desperately wanted the police profession to move towards a community-policing
model o f operation that millions of dollars were released to local police departments
with no controls. At each release of federal funding, the computer vendors
capitalized by descending upon police departments in efforts to profit from the
federal funding. Vendor sales employees learned the trade as they moved from
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company to company to sell computers to the police. They learned how to sell and
deal with the police, and this knowledge was passed on from company to company
as these employees “made the circuit.” Within the corporations, a culture of deviant
behavior and normalization of activity was created as vendor employees competed
for bonuses and other rewards for project completion, deadline realization, and the
signing o f contracts worth millions of dollars. Stages were used to orchestrate and
manipulate the projects and acquisition of contracts, as vendors sought to tap into the
millions released by the federal government.
Lack o f controls, at both the federal and organization levels, existed as KDPS
attempted to implement complex, large computer systems without adequately trained
professionals to accomplish the task. The lack of SOPs, together with the lack of any
federal, state, or local government guidelines or regulations, allowed vendors to
operate without fear of reprimand or penalty as they implemented systems that were
plagued with functionality problems, and, in some cases, ones that did not function at
all.
One important note in the explanation of the state-corporate crime that
occurred at KDPS was the divergence from the normal perceived victimization in
these types o f social harms. As Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) point out, “as with
the victimology of traditional street crime, the least powerful are almost always the
most likely to be victimized by state-corporate crime” (p. 375), but this is not the
case with this work. The police are never thought of as being the least powerful. In
fact, the literature on critical criminology places them squarely in the position of
dominance, hegemony, and the apparatus of the powerful to accomplish hidden
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agendas against the marginalized. What we see within the present study is the taking
advantage of a powerful institutional base within society. This study begs the
question, if corporations can take advantage of the police, who else is suffering
social harms similar to those committed against the police?
Integrated Model of State-Corporate Crime
The use o f the integrated model developed by Kauzlarich, Kramer and Smith
(1992) and further elaborated upon in Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), Kramer,
Michalowski, and Kauzlarich (2002), and Michalowski and Kramer (2006) was a
useful framework in helping to explain the deviance and social harms that occurred
at KDPS. Only through examining the multiple levels of the events that unfolded can
one get at the true underlying causes of the problems. As disclosed in previous case
studies, the institutional level defined the parameters within which the actions that
occurred at the organizational and interactional levels took place. The activity that
happened at each level was closely related to the activity occurring at the other
levels.
This study demonstrates the value of using the integrated model to examine
and explain an event at the local government level that has not attracted media
attention. Previous work focused on major events involving billions of dollars and
loss o f many lives, analyzing the multiple levels that caused the tragic events. The
present study has demonstrated the applicability of the model in examining events
out of the public eye. It is doubtful that KDPS will make national news headlines
because o f the loss o f money and failure of its computer systems, but, nonetheless, it
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remains an important local event since the department, the city, and the community
taxpayers lost millions o f dollars on several computer systems, and there was the loss
o f at least one life.
Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) called for further work in state-corporate
crime and the elaboration o f the integrated model to focus more on the interactional
level. The present study has done that as well. Going beyond the typical approach to
explaining interactional encounters with differential-association theory, this work
incorporates other important sociological theories to explain deviance at the face-toface level. While some criminologists have used a constructionist approach in
explaining crime (see Potter and Kappeler 1998; Kraska 2004), few, if any, authors
have utilized a dramaturgical approach in the explanation of criminal or deviant
behavior. The ability to utilize both in an integrated approach to explaining the
occurrences at the interactional level adds to the importance of not only this work,
but the use of the framework as an established means of explaining state-corporate
crime. Both theories were additions to the integrated model and provided for further
explanations of how the face-to-face encounters unfolded and perpetuated the
deviance.
The use of the model also exemplified how important the exercise of social
control is in a capitalistic society. On all three levels, the lack o f any type of controls
by the federal government, the three organizations, and within interactional
situations proved to be the definitive catalyst that allowed for the social harms to
occur. The federal government’s failure to provide regulations, laws, guidelines, or
some form of constraints on the vendors facilitated the actions at the organizational
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level. In turn, the failure of KDPS to have established guidelines further fueled and
facilitated the deviance of the agents of the two corporations. IPS failed to supervise
its employees closely while they were running their projects, resulting in one of their
employees spending his time “job hunting” instead of working on the KDPS project.
It is hard to believe that the computer fiascos at KDPS have escaped the
attention o f the media. While I will address the issue of generalizability in the next
section, and the events similar to what occurred at KDPS in other police
departments, only rarely has attention been paid to such events in the local media
(see below for a few exceptions). How was it that the local press in Kalamazoo never
learned of the economic costs and loss of life associated with the failure of two
computer systems at KDPS? Why hasn’t the media stepped up and fulfilled their
watchdog responsibilities by uncovering the losses experienced at KDPS?
Limitations
Case studies can be both descriptive and explanatory in nature, depending
upon the research question the researcher is attempting to answer. In the present
study, the case study method was used for both explanatory and descriptive
purposes. The question arises as to what can be learned from the study of a single
case. Stake (1998) stated it can be used to study the particular or uniqueness of a
situation, to explain issues, and to tell a story. Vaughan (1992) argued that it can be
used to elaborate and develop theory. In the present study, my goal was to address all
of these issues.
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Two important questions arise in using the case study method. The first is the
generalizability o f the events that occurred to KDPS to other police departments.
Have other police departments suffered in similar ways at the hands of computer
vendors? Did the institutional conditions created by the federal government lead to
the creation o f social harms in other jurisdictions? The second important issue has to
do with my personal involvement in the case and the possible biases this might
introduce into my interpretation of the events that occurred at KDPS. Am I able to
tell the story in a sound, scientifically responsible manner? Are my observations
valid and reliable given my closeness to the events as they unfolded?
Can the events that happened at KDPS be generalized to other law
enforcement agencies? A review of some newspaper headlines shows that the
problems with computer vendors that KDPS encountered are not unique.
On January 14, 2005, the New York Times reported that “FBI May Scrap
Vital Overhaul for Computer System” (January 14, 2005). Likewise on the same day,
the Washington Post proclaimed, “FBI Rejects Its New Case File Software; Database
Project Has Cost Nearly $170 Million” (January 14, 2005). These headlines refer to
the fact that in 2005, the FBI scrapped a $170 computer system that was supposed to
link all the FBI agents in the world together through one central system. They also
dropped the computer system’s vendor. The story behind these headlines bears some
resemblance to problems encountered by KDPS.
The FBI contracted with Science Applications International Corp (SAIC) to
develop the Virtual Case File (VCF) program, which was supposed to be a
networked case file tracking system. This system was to replace the paper system the
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FBI was using and would allow agents to go “paperless” in terms of filing reports.
Months before it was to go on-line, software tests revealed hundreds o f error reports.
Problems in the system were blamed on poor conceptualization and muddled
execution of the project. Initial blame was placed on the FBI, but the problems were
not due to the FBI alone. An open-ended contract with few controls allowed SAIC to
collect millions o f dollars as the project grew larger and more complex, even though
the FBI realized that the SAIC software would never work properly. An unreleased
audit report completed in 2005 obtained by the Washington Post disclosed “the
system delivered by SAIC was so incomplete and unusable that it left the FBI with
little choice but to scuttle the effort altogether” {Washington Post, August 19, 2006).
The FBI story has all the elements of state-corporate crime—an institutional
environment that was ripe for exploitation by computer vendors, an organizational
environment lacking the expertise to implement a $171 million computer system,
and interactional aspects that allowed for the project to continue even though it was
doomed.
This media attention and state-corporate crime was not unique to the FBI.
The problems other local police departments have had in implementing computer
systems have also made headlines. In Glasgow, Scotland, The H erald reported,
“Revealed the GBP on Computer Police Bungle. The System is Three Years Late.”
The Milwaukee Journal in September 2005 reported, “$7 Million and 6 Months
Behind, Still Failing to Deliver” about the Milwaukee’s Police Department’s $7
million computer system replacement. On October 29, 2005, the News proclaimed
“Buffalo Police Trying to Work Out Glitches in New Computer System.” Finally, on
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October 22, 2005, the Boston Herald declared “Computer Revamp Puts Byte on
Crime Information Flow, Released with ‘Glitches.’”
Newspaper headlines reveal only the tip of the iceberg. In C hiefInformation
Officer (CIO) Business Technology Leadership, a periodical published for public
sector IT managers, an article in its May 15, 2006 edition revealed, “Federal IT
Flunks Out.” This article details “patterns of failure” in eight major federal computer
projects that are either dead, grossly over budget, incomplete, or grossly behind
schedule plus being over budget. For example, the Department of the Interior spent
$63 million on a $120 million project to consolidate its financial system. That project
failed and is being considered for another start date. The FAA has spent $11.4 billion
on an $8.3 billion budgeted project to upgrade air traffic control computers. In all,
there were sixteen projects reviewed in the article— four were on schedule while the
other twelve are 1-13 years behind schedule. The FAA is reassessing their practices
and investments. The Department of Homeland Security budgeted $229 million to
upgrade eight legacy financial systems. After spending $18 million, they realized the
project was a failure and terminated it. The project is scheduled to be resurrected at
an undisclosed date. The rest of the projects do not get any better. Millions of
taxpayer dollars have been spent on federal-level computer projects over the last
several years for systems that have not been completed, are grossly oyer budget, and
are doomed to fail.
I know of two other examples that have not been publicized but are just as
damaging, and they both involve DM Data. Plantation (Florida) Police Department
(PPD) invested approximately $5.5 million with DM Data in March-April of 2002.
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They contracted with DM Data for CAD, RMS, and MPCs, but never received any
services before DM Data walked away from the contract. The company that
purchased DM Data, Prolease, Inc., did not purchase the rights to PPD’s contract.
PPD was left with no computer system and were having to run dispatch using paper
cards to track calls-for-service. The last time I heard from the IT people at PPD was
in 2005, and they had an open lawsuit against DM Data. They were trying to find
Dorfman, who was allegedly hiding in a small town in Minnesota (personal
communication with the Deputy Chief of PPD and members of PPD’s IT staff).
The other department, an east coast city that does not want to be identified
until it finds another computer system, was a DM Data user and was actually testing
the IPS product when I talked to the project manager. She shared many similar
horror stories pertaining to her dealings with DM Data. She stated the department
was going to sue DM Data for failing to provide a functional system, but gave up
when the company had been sold several times and no one could locate Dorfman.
The project manager stated they struggled for years trying to cope with the
deficiencies o f the DM Data product, were looking for another system, but did not
have adequate funding (personal communication 2005).
Clearly, KDPS is not alone in computer project implementation difficulties,
nor in its problems in dealing with vendors. If the FBI enters into a project and loses
$171 million because of an inept vendor and inadequate project management, how
can we take smaller police agencies to the task for having similar problems? While
this study cannot state with certainty that state-corporate crime occurs in other
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agencies, a review of available literature does point to a “pattern of failure” beyond
the KDPS case.
The second limitation of the present study is my involvement with the
computer systems projects as a KDPS employee and its potential impact on the
research findings. I was not an impartial participant in the computer implementation
process. I was actively and passionately involved in what took place—active in terms
o f project management, and passionate in terms of desperately wanting both
computer systems to work flawlessly. Some would argue that this close involvement
may bias my perception o f what took place and may cause me to be less than
objective in assessing the role of the vendors in the production of social harm.
Stake (1998) writes of the notion of knowledge transfer, in that knowledge
from the researcher can be transferred to the reader. Moreover, it is about
transferring the story or telling the story. No one was in a better position than I to tell
the story. As a scholar o f political economy, criminology, policing, and sociological
theory, I bring an important interpretation that those in KDPS, or those outside of
KDPS, cannot bring. My interpretation is based on my academic training and my
direct participation in the case. I was the only trained sociologist/criminologist
involved in the project. I brought a unique perspective to the story-telling, and to the
explanation of state-corporate crime that occurred at KDPS.
Feminist field research methods indicate that standpoint knowledge is an
inevitable part of research. In addition, writing about positionality and
representation, they share the notion that being the “insider” often brings important
insights to the study. This approach

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

224
encompasses feminist and postmodern challenges to the legacy of Western,
predominantly male, scholarship. These challenges make problematic the
relationship between the researcher and the subject of research, or the knower
and the known. In this problematic, the identity of the researcher, defined by
social, historical, and political position, is understood to profoundly influence
the production of knowledge—the researcher’s interpretation or
representation o f the subject o f study. Knowledge is always, at some level,
defined by the positionality of the scholar. (Scott and Shah 1993:93)
There is nothing reported in the present study that cannot be verified by reviewing
email messages, other correspondence, or official documents. The only information
that cannot be reviewed is the telephone calls and personal conversations I had with
other individuals. Since these make up such a small part of the story, the removal of
this information would change little in this study. The notions of triangulation,
comparison, and other methodological precepts have been closely followed and
adhered to in this study.
My involvement, in fact, is a necessary part of the story and key to the
sociological/criminological importance of this work. The insider story, in this matter,
is paramount to the results of this study being disclosed as a warning to other police
departments. A conversation took place between myself and one of the computer
technicians at KDPS, who at the time of this research, was still working at KDPS,
and had worked for me for several years. He is a former federal employee, who has
friends working in the federal government in IT positions. They report that the
“story” behind the FBI’s debacle goes much deeper than a failure of the contractor.
The three levels o f the catalysts for action were apparently present in that situation.
Essentially, the deviance and maneuvering between organization and individuals was
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the similar to that reported here. The point is, however, that there is always more to
tell, always more to learn from the “insider” on issues such as these.
Future Research
This research sets the stage for future work in both explicating what was
found here, along with further elaboration of the theory of state-corporate crime. As
Kauzlarich and Matthews (2006) have pointed out, most work in state-corporate
crime has been focused at the institutional and organizational levels, and thus more
work needs to be done at the interactional level of analysis. The present study, for the
first time, actually focused on the interactional aspects of the theory, and the
relationships between the individuals involved as they were impacted by the other
institutional and organizational factors. This level should be examined in even more
depth in future research. In-depth interviews with the agents involved in the KDPS
case would, and could, add further richness to the story. In addition, I drew some
subjective conclusions with respect to the actions of those involved at the
organizational level, specifically pertaining to the deviant actions of vendor
representatives as being motivated by bonuses and getting contract awards.
However, both o f the IPS sales representatives, Mike Feeney and Taylor Edge, told
me about the importance of “landing KDPS” as a customer. So, this is not mere
supposition. Conversations with Moyer were more guarded on her part. She was
methodical, detail-oriented, and “closed-mouthed” concerning the operations o f IPS,
and specifically about her pay incentives. Her actions, however, indicated clearly
that she was driven by organizational goals, which were her goals. The importance of
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the deadlines and implementation of “go-live” dates were extremely important and
apparent during our conversations. Thus, conducting systematic in-depth interviews
with key participants in this case would further enrich and offer evidence for
conclusions drawn in this study.
The issues o f external validity raised in the present study could be addressed
in future work by conducting a survey with a representative sample of police
departments around the nation. Using a survey, one could ascertain how widespread
the state-corporate crime identified in this study has been, and whether the
institutional, organizational, and interactional factors were similar in producing
social harms like those in the KDPS case. For example, top executives could be
surveyed to determine the extent to which certain institutional-level conditions
influenced them to push automation in their departments. Was it the justice
department’s campaign for community policing, COMPSTAT, or simply the
availability of federal money that pushed them to adopt computer information
systems? Or was it the support of the professional associations for computerization
o f the profession that led them to believe that it was an important endeavor? A
survey instrument could be designed to capture this information.
Praxis
One important aspect of this work that has not been touched upon as yet is
the impact of the social harm that resulted from state-corporate crime at KDPS, and
the importance o f getting this word out to prevent similar social harm from
happening elsewhere. Somehow the wall between academe and the police profession
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must be broken down to allow for the creation of safeguards to stop this type of
state-corporate crime activity. While I have used the theory from the academic side
to provide explanations of the social harms that occurred in the KDPS case, it is my
professional voice that needs to be used to prevent the fleecing of police and
taxpayers, and deaths that can potentially occur when CAD systems fail. In
particular, the deceptive practices of computer vendors must be exposed and stopped.
Whether this takes the form o f educating the police profession as to the problems
that may be encountered with computer vendors as found in this study, or adoption
o f guidelines, regulations, SOPs, or laws, or both, something needs to be done. As
the Seaskate Report (1998) acknowledges, the police profession is a fragmented
group of independently operated agencies, all with the same focus, but with many
different levels of expertise, knowledge, funding, and constraints which impact their
ability to implement and maintain large computer systems.
How might one do this? A review of the popular periodicals of the
profession—e.g., Law Enforcement, Law Enforcement Technology, Law and Order,
Government Technology, The Police Chief, The F B I Bulletin, Mission Control—
points to the benefits of computerization. While adoption of computer information
systems by police departments has many benefits, the difficulties with
implementation of such systems must be communicated. Implementation of these
systems is complex, and the actions of the vendors are motivated by making money,
not the satisfaction of the department. As the Washington Post pointed out in the FBI
story,
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SAIC reaped more than $100 million as the project became bigger and more
complicated, even though its software never worked properly. The company
continued to meet the bureau’s requests, accepting payments despite clear
signs that the FBI’s approach to the project was badly flawed, according to
people who were involved in the project or later reviewed it for the
government. (Washington Post, August 19, 2006)
The goals of the vendors, as individuals, have nothing to do with the adequacy and
functionality o f the systems the police are buying.
As noted above, I do not understand the lack of the watchdog activity on the
part of the media. How is it they are not disclosing the fleecing of taxpayers and loss
o f life that happened as a result of state-corporate crime at KDPS? There is yet
another botched computer project involving the Kalamazoo County government that
has not been exposed in the local media. In this instance, with good intentions in
mind, county government officials (IT, the prosecutor, and law enforcement) set
about computerizing and attempting to connect all the criminal justice databases in
the county together, so information may be shared among all the county criminal
justice agencies. An admirable goal, but the system was plagued with problems
similar to those experienced by KDPS, and a project has never been completed.
Kalamazoo County paid Motorola, Inc. millions of dollars for a planned
connection between disparate computer systems. Demonstrations indicated the
potential for an end product that connected the systems, and the appearance that
Motorola could complete the project. It was not to be. Motorola was never able to
produce the end product, and both parties walked away from the project before
completion. Motorola could simply not make it work. Crashing databases, broken
promises, and the slow realization that the project would not work characterized the
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project. Deadlines were missed, the court system’s databases were impacted
negatively during testing, and the county continued to pour money into the project in
hopes o f resurrecting and completing the implementation. The project never reached
the implementation phase. As of this writing, Motorola, the provider o f the
computerized telephone system used by KDPS, is going back on promises it made
for the use of their computerized system.
Vendor representatives’ explanations for these problems, supported by their
programmers, is that these systems are so complex that problems are bound to occur,
and they are not the result of deviance, but rather due to the complexity and
requirements for customization by their customers. I use a simplistic analogy when
retorting these claims. To me, there is nothing more complex than a big screen
television set, or a large plasma screen television. If I were to spend over a thousand
dollars on such a device, and brought it home, and it did not work, I would return it
for replacement. I purchased a complex piece of technology that did not function as
purchased. The answer is to return it and get another one, or go to another supplier.
The suppliers of big screen televisions have learned this, and therefore do not ship
their product without it working properly, knowing it must satisfy the customer. Why
is the situation different with computer vendors when police departments are their
customers? Why do the police accept a piece of complex technology that does not
work instead of holding computer vendors accountable?
What is important now is that the results of this study are made known to
those in the policing field. The profession must know what is occurring and that they
are also part of the problem, and part of the solution. It is time to correct the wrongs,
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stop wasting taxpayers’ money, and stop placing the public in harm’s way when
CAD systems do not work. This will not be an easy task, as bad news does not sell.
The first step is the publication of results of this research in scholarly journals,
followed up with professional periodicals, along with contacting the popular media.
Somehow, the media needs to get involved because Kalamazoo is not the only city
suffering the loss of millions of dollars at the hands of computer vendors, as well as
the potential for the loss of lives.
Conclusion
This study started with a casual conversation about the problems encountered
at KDPS with computer systems, and my experiences through the implementation
phase o f the IPS contract. The more we discussed it, the more we believed that it was
a case o f state-corporate crime. As the proposal came together and the project
became serious, there were two particular goals that I wanted to accomplish. The
first was to use the Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998), Kramer, Michalowski, and
Kauzlarich (2002), and Michalowski and Kramer (2006) framework to not only
explain what occurred, but elaborate and expand the use of the theory beyond the
common macro-level approach. Not only was this accomplished, but a close review
reveals that the theory, as well as the integrated approach examining multiple
catalysts at multiple levels, provided for a deeper understanding of what occurred
and how multiple levels of examination prove invaluable. As criminology students,
we are taught criminogenic theories singularly. On the other hand, police
professionals know intuitively that there are many issues at hand that cause crime or
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lead to criminal behavior. The theoretical approach used in the present study
combines the ability to explain what occurred using multiple theories, multiple
intersections, and multiple levels.
This study also incorporates micro-level interactional theories that have not
been used in the explanation of agents’ interactions in previous work on statecorporate crime. Not only that, a review of the literature disclosed no previous use of
a dramaturgical approach for the explanation of state-corporate crime at the
interactional level. My experience as the project manager led to the playing out of
o r

many dramas

and the use of stages as a means of interacting and playing out

complex situations. This also occurred at many levels, from the employees to the
supervisor/managers, to the top executives at all three agencies.
One final situation that played out during the implementation phase o f the
IPS system occurred that lends support to a dramaturgical analysis. After the IPS
servers were installed, one of the KDPS computer technicians discovered a strange
«

batch file running on several of the city servers, which included the five IPS servers.
Subsequent investigation disclosed one of the city IT system administrators had
installed a batch file program on over 183 city computers, including most of the
city’s servers and the IPS servers. This program would run at 5:10 p.m. on all
computers and would use the unused portion of the processor on the computer. For
instance, if the user was still at work, after 5:00 p.m. was key here, using 20% of the

-if

I am not using this term in the slang sense, but rather as Goffman (1959, 1974) and
Manning (1977, 1997, 2003) use it to explain the face-to-face encounters clouded in
the use o f front and back stage performances.
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processor on the computer, this batch file would use the other 80% when it started to
run and not free the 80% up until the process was over. I asked the individual, who
was working for me while I was interim IT director, what could cause the slow down
o f computers at 5:10 p.m., because many of the employees working late experienced
a slow down on their computers between 5:10 and 5:15, affecting email and even
word processing. He denied knowing anything about it. We later found out he was
running a program searching for extraterrestrial radio signals with a program called
SETI-At-Home, a program from the University of California-Berkley, that searched
for radio waves of signals sent from outer space. This program intrigued him because
it allowed for the “clustering” of computers to search the radio waves. The internet
web page kept track of the activities of each user. He apparently was ranked number
two or three in the country for “clustering” computers and searching the radio waves.
His employment was subsequently terminated. The point is he continued to use
fronts and stages to keep people from discovering what he was doing, even though
he was questioned about it. Another employee, who was disciplined for his role in
the matter, knew of the program and what the other employee was doing, but
believed the other employee when he said it was not causing any problems on the
city-wide system. While this incident was not a contributing factor in the problems
we encountered with the computer vendors, nor directly related to system
implementation, it is an example o f the use of dramaturgy to explain deviant
abhorrent behavior.
The second reason I wanted to conduct this study was to reveal the social
harms that occur when police departments adopt computer information systems
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under current institutional, organizational, and interactional conditions. The results
o f this study suggest that police administrators must do more to protect their
departments and the citizens they serve against the self-serving actions of computer
vendors, and ensure they have staff members who have the technical training and
knowledge to deal with computer vendors and implement these complex computer
systems. Secondly, the federal government needs to establish some sort of safeguards
to avoid waste of taxpayers’ money and even the loss of citizens’ lives. If the federal
government is going to continue to support and encourage theses endeavors, it must
put protective measures in place to avoid these losses and other harms that are
occurring. Third, there must be some movement, either by the police profession or
by the media, to expose these social harms to the public. There must be an outcry to
rally the public in some form of social movement to send the message to computer
vendors that this sort o f behavior and taking advantage of the police departments
must stop. Finally, if the high-tech, large screen TV doesn’t work, take it back. The
same logic should prevail in dealings with computer vendors, programmers, and
sales representatives. I f the computer system doesn’t work, send it back for a full
refund.
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W e s te r n M ic h ig a n U n iv e r s it y
Human Subjects Institutional Review Board

Date: June 16,2006
To:

Susan Carlson, Principal Investigator
Steven Reifert, Student Investigator for dissertation

From: Amy Naugle, Ph.D., Ch
Re:

Approval not needed for protocol 06-06-14

This letter will serve as confirmation that your project “A Case Study o f State-Corporate Crime
in the Kalamazoo Department o f Public Safety” has been reviewed by the Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB). Based on that review, the HSIRB has determined that
approval is not required for you to conduct this project because you are not gathering information
about individuals. Thank you for your concerns about protecting the rights and welfare o f human
subjects.
A copy o f your protocol and a copy o f this letter will be maintained in the HSIRB files.
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Table 1
An Integrated Theoretical Model of State-Corporate Crime

LEVELS OF
ANALYSIS

CATALYSTS FOR ACTION
Opportunity

Control

Institutional
Environment

Culture of competition
Economic pressure
Organizational goals
Performance emphasis

Availability of legal means
Obstacles and constraints
Blocked goals/strain
Availability of illegal means
Access to resources

International reactions
Political pressure
Legal sanctions
Media scrutiny
Public opinion
Social movements

Organizational

Corporate culture
Operative goals
Subunit goals
Managerial pressure

Instrumental rationality
Internal constraints
Defective SOPs
Creation of illegal means
Role specialization
Task segregation
Computer, telecommunication,
and networking technologies
Normalization of deviance

Culture of compliance
Subcultures of resistance
Codes of conduct
Reward structure
Safety & quality control
Communication processes

Interactional

Socialization
Social meaning
Individual goals
Competitive individualism
Material success emphasis

Definitions of situations
Perceptions of
availability & attractiveness
of illegal means

Personal morality
Rationalizations &
techniques of neutralization
Diffusion of responsibility
Separation from
consequences
Obedience to Authority
Group think
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Motivation
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Table 2
Institutional Environment
Institutional
Environment

Motivation

Opportunity Structure

Controls

Advances in Technology
Brought on by the Space Industry
and Military

Expansion of IT through the
1980s & 1990s

No federal
guidelines or
controls

New Federalism and move from
Categorical Grants to Block Grants

Release of Crime Bill & Patriot Act No Watch
Dog Activity
by the media
Professional Associations
Started supporting and touting
No Institutional/
the benefits of IT systems
Cultural/Social
Controls

Violent Crime Control Bill of 1994
Balanced budget and period of economic
growth and stability through the 1990s.

monies

President William Clinton’s social
programs brought money back to
local governments to spend on technology
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Table 3
Organizational Catalyst for Action

Organizational
Environment

Motivation

Opportunity Structure

Controls

Competitive Corporate
Culture- Small Market
Need for new customers

Instrumental rationalityselfish goal attainment for the money
MICRS report- can do -could not

No controls existed at the organizational
level.

Goal Attainment- Bonuses
tied to deadlines

Defective SOPs- Lack of control
over employee actions
no SOPs at KDPS

Culture of compliance- KDPS personnel
were use to the fact that computers did not
work

Managerial Pressure“Reduce the Costs of
Government Services”

Communications- blocked by the use of emails
Normalization of devianceDM Data claims things were fixed
IPS shipped products with known
Defects
Computers and technologiescreated problems by lack of knowledge
by KDPS
Internal constraints- dispatchers as
computer technicians

Reward structure for vendors based on money
No penalty for vendor actions- rewarded for
persistence as KDPS always paid.
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Table 4
Interactional Catalysts for Action

Interactional
Environment

Motivation

Individual Goals- tied to
bonuses and retribution for
not meeting deadlines

O pportunity Structure

Definition of situationreplacing several systems,
urgency to replace, pressure
to implement a functional system

Individual Competitiveness
Lack of skilled KDPS computer
technicians

Controls

Personal Moralitylies, knowledge of
defective equipment
“job hunting” while
on thejob
Neutralization of
actions
Rationalization of
behavior
Obedience to
Authority
Culture of Deception
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